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SOUTHERN CONGRESSMEN AND AGRICULTURAL REFORM: 1913-1917
A SUMMARY
Between 1913 and 1917 the Democratic party enacted an 
agricultural reform programme that provided federal funds 
for agricultural education and highway improvement, estab­
lished a fiscal structure for agricultural credit, licensed 
warehouses, and regulated speculative dealings on cotton 
exchanges. These formed a major landmark in American agri­
cultural policy, influencing later legislation. As the first 
major implementation of matching funds legislation between 
the federal and state governments they determined the nature 
of future central government intervention in the economy. 
Southern initiative and support secured the passage of these 
measures.
Southern congressmen came from the class that tradition­
ally dominated Southern politics, being lawyers from agricul­
tural areas. Despite industrial growth, agriculture con­
tinued to provide the bulk of Southern wealth and to dominate 
Southern politics. As a consequence of the Populists defeat 
and the passage of the disfranchisement laws Black Belt land­
owners found their authority unchallenged. While generally 
profitable. Southern agriculture ran below its full potential 
and serious structural problems existed such as the spread of 
tenancy. Only federal legislation provided a realistic solu­
tion, the state legislatures being too inactive or impover­
ished to face the challenge.
The Democratic victory of 1912 provided Southern 
congressmen with the opportunity to aid Southern agriculture. 
The/
The South dominated the government as no region has since: 
the President and most of his cabinet had Southern connec­
tions; Southern congressmen controlled the major congress­
ional committees and formed the Democratic leadership. While 
influenced by the activities of lobbyists, these congress­
men retained a degree of independence^ voting according to 
their convictions, and not solely on the command of an 
interest group. More experienced than most congressmen 
Southern leaders ensured that the many novel and controver­
sial aspects of the reform legislation passed with the mini­
mum of amendment. They managed debate in a sympathetic and 
professional manner, defeating the efforts of New England 
and Midwestern Republicans to pass damaging amendments. As 
Woodrow Wilson took little interest in agricultural reform 
this required considerable skills on the part of Southern 
leaders. In addition to shepherding the reforms through 
Congress they had to initiate and draft the legislation. The 
agricultural reforms demonstrate Congress's ability to 
initiate and enact reform despite the presence of a charis­
matic President.
While eager to extend the functions of federal govern­
ment, most Southerners distrusted the extension of federal 
power, due to their perceived experience of the Civil War 
and Reconstruction. For federal legislation to be accept­
able to Southerners, it had to incorporate checks upon the 
federal power. In the agricultural reforms this was 
achieved by involving state governments on a matching funds 
basis. Southern leaders ensured that the state governments 
retained financial and initiatory powers thus preserving 
local/
local autonomy. Although no funds were involved in the 
financial legislation the fiscal system operated in a decen­
tralised fashion, achieving the desired aim. This accorded 
with the Southern interpretation of federal government, as 
taught by legal education, political experience, and histori­
cal circumstance. The states rights argument provided legal 
and constitutional solutions to economic and social problems 
that the Southern elite found acceptable. States rights 
could advance as well as defend the interests of the Southern 
elite, and this explains its attraction and survival after 
military defeat in 1865. This reform legislation operated 
throughout the 1920s and while guaranteeing that Southern 
agricultural life improved, it ensured that landowners were 
the only direct beneficiaries; tenants however received 
indirect benefits.
INTRODUCTION
In 1913 the majority of Americans lived on farms or 
else in small towns dependent on agricultural production: 
they lived neither in highly industrialised areas nor in 
great cities. They formed the largest lobby group in 
American politics, yet until 1913 few legislative measures 
had been enacted designed specifically to aid them. While 
almost all legislation affected the rural community in some 
way and very few politicians could afford to sponsor legis­
lation that harmed it, no legislation existed in the United 
States comparable to that in Europe where central govern­
ment actively supported the farmer. By 1917 however the 
American farmer was favoured with a body of legislation 
without equal in either its breadth or depth. It was no 
coincidence that this legislation was drafted, sponsored, 
and shepherded through Congress by the congressmen of the 
most agrarian region of the union, the South.
The reforms are most conveniently grouped under three 
headings: educational, financial and marketing legislation. 
The Smith Lever Agricultural Extension Act of 1914 and the 
Smith Hughes Vocational Education Act of 1916 comprised the 
educational reforms. The Hollis Bulkeley Federal Farm Loans 
Act of 1916 formed the main financial legislation although 
some clauses of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 directly 
influenced rural finance. The Smith Lever Federal Warehouse 
Acts of 1914 and 1916, the Shackleford Bankhead Federal 
Highways Act of 1916, and the Smith Lever Federal Cotton 
Futures Act of 1916 covered marketing.
Within/
Within the context of progressive reform, the agri­
cultural legislation was unusual in its comprehensiveness. 
While many of the social measures passedat federal level 
such as child labour regulation, workmen's compensation 
and maximum work hour legislation inter-acted, very little 
was conceived as a whole. The agricultural reforms, by 
contrast, were so conceived, the areas of each measure 
being carefully defined. Hoke Smith, the Georgian senator 
who sponsored much of the legislation, remarked at the 
beginning of the debates on the Agricultural Extension 
bill how this would be the first act of a whole programme 
that would ultimately include vocational education, public 
road improvement, the regulation of commodity exchanges 
and rural credits legislation. To these would be added 
the warehouse act as a response to the 1914 cotton crisis. 
The Democratic platform of 1912 had promised that the 
party would enact a comprehensive series of legislation 
intended to help the farmer. Considerable political skills 
ensured that very few amendments were successfully adopted 
while the bills were in Congress.
The legislation was unusual not only in its scope, but 
also in its form, as it marked the first major application 
of the principle of federal matching funds. As such, its 
importance lies not only in agricultural history but also in 
constitutional development. Several of the most important 
components of the programme employed a novel concept of 
federal and state governments acting in cooperation with 
bureaucracy; this created an important precedent for sub­
sequent reform legislation particularly during the 1930s.
Historians/
Historians have paid little attention to the legisla­
tion despite its importance both in its own right and as a 
portent of what was to come. Writers on the Wilson admin­
istration have tended to emphasise its impact on the office 
of President; its implications for American foreign policy; 
or else have focussed on the enigmatic personality of Wilson 
himself. Historians such as Arthur Link have correctly 
recognised the importance of Wilson's ideas and personality 
in adding to the power and prestige of the Presidency. By 
concentrating on such major measures as the Federal Reserve 
Act, the Underwood Simmons Tariff, the Clayton Anti Trust 
Act and a whole host of social reforms such as the La Foll­
ette Seaman's Act, the Adamson Eight Hour Act, and the 
Keating Owen Child Labor Act it has been demonstrated how 
one man with the aid of a disciplined and cohesive party 
could enact a corpus of legislation without precedent in 
United States history. New Left revisionists while por­
traying Wilson as more of a conservative than a nineteenth 
century liberal have continued to focus attention on what 
may be termed the most important reforms of the administra­
tion. They have not broadened the base of the argument: 
indeed, by playing down the importance of social reform and 
emphasising the banking and commercial reforms they have 
narrowed the ground upon which the administration is judged.
Despite the considerable scholarly effort already 
devoted to the period, large areas of the Wilson administra­
tion remain uncovered. While no one can underestimate the 
importance of the Reserve Act or the Underwood Tariff, it 
is worth remembering that they represent only the tip of° the 
iceberg;/
4iceberg; indeed they are highly untypical in providing a 
view of the duties and functions of the American politician, 
much of whose energies were expended not upon epoch making 
legislation but upon routine matters of administration and 
procedure. Infinitely less glamorous, such tasks are im­
portant if a complete picture is to be drawn of the 
American politician at work.
The agricultural reform programme cannot claim to be 
particularly sparkling legislation. Its claims to import­
ance lie neither in an inspiring and reassuring humanity, 
nor in its sweeping and decisive effect on American econo­
mic life: but in its use of conservative constitutional 
doctrine, its manipulation of the politics of greed, and 
the application of power politics within Congress. Very 
few fanfares accompanied its passage, contemporary news­
papers all but ignoring it, but it is crucial in consider­
ing the role of Congress during the progressive era. All 
the banking and commercial reforms and most of the social 
reforms were administration bills receiving the active 
support of the President, but the agricultural reforms 
were enacted largely on the initiative of congressmen. 
Wilson did not oppose the legislation, but his support was 
largely passive, the only exception to this being his 
active campaigning, albeit reluctantly, for the Federal 
Farm Loans Act. Agricultural reform did not interest 
Wilson: it passed Congress, he signed it after making vague 
remarks on the virtues of agrarian life, but that was 
really the extent of his participation. As such the agri­
cultural reform programme is a valuable reminder of 
Congress * s/
Congress's power to initiate and enact legislation; this 
has been overlooked due to an emphasis on presidential 
power during the progressive period.
While the standard works on the Wilson period mention 
the agricultural reform, few accord it much attention. 
Arthur Link in his monumental biography of Wilson mentions 
all the measures by name, and devotes space to the draft­
ing of the Federal Farm Loans Act, but inevitably views 
them as sideshows to the main events. There is no attempt 
to look at the legislation in detail, nor as a complete 
whole. The standard survey of post 1913 Southern history 
by George B. Tindall is even briefer; Tindall contents him­
self with acknowledging the existence of the legislation 
and stressing the involvement of Southern politicians. The 
underlying thesis is that by acting in this manner the 
South played an active and positive role in the life of the 
union. As this was written by a Southerner in the mid 
1960s such an attitude is understandable if hardly condon- 
able. Southerners were in the forefront of the action, but 
few attempts have been made to analyse how Southern thought 
and politics influenced reform. And the question is worth 
asking; how did Southerners, universally considered to be 
strict constructionists in constitutional argument, come to 
advocate such a constitutionally advanced doctrine as 
federal and state cooperation? The question becomes more 
puzzling with the knowledge that the most consistent oppo­
sition to the agricultural reforms came from Midwestern and 
Northeastern Republicans who argued that Southerners viola­
ted states rights and usurped the reserved power of the 
states- 1
One/
One work does attempt to relate the agricultural 
legislation to the South: Farmer Movement in the South 
1865-1933 by Theodore Saloutos. Saloutos views the 1912 
Democratic victory as the agrarian’s greatest triumph; in 
particular he considers the Underwood Tariff to represent 
the culmination of decades of agrarian protest. While 
acknowledging that the Federal Farm Loans Act did little 
to aid the tenant, Saloutos nonetheless claims that by 
1917 the agrarian dream had begun to assume reality. 
Although the New Freedom reforms did not accomplish all 
that the farmer wanted, it did allow him to survive in a 
complex, urban, industrial society. Saloutos further 
asserts that in the South the dream of the populist and the 
dream of the progressive were fundamentally the same. Plac­
ing both in a tradition of Southern radicalism stretching 
back to colonial times, he views the populists as sowing 
the seeds the progressives gathered. While identify­
ing a difference between the populist and the progressive, 
Saloutos dismisses this as merely tactical: populists 
preferred political action, whereas the progressives opted 
for "the economic formulas of old”. The populists however 
left a legacy in the agricultural legislation of the Wilson 
administration. 2
This analysis is open to question in many areas. The 
complexity of Southern rural society is underestimated: it 
is simply not accurate enough to continually talk about 
"the Southern farmer”. A simple but crucial division exist­
ed between those who owned land and the increasing number 
who did not. Important social, economic and political 
division/
division existed between and within landowners and tenantry, 
there being a world of difference between a renter and a 
cropper: a renter retained control over when and how he 
grew his crops, but a cropper did as he was told. On occa­
sions their aims could be mutually exclusive; this is 
particularly true for credit reform. While "Southern 
farmer" provides a useful label for generalising, it is 
inadequate when analysing Southern society and politics.
The least convincing part of Saloutos's argument con­
cerns the relationship between the populists and the pro­
gressives. Since Saloutos wrote his book, subsequent work 
on the populists has shown them in an entirely different 
light, Lawrence Goodwyn has portrayed them as agrarian 
radicals who attempted a complete structural reform of 
American society; they sought to destroy Northeastern fin­
ancial capitalism, and to replace it with a "cooperative 
commonwealth". Whether one accepts Goodwyn's argument that 
the populists were a nascent rural proletariate or not it 
is clear that they were not the same as the progressives. 
Their goals differed, even though they occasionally trod 
the same paths. Both made rhetorical use of the virtues of 
cooperation it is true, but they meant different things by 
this. The populists used it in an economic and social 
sense: the sub treasury plan their conception of
cooperation. This was an economic plan designed to effect 
a working alliance of urban and rural labour against 
capital; theirs was a cooperative crusade. Progressives 
employed the term in a more prosaic and bureaucratic manner, 
for they interpreted cooperation in a political and con­
stitutional sense: as the coming together of federal and 
state/
8state authorities to aid the agricultural economy. Neither 
Southern nor Midwestern congressmen uttered any eulogies of 
the populists and their dreams during the debates on the 
reform legislation; it was almost as if the Alliance had 
never been. 3
Saloutos also wrongly plays down the importance of 
post populist political activity. While few populists 
returned to the Democratic Party in the 1890s, and those who 
did such as the Virginian Mann Page did so reluctantly, 
recent studies have emphasised the vigour of Southern radical 
politics during the progressive period. James Green has 
documented the survival of populist aims amongst socialists 
in Texas and Oklahoma. In both the 1912 and the 1916 presi­
dential elections the Socialist Party candidates received 
higher percentage votes than their national averages in 
Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana and Texas, Eugene Debs receiv­
ed more votes in Florida than Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, 
These groups more truly represented the populist legacy than 
the progressives did. The tradition survived and had im­
portant success at local level, but their impact at federal 
level was negligible. 4
The agricultural reform legislation of 1913-1917 was 
largely Southern, but it was upper class Southern legisla­
tion. It came from a completely different tradition: that 
of the Democratic Party. Those who proposed it and stood to 
gain by it were not the tenants or upland farmers of the 
South, but the black belt planters who, as a result of the 
political battles of the 1890s and Reconstruction, controll­
ed Southern politics. Along with their allies of the fledg­
ling Southern commercial and industrial world, with whom 
they/
9they increasingly found common ground, they held all the 
important cards in the political stakes. Although South­
ern business stood to gain little from the agricultural 
reforms directly, the potential indirect benefits of a 
more effective, regulated, and prosperous agricultural 
sector were enormous. There would be little serious anti­
agrarian rhetoric from the commercial community.
Many groups in the South had a vested interest in the 
passage of the legislation: planters desired cheaper, more 
easily available credit; educators wanted to expand the 
agricultural colleges; and brokers longed to regulate the 
cotton exchanges. These groups were entitled to influence 
the vote of their elected representatives, and all attempt­
ed to do so. In the final analysis however, the decision 
as to whether or not a bill became law was that of the 
politician. Congressmen were not mere pawns whose sole 
functions were to ensure that a bill was constitutionally 
accurate and guided through Congress with the minimum fuss. 
They were educated men, able to make informed decisions on 
many wide spread issues not all of which related to law or 
politics o
Neither constitutional nor congressional history has 
been amongst the more fashionable branches of American 
history for a long time. Although New Left historians have 
studied legislation, they have largely ignored proceedings 
in Congress. James Weinstein in The Corporate Ideal in the 
Liberal State 1900-1918 devotes only a couple of pages to 
congressional debate when considering the legislative history 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Gabriel Kolko used the 
correspondence/
10
correspondence of top level politicians and bankers, as 
well as the editorial opinions of leading bankers' journals, 
in writing his admirable account of the Federal Reserve Act. 
He makes no direct reference to either congressional debate 
or the activities of House and Senate committees. The 
earlier work of Arthur Link used both. Kolko*s inference 
is clear: happenings in Congress were unimportant; all the 
crucial decisions had been taken and all the important 
details fixed before the bill reached the floor of the House; 
Congress merely rubber stamped the bill; and the democratic 
political process had been bypassed and betrayed. 5
While there is much truth in this argument, it would 
be a mistake to underestimate the workings of Congress 
during the Wilson presidency. Certainly it is true that 
few congressmen understood financial legislation; one repre­
sentative writing to the President described his colleagues' 
understanding of banking and commerce as "abysmal". Yet 
congressmen were not the completely unwitting stooges of 
the anonymous expert. The various government agencies and 
bureaus contributed massive, well researched and learned 
reports that when studied could hardly fail to fill in the 
necessary gaps in a congressman's knowledge. Every con­
gressman chose two or three areas to specialise in, usually 
related to committee appointments, but most had a good 
general knowledge, and their experience of state politics 
taught them how legislation worked in practice. Normal 
common sense, intuition, or party doctrine provided the 
necessary guidelines when specialised information was un­
available, but the evidence is that many congressmen went 
considerably/
11
considerably out of their way to acquire detailed informa­
tion. During the tariff debates for example Midwestern 
Republicans studied the details of how each commodity would 
be affected by the new schedules long into the night and 
early morning. The grasp held by seemingly every Southern 
politician of the intricate details of cotton marketing and 
production is astounding. Only on the most emotive of issues 
such as race did congressional debate lapse into empty 
tirades; generally it was well informed and relevant. A 
reading of congressional debates can produce not only a 
source for legislative history, but also an objective view 
of American life in the 1910s, bristling with facts and 
statistics. 6
Despite their appetite for social and economic informa­
tion the business and overriding responsibility of the 
congressman was the constitution. Congress's function and 
duty was to legislate, not report. Private and public 
bodies provided the necessary information, but this had to 
be fitted into a framework that was acceptable to the legis­
lature and the judiciary, otherwise it was interesting but 
meaningless. The task of the Democrats in accomplishing 
this was eased by their control of all branches of the 
government, and their undivided allegiance to a construc-
A
tionist view of the constitution.
It required considerable organisational skills to 
guide legislation safely through Congress. Party lines were 
tightly drawn during the Sixty Third and Sixty Fourth Con­
gresses, but even so a bill's passage could be hazardous. 
While the Democratic House managers could guarantee the 
quick and efficient approval of a bill, the situation was 
different/
12
different in the Senate. There the Democratic majority was 
only six in 1913 causing considerable problems for the 
party whips. Although the party's majority rose to sixteen 
in 1915Inconstant vigil was still required to ensure that 
no damaging amendments were successful. Furthermore, by 
virtue of their longer terms, members of the upper chamber 
were permitted a greater independence from the party espec­
ially when there was little presidential pressure to toe 
the line. Consequently, Democratic senators spoke out and 
voted against important clauses, the equivalent of which 
was rarely seen or tolerated in the House. Additionally, 
Republicans particularly from the Midwest were able to 
mount the most cohesive and effective opposition to the 
legislation in the Senate. This study therefore will pay 
greater attention to proceedings in the Senate than in the 
House.
The legislative history of the agricultural amend­
ments illustrates how easy it was for a bill to be lost 
through a procedural error or by a tactical amendment added 
by opponents. Southern congressmen were generally adept at 
handling legislation and marshalling their troops, but some 
bills were almost lost not because they were voted down, 
but due to procedural errors. The Agricultural Extension 
Act was almost referred to a House committee which would 
have successfully buried it; attempts to recall the bill 
from conference after it had passed both chambers were also 
made, which if successful would have killed the bill. An 
error by the House managers sent the Federal Highways bill 
to the wrong Senate committee, thus wasting valuable time. 
After/
13
After had been approved by both chambers, the Senate 
had to recall the Cotton Futures Act when it was noticed 
that it legalised cotton pools, and would be voided by the 
courts. While such errors owed as much to bad luck as in­
efficient management, they demonstrate that the passage of 
a bill was by no means assured once it left its committee. 
The writing of accurate legislative history therefore 
requires more than just detailing who drafted the legisla­
tion or analysing a series of roll call votes. 7
While taking note of what happened in committee, this 
study will concentrate more upon what happened on the floor 
of Congress: there are reasons for this. Traditionally the 
influence of the committee in the legislative process has 
been held to be considerable. The choice is made in 
committee between rival proposals and decisions are taken 
to pigeonhole unsuitable bills. A committee can so weigh 
down a measure with amendments that its chances of passing 
the legislature are slim; alternatively, a committee’s 
endorsement can be so strong as to reduce proceedings in 
the House and Senate to a formality. Woodrow Wilson in 
Congressional Government stated that the leaders of the 
House and Senate were the chairmen of the permanent stand­
ing committees ; and that Congress had as many leaders as 
it had subjects of legislation. 8
With the notable exception of the Federal Farm Loans 
Act however the main attempts to challenge the legislation 
were not in the committees, but in the Senate and to a 
lesser degree in the House. This presents a vivid contrast 
to other New Freedom legislation, notably the Federal 
Reserve/
14
Reserve Act. The committees involved in the agricultural 
reform tended to be headed by seasoned and strong Southern 
politicians who knew what they wanted and how to get it ; 
this was particularly true for the Senate committees on 
post offices and post roads, education and labour, and 
agriculture and forestry. The Senate banking and currency 
committee proved to be an exception to this in that its 
Democratic members were wayward and motivated more by per­
sonal concern than party loyalty. Generally though the 
committees appear to have acted in a united fashion; they 
drafted the legislation, but offered few dissenting voices. 
Democratic control over these committees was such that opp­
osition would be futile within the relative anonymity of a 
committee room. 9
It is claimed that the importance of a committee 
increases because while a bill is in committee it is most 
vulnerable to the influence of extra political bodies. 
Committee members were notorious for blindly accepting the 
opinions of expert witnesses on complex issues, but in the 
case of the agricultural reforms a considerable consensus 
existed among those who stood to gain; only really in the 
case of rural credits were congressional committees faced 
with a decision to make on which proposal should be endors­
ed. The supporters of agricultural reform took little 
interest in the constitutional details of the legislation. 
Thus, while the deans of the agricultural colleges lobbied 
for educational reforms, they offered no suggestions as to 
how the federal and state authorities should cooperate to 
accomplish this. Similarly, with the Cotton Futures Act, 
Southern/
15
Southern planters were eager to regulate the New York 
Cotton Exchange, hut they left the politicians to decide 
how this should be done. The position with the Federal 
Highways bill was slightly more complex in that the two 
main vested interests, the automobile manufacturers and the 
agriculturalists, had differing aims but both recognised 
the cardinal importance of enacting some form of legislation.
The very nature of the agricultural reforms explains 
why they were challenged more in debate than in committee.
It is not usually prudent for minorities in committee to 
voice their opposition once a bill has been reported out of 
committee; but when legislation was as novel and controver­
sial as certain of the agricultural reforms were, then the 
politician stood to gain by attacking the bill in as public 
a forum as possible, especially when the majority of his 
constituents were farmers. A Midwestern congressman knew 
that his electorate expected him to oppose a bill that 
favoured cotton producers over wheat growers; and it was 
better tactics to be reported doing this in debate rather 
than in committee. There also existed the real chance that 
an amendment in the Senate would be successful, thus delay­
ing the progress of a bill.
Most arguments centred around details. While a differ­
ence existed between both parties' general approach to agri­
cultural reform, the Republicans favouring the workings of 
the free market within a high protective tariff and the 
Democrats preferring a low tariff with compensating, support­
ive legislation, neither could afford to be seen to act 
against the rural community. While differing vigorously over 
certain clauses, they had a common interest. Thus, although 
Albert/
16
Albert Cummins of Iowa almost came to blows with James 
Vardaman of Mississippi in the Senate over agricultural ex­
tension, he made it clear that he preferred the bill as it 
stood to no bill at all.
The one important area that could only be argued in 
public debate was the constitutional correctness of a bill. 
Although the ultimate congressional arbiters on such matters 
were the committees on the judiciary, the main arguments 
were thrashed out not in committee but on the floor of the 
House or Senate. Much of what passed for learned constitu­
tional discourse was mere verbiage intended to cloud the 
issue or impress the ignorant, but most arguments were rele­
vant, informed, and necessary if a bill was to have any life 
after it left the Capitol. Furthermore, most congressmen 
were lawyers and as such thought in legalistic terms; the 
constitution mattered, both to those claiming the heritage 
of Hamilton, and those who claimed the heritage of Jefferson.
Southern constitutional thought greatly influenced the 
agricultural reform programme. Yet there is no inherent 
contradiction between the Southern states rights doctrine 
and the endorsing of centralising legislation. A construc­
tionist did not oppose the growth of the federal government 
per se; he only opposed it when it seemed to threaten the 
position of the state. When economic and political gains 
could be coupled with an acceptable extension of central 
government, the attractions were considerable. States rights 
arguments could be employed not only to protect the Southern 
elite, as they were on racial questions, but also in a posi­
tive manner to advance the position of the elite within the 
South. As such, states rights was not only a defensive 
doctrine/
17
doctrine, but also a doctrine of power. It averted dan­
gerous and unwanted changes and promoted the aims and ends 
of upper class Southerners within their own constituencies; 
based firmly upon constitutional precedent it formed a 
remarkably durable and effective doctrine.
Southern historians have devoted considerable time and 
effort in defending their native region. Demonstrating 
that the South has a liberal tradition comparable to other 
regions, they have been aided by the realisation that the 
North is as racist as the South: no longer is a white 
supremacist doctrine seen as the sole indicator of an 
aberrant region. States rights however has proved a con­
siderable embarrassment to liberal Southerners, for while 
they accept it as a vital component of Southern political 
thought, they also sense it to have racist and social over­
tones that worked against long term Southern development. 
Consequently, there appears to have been an almost sub­
conscious effort to play down the doctrine, or else to dis­
miss it as a quaint Jeffersonian folk memory with little 
relevance to economic realities. This is particularly true 
of historians of the post bellum South. John S. Ezell, for 
example, claimed that Andrew Johnson could have accomplished 
much if only he had not been "fettered to a belief in 
states rights". Similarly, in comparison to the progressive 
and business orientated policies of the Southern Republi­
cans in the 1870s, the Democrats' states rights policy was 
"archaic". 10
The best examples concern Southern opposition to the 
Keating Owen Federal Child Labor Act of 1916. This accord­
ing to Tindall was based upon mere "constitutional scruples"; 
yet/
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yet Tindall omits to mention that these ’’scruples" were 
proved correct in 1919 when the Supreme Court voided the 
act. Dewey Grantham also fails to mention this when 
attempting to explain away Hoke Smith's embarrassingly 
illiberal vote against child labour regulation when it 
would be thought that the biographer should be noting his 
subject’s legal scholarship. Link grants that Southern 
politicians were sincere in their constitutional beliefs, 
but implies that these beliefs led them erroneously to vote 
against the most progressive measure of the era. Yet, as 
Arden Lea has noted, the Keating Owen Act was aimed at only 
a small part of one industry: the cotton manufacturers of 
the Southern Piedmont. Southern opposition therefore was 
not only constitutionally accurate and proper, but econo­
mically justified. 11
States rights doctrine cannot be dismissed lightly 
when considering the actions of Southern congressmen: its 
logic and language permeated the most unlikely of topics. 
While not the sole preserve of the South or the Democratic 
party, Southerners used it more constructively, inter­
preting its implications differently from those in the Mid­
west or New England. Southern law schools placed a strong­
er emphasis on the position of the state within the union 
than did legal teachers in the North. In the 1910s, South­
ern hagiology of the Civil War and Reconstruction reached 
its nostalgic and emotional peak as a new generation adopt­
ed the garb of the lost cause, thus adding an appeal to 
states rights that was non existent elsewhere. The 
doctrine's main strength however lay not in its academic 
traditions, its emotional appeal, or its political useful­
ness , /
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ness, but In its capacity as a problem solver.
While states rights did not solve all the problems 
facing the Southern elite, it nonetheless appeared to be 
better than any alternative. It did not address serious 
structural problems in the Southern economy or society, but 
these were hardly pressing problems to the Southern elite 
in the 1910s; the chance of a lower class white challenge 
had been eliminated in the 1890s; the blacks had been ex­
cluded from effective politics; economists could point to 
the spread of tenancy as a serious structural problem, but 
landowners made too great a profit from the system to see 
it as such; but above all, the 1910s were years of growth 
in the South and there seemed little reason to change what 
appeared to be a successful dogma. The states rights doc­
trine allowed the South to focus on a relatively narrow 
range of problems, that is those that could be expressed 
in constitutional terms, but this narrow focus permitted 
Southerners to become adept as solving them. These were 
the only problems that the Southern upper class perceived 
as mattering: how do we maintain white supremacy?; how can 
we improve our agricultural practices?; how can we encour­
age and protect our industries?; how can we play a full 
part in the national life?; and how can we improve condi­
tions within the South while maintaining our own dominance? 
Southern elites perceived these problems as solvable by the 
legalistic postulate of states rights working through the 
established, federal, political system. States rights 
retained its vitality and relevance not because it was 
romantically linked with Pickett and his brave Virginians, 
although/
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although that was important, but because the Southern elite 
perceived it as being applicable to concrete problems, for 
without this relevance states rights would have been rapid­
ly discarded. 12
Southern elites had long perceived states rights as 
providing acceptable solutions to social and economic pro­
blems. Arthur Bestor has shown how pro slavery groups in 
the 1850s used states rights as a constitutional argument 
to both defend and advance slavery. The descendants of the 
ante bellum politician used the argument in a similar fash­
ion. States rights could be employed to bar the federal 
supervision of elections thus keeping blacks in an inferior 
position; it could also permit economic progress by attack­
ing the federal government's constitutional right to regul­
ate commerce. But states rights did not create a stagnant 
South surrounded by impenetrable barriers of constitutional 
long windedness: for such a doctrine would soon become 
bankrupt and discredited. Rather states rights permitted 
advance and a certain degree of change; but as it placed 
the responsibility for this on the state government it en­
sured that any change would be closely monitored and mod­
ulated by the elite with little risk of outside interfer­
ence. And it was this ability to allow, and even promote, 
change,even though this involved the federal government, 
that guaranteed states rights a vital and active life long 
after the South's military defence of the argument had 
failed.
The problem regarding agricultural reform was simple: 
Southern agriculture was technologically backward, subject 
to wildly varying fortunes, and although generally profit­
able/
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able it continually ran below its full potential. South­
ern landowners, particularly in the Black Belt counties, 
wanted reforms that would regulate marketing procedures, 
aid agricultural education and research, and place South­
ern agriculture on a sound financial base. Unfortunately, 
such reforms were impossible either within their own com­
munities or states. The Southern state legislatures were 
too poor, too inefficient, too inactive and in the case of 
rural credits, an increasingly inappropriate level for re­
form. Additionally, as state legislation would inevitably 
mean an increase in state property taxation, landowners 
were reluctant to press too hard for state reform. 13
Federal legislation represented the best solution. 
States rights was conceived in federal terms, and Southern 
elites were experienced in national as well as regional 
government; but the federal government represented a double 
edged sword. While its treasuries were full and tempting, 
the generation who controlled the South in the 1910s viewed 
the national authority with suspicion. It is ironical that 
the group most identified with state autonomy should have 
had, through Reconstruction, the greatest experience of a 
strong national authority, and Southerners in the 1910s per­
ceived this as having been a greater calamity than defeat 
in the Civil War. The federal troops had left the South by 
1877, but for the next thirty years Southern politics would 
be dominated by attempts to restore the political system of 
the slave South. This work was accomplished by the 1910s, 
but the South continued to fiercely resist any proposed ex­
tension of the national authority.
The/
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The states rights argument does not completely ex­
plain the story of the agricultural reform programme, nor 
does it entirely explain the behaviour of all Southern 
congressmen, but it goes a long way to revealing why South­
ern congressmen drafted legislation the way they did, and 
how they defended it in debate. This was national reform: 
it affected Northern and Western farmers as well as South­
erners. Although Southern politicians framed, defended, 
shepherded and enacted the legislation they had to remember 
the demands of other regions. New England was heavily in­
volved in the drafting of the Federal Farm Loans Act, the 
only reform not sponsored by a Southerner, but it is not­
able that the constitutional defence of the bill was led by 
Southerners, and passed by Southern votes.
Nor would it be wise to discount entirely any human­
itarian motivation on the part of Southern congressmen. The 
study of how elite groups think and act in politics invar­
iably results in a cynical and ultimately pessimistic view 
of democratic politics and history. But not all elites are 
malevolent, and not all members of the elite have their 
motivation in the politics of power. The Smith Lever Agri­
cultural Extension Act was a disgraceful measure in many 
aspects: Southerners ensured that its appropriation was 
deliberately balanced to favour the South at the expense of 
the North and West; one clause secured the exclusion of 
Southern blacks from any direct benefits; and the Senate 
debates produced some of the most virulent racist speeches 
by the South during the Wilson administration. Yet Hoke 
Smith hoped that one clause of the bill would improve the 
quality/
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quality of life for farm women, a hitherto neglected group, 
by promoting the teaching of domestic science. This pro­
vision was advanced in terms of contemporary social thought, 
the very real plight of farm women being ignored by fashion­
able progressive reform.
States rights provided the South with the solution of 
achieving national reform while keeping the federal authori­
ties at bay. Thus, reform was permissible. Southern con­
gressmen accomplished this through matching funds legislation 
involving the cooperation of the state and federal govern­
ments. The states rights doctrine however demanded that 
power should remain with the state legislatures, the main 
seat of Southern elite power, and not the federal authori­
ties. Despite the veto held by federal agencies over pro­
posals made under matching funds legislation. Southern con­
gressmen ensured that the vital initiatory powers and fin­
ancial control remained with the states. Southerners there­
fore accomplished improvements while reconciling an increase 
in federal authority with states rights doctrine.
This study does not claim to be a contribution to the 
history of ideas. Rather it attempts to show how one group 
applied a doctrine to a particular problem. As such it 
suggests that a re-evaluation of the states rights argument 
in Southern tradition is necessary; Southerners were not 
"fettered" to states rights, neither was it "archaic".
Rather than hindering or blocking change, it moulded, per­
mitted and controlled reform. While subsequent generations 
may regret its limitations, the agricultural reform pro­
gramme was radical within the context of both constitutional 
development and Southern politics and society.
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CHAPTER I
SOUTHERN POLITICS AND CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT
The Democratic victory of 1912 returned to government 
a party that had held for only eight of the forty
seven years since the Civil War, It heralded the first 
effective return to power of the South since 1861, Admin­
istering the oath of office to the Virginian born Woodrow 
Wilson on 4th March 1913 was Chief Justice Edward Douglas 
White, an ex Confederate officer. The rebellious South 
was vindicated. Commentators considered the whole "flavor 
and color" of events in Washington to have been Southern 
on that March day, even though the election had also been 
a victory for William Jennings Bryan and the West, Some 
writers were disturbed by the new administration's identi­
fication with the South, but most were enthusiastic. One 
considered that the South's control of the government 
would at last break down sectionalism; and that this would 
be but one of the many benefits that would come from the 
new Democratic administration, 1
Yet, just as Wilson's victory had been an aberration 
allowed only by the split Republican vote, so the Southern 
return represented a deviation. The Southern political 
system differed from that of the North or the West, as did 
its economy. This created economic and social problems 
that no other region had to contend with; this had politi­
cal implications for the union. The predominant trend in 
late nineteenth century American government had been 
towards increased authority particularly at national level 
The/
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The principlesof Alexander Hamilton held sway in the court 
of Theodore Roosevelt. Now the union was to be governed 
by a party committed electorally and historically to 
Jeffersonian states rights. The Southern Democratic 
triumph clearly meant a change from the business orienta­
ted, Northeastern Republican rule of earlier years.
Southern politicians however were generally respons­
ible men, well educated and well versed in politics as the 
art of what is possible. They would not take a demagogic 
revenge on either the North or business. How Southern 
politicians reacted with regard to agricultural reform will 
be related in later chapters; this chapter will attempt to 
describe the political and intellectual context in which 
these men made their decisions. This involves considering 
two distinct areas. The first will be a look at Southern 
politicians themselves, how they operated in Congress and 
in the South, and what groups attempted to influence and 
win their votes. The second concerns the theoretical and 
intellectual background of a politician's behaviour and how 
this affected his thinking.
The extent of Southern influence on the Wilson admin­
istration cannot be underestimated; it permeated every level 
of government. The President himself was strongly sympathe­
tic to the South. Many of his formative years and all his 
professional career had been spent outside the South, but 
the memories of a Virginian and South Carolinian boyhood 
were important to Wilson, Viewing these with an increased 
nostalgia/
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nostalgia,Wilson became fond of declaring that the South 
was the only part of the world where nothing had to be 
explained to him. His personal ties with the South were 
strengthened by his Georgian wife, Ellen Louise Axson. 
However, as Link has pointed out, Wilson was Southern in 
more than just sentiment: in his attitude towards women 
and his belief in racial inequality Wilson was Southern to 
the core. He had a deep love of community, family and a 
"personal identification with the living generation of the 
dead". Wilson saw himself as the force that could heal 
the wounds of the Civil War and bring the South back into 
national life. One of the happiest circumstances of his 
election, he said, was that he became the instrument, "the 
innocent instrument of bringing about the end of the old 
feeling that the Southerner was not of the same political 
breed and purpose as the rest of American citizens". 2
Deeply aware of Southern strength in Congress, Wilson 
had worried about the geographical balance of his cabinet, 
hoping not to offend any other region. Despite his con­
cerns a strong Southern bias was the most obvious feature 
of his cabinet. Josephus Daniels, secretary of the navy, 
was a North Carolina newspaper editor; Albert Burleston, 
postmaster general, had been Wilson’s Texan campaign 
manager; David Houston, secretary of agriculture, came 
from the border state of Missouri, but was born and educa­
ted in North Carolina, Additionally, two members brought 
in to represent the Northeast, J.C. Reynolds the attorney 
general and William Gibbs McAdoo the secretary of the 
treasury, had been born in Georgia and Tennessee respect­
ively. The influence of the Texan Colonel Edward House 
over/
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over Wilson was also important. House had already turned 
down a cabinet post, not because of any lack of ambition, 
but in order to have more direct access to presidential 
power. He was the most direct route to Wilson for many 
politicians and businessmen. Although not all that con­
cerned with agricultural reform, House was an important 
source of advice and support for Wilson; furthermore the 
new secretary of agriculture owed his position to House's 
patronage. 3
Wilson's concern for the South was compounded by the 
political debt that he owed the region. His victory had 
not been decisive; he was the first minority President since 
Lincoln, and one of the very few in American history. In 
terms of the popular vote, the only state, outside the South 
where he polled a majority vote over Taft and Roosevelt was 
Arizona. For a second term to become a reality, Wilson had 
to broaden his appeal throughout the union, and also protect 
his base in the South.
Southern machine politicians had been unenthusiastic 
about Wilson at the 1912 Baltimore Convention. Their choice 
was Champ Clark of Kentucky, the speaker of the House of 
Representatives and a well known conservative. Wilson's 
liberal record as the governor of New Jersey combined with 
his clipped academic tones alienated the stolid professional 
politicians of the South: even Virginia voted against his 
nomination. Wilson did have support among the Southern 
Democrats, but the many enthusiastic Wilson clubs were never 
influential within the state parties, and would be soundly 
defeated in the patronage scramble after the election. None­
theless, once Wilson won the nomination, the South swung in 
behind/
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behind the party banner. Some suspicions remained, but 
these soon disappeared when Wilson announced that he would 
introduce racial segregation in federal departments. 4 
The Democratic control of Congress began in the 1910 
election when the 47 member Republican majority in the 
House was turned into a 67 member Democratic lead. This 
truly stunning transformation was built upon in 1912 when 
the Democratic majority increased to 164. Of the 291
Democrats in the House, 120 were Southern, by far the larg­
est regional bloc vote. As already alluded to though, the 
Democratic grip on the Senate was less certain, and party 
managers had to maintain tight discipline and rely upon the 
support of others. The South however had a relatively 
louder voice in the Senate than in the House: 26 of the 51
Democrats were from the South, 5
More important than this impressive strength on 
Congress’s floors was the control held by the South over the 
House and Senate committees. According to one disgruntled 
Republican journalist, this was the most depressing feature 
of the new Congress: "the leading members of most committees 
will be from the most reactionary Democratic members". The 
seniority system allowed Southerners precedence over their 
Northern and Western colleagues in the allocation of 
committee chairmanships. In the important Senate committees 
where many of the battles of the New Freedom would be waged, 
twelve of the fourteen committees were headed by Southerners. 
The only important committees that Southerners did not chair 
were agriculture and interoceanic canals and interstate 
commerce. In the House, the South chaired eleven of the 
thirteen/
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thirteen standing committees, although control of the House 
committees was less vital than control of the Senate comm­
ittees. The relative security of re-election possessed by 
most Southerners gave them not only the length of service 
needed to chair a committee, but also the experience necess­
ary to understand the workings of that committee. Congress 
was increasingly dealing with complicated legislation that 
required not only a constitutional framework, but also 
considerable technical understanding of the problem. Only 
with this could legislation be effectively framed or chall­
enged; and this came only with experience. 6
The Sixty Third and Sixty Fourth Congresses were novel 
in American political development up to 1913 in that the 
role of party, and the function of party leaders, was 
heightened. Control over the traditionally loose American 
coalition parties was asserted by party managers in a 
manner similar to that of the whips in the House of Commons. 
This was due to Wilson's ideas on government. His consider­
able academic reputation rested on his ideas of how parties 
should behave while in government, and seeing little of 
value in American parties he took for his model the tightly 
disciplined British parliamentary parties. When headed by 
a strong Prime Ministerial figure, he considered that this 
produced the most effective and responsible type of govern­
ment. By asserting his leadership in Congress Wilson con­
tributed significantly to the development of the Presidency. 
The effect was to transform the disparate Democratic party 
in Congress into an effective instrument of government. One 
by-product of this was to increase the importance of the 
party's/
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party's natural leaders in Congress: the long serving 
Southerners. 7
Aiding the House and Senate leaders was the fact that 
the Sixty Third Congress was largely one of "new men". Of 
the 120 Southern representatives, 25 were there for the 
first time; 24 of the rest had served only one term. The 
Sixty Fourth Congress had 23 new Southern members. The 
Senate turnover was higher: nine new senators were elected 
from the South between 1912 and 1914. This contrasts 
vividly with earlier Congresses: the Fifty Seventh Congress 
contained only four new Southern members, as did the Fifty 
Eighth; only one new Southern senator entered the Fifty 
Ninth Congress. This trend was true for the union, and not 
only the South. Only 15 senators in the Sixty Third Con­
gress had served more than two terms; 23 of the 96 members 
were freshmen. 8
Contemporary commentators puzzled over this. Many of 
the new Democratic representatives had been elected only 
because of the split Republican vote, this being particu­
larly true in the Midwest. One commentator explained the 
high turnover in the Senate as being caused by the intro­
duction of direct elections, the Senate consequently becom­
ing more like the House in its rotation of members: sena­
tors were now the choice of the voters rather than the 
state boss. Not all agreed with this. Charles Thomas the 
Democratic senator from Colorado considered that the pro­
mise of the Seventeenth Amendment had fallen far short of 
realisation in this regard. 9 
Whatever/
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Whatever the causes, the effect increased the power of 
those already there, particularly in the Senate where a 
freshman was very much a subordinate. He was expected to 
keep quiet, watch, learn from and obey his elders in all 
matters, and develop an understanding of the "folkways" of 
the Senate before attempting any meaningful contribution.
Only by doing so could be command the respect necessary to 
be effective. Most first term representatives devoted 
their energies to securing their re-election; this left 
little time to consider the intricacies of legislation. Nor 
should the effect of a move to Washington in a pre-aircraft 
age be underestimated in considering the effectiveness of a 
new congressman. Election usually meant buying a house or 
acquiring rented accommodation, and the probability of leav­
ing friends and family for long spells. Southerners usually 
spent all year in Washington, returning to their constituen­
cies for only short spells. Adjusting to this new life 
could prove troublesome. 10
This is not to suggest that the new men were political 
innocents. To be a United States representative or senator 
was invariably to be a successful politician. The vast 
majority had worked their way up the political ladder and 
were experts in the arts of compromise and opportunism before 
they entered Congress. The average age of a Southern senator 
when elected to Congress was 50. He had spent an average of 
eight and a half years in other elected positions; this could 
be at state level or in the House of Representatives. Some 
men such as John Sharp Williams, Oscar Underwood and John 
Bankhead, both of Alabama, spent more than fifteen years in 
other/
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other positions prior to entering the Senate. Nine South­
ern senators in 1913 had previously been state governors, 
a higher proportion than^any other region. Of those with 
no prior experience before entering the Senate only Luke 
Lea of Tennessee, the youngest senator, made any impact; 
and he was part of a particularly well established politi­
cal machine. 11
A remarkable cohesiveness and consensus existed amongst 
the Southern congressmen. Many scholars have attempted to 
bury the idea of the solid Democratic South, portraying 
Southern politics as being "pragmatic and parochial". South­
ern politics it is argued was as fiercely competitive as any 
in the union. At state level Southern politics was complex 
and not all politicians fit easily into the standard stereo­
types. Vast differences existed between the tone and 
manners of the machine politics of aristocratic Virginia 
and, for example, the seamier politics of Louisiana. Indeed, 
given the differing needs of the sections of this huge 
region, it would have been remarkable if Southern politics 
had been completely homogeneous. 12
A different picture emerges when the workings of South­
erners at federal level are studied. During the Sixty Third 
and Sixty Fourth Congresses they rarely voted on different 
sides; on most major issues the South voted as a bloc. Those 
who voted against the party caucus unless for valid local 
reasons were not easily forgiven by either party or con­
stituents. Vladimir Key concluded that there were no poli­
tical parties in the South: the Democrats existed only for 
external purposes, that is "as an arrangement for national 
affairs"./
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affairs". The voting records of Southern Democrats from 
1913-1917 however argues for those standards of permanence, 
cohesiveness, and responsibility that characterise politi­
cal parties. Albert Hart, the Harvard historian, consider­
ed that Southern social and political leaders fitted to­
gether much more closely than their Northern counterparts. 13 
A survey of roll call votes in Congress from 1911 to 
1916 on selected reform issues by Howard Allen emphasises 
the solidity of the Southern bloc vote. A sample of 355 
Senate votes were considered and rankings drawn up accord­
ing to the consistency of support or opposition displayed 
by each senator. Sixteen Southern senators were placed 
among those consistently opposed to reform: only three 
provided support for reform. In an analysis of twelve 
"major reform votes" the South displayed a more uniform 
record than any other region. Twenty four Democrats voted 
for ten or more of the issues: only five Southerners did.
Of the twenty four senators who voted for less than ten 
issues, fifteen were Southern. Twelve senators voted for 
less than eight issues, ten being Southerners. 14
Such studies can mislead. Pew of the issues studied 
by Allen had much relevance to the South, being concerned 
with industrial or urban matters. Furthermore, the 
decision as to what constitutes a "major reform issue" is 
that of the historian not the politician. Allen also 
ignores the fact that not all senators were in the chamber 
when the votes were taken, and this inevitably throws the 
balance against those most involved in the administration. 
Despite such qualifications the study is a useful reminder 
of the consistency of the Southern vote, especially 
compared/
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compared to other regions.
Answerable to Senate and House managers on how they 
voted, Southern politicians had also to respond to their 
electorates. The Southern politician was more secure than 
most once elected. Of the 142 representatives from the 
South between 1913 and 1917, 80 served more than 15 years. 
Over half, 81, lost their seats only by death or else by 
resignation usually on health grounds. Only nine represen­
tatives lost their office through an unsuccessful candidacy 
in the primaries, and a surprisingly large number, 27, lost 
office through an unsuccessful candidacy in the election 
proper. Of the remainder, most left the House for the 
Senate or else found a judicial post. 15
The position in the Senate was more complicated, but 
reveals deeper seated trends. Some senators were only 
temporary members appointed by governors on the death of an 
elected member until a new election could be held, or else 
the state legislature could appoint a new senator. Despite 
this, the trend in the Senate from 1900 was similar to that 
in the House. Of the 74 senators from the South between 
1900 and 1916, 20 held their seats longer than 16 years: 
the average length of service was 11 years. Death accounted 
for 25 senators, and a further 20 either resigned or declin­
ed renomination. Six unsuccessfully contested elections and 
15 lost their seats during the primary elections.
Why Southerners enjoyed such considerable security of 
tenure lies in the nature and organisation of Southern 
politics in the 1910s. By then the last threats to the 
supremacy of the Southern elite had been met and defeated. 
The/
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The last disfranchisement clause was passed in 1909: the 
remaining active elements of populism had resigned them­
selves to either local politics or lobbying tactics. The 
court house cliques had regained control over who won and 
lost elections. Consequently the small Southern white 
electorate wielded undue influence not only over life in the 
South, but also over the federal government. Theodore Roose­
velt considered that the Southern whites because of the 
smallness of the electorate had 50 electoral votes and 50 
congressmen, "to which they are no more entitled than the 
people of Kamchatka". 16
Why this aberration came about is an unresolved ques­
tion. The literature on the subject is vast and impressive 
but the central question of whether the disfranchisers acted 
against blacks alone or against blacks as part of the lower 
class remains unanswered. What is undeniable is that upper 
class whites, particularly of the black belt, fought hard to 
win control of the political system. In 1912 some blacks in 
the South, and a larger number of poor whites voted, but 
they were represented by upper class whites; many Southern 
congressmen had served their political apprenticeships 
during disfranchisement: and most of the Southern political 
machines of the 1910s had been formed during the 1880s and 
1890s. The ferocity with which Southerners waged political 
war during Reconstruction and the 1890s indicates how poli­
tical control was valued.
Walter Hines Page, the North Carolinian editor and 
educator, sympathised with the "Forgotten Man": the poor, 
landless, white Southerner. He perceived this figure as the 
product/
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product of the ante bellum South. That society had produced 
"that unyielding stability of opinion which gives a feeling 
of despair, the very antithesis of social growth and social 
mobility". There were two ways out of this: the first was 
education; the second was industry as this alone could hand 
"essential power over to a class of men that bring mobility 
to social life and opportunity to them that can take it". 17
Yet Page's favoured class of men was not prominent
among the region's politicians in the 1910s. Commercial men
were noted more for their absence than presence among the
Southern congressional ranks. Tables I and II illustrate 
the vocational backgrounds of the Southern senators and rep­
resentatives. The overwhelming majority were lawyers, the 
implications of which will be considered in the next section. 
Most came from the black belt counties, not the "magic 
cities" of Henry Grady's New South; they had much in common 
with the style, manners, and outlook of the ante bellum 
politician. Of the senators who represented the South from 
1913-1917 the following men owned either plantations or 
ranches: John Sharp Williams; Benjamin Tillman and Ellison D„ 
Smith of South Carolina; Morris Sheppard and Charles Culber­
son of Texas; John Bankhead and Frank White of Alabama; Hoke 
Smith of Georgia; Joseph Ransdell, John Thornton and Robert 
Broussard of Louisiana; and Joseph Clarke and Jefferson 
Davis of Arkansas. Others still retained the vestiges of 
plantation culture even though they lived in the cities:
James Vardaman for example, the most outspoken critic of the 
XlVth and XVth Amendments came from a family that had owned 
fourteen slaves; the family of Furnifold Simmons of North 
Carolina/
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Table I ; The occupations of Southern senators 1901-1917 
(As declared in the Biographical Directory of the American 
Congress 1774-1961)
Lawyer
Lawyer and editor
Lawyer and planter
Lawyer and banker
Editor
Planter
Entrepreneur
Journalist
Teacher
53
5
4 
1 
3
5 
2 
1 
1
%
71
6
5
3
6 
3
81%
75 100
Source: Biographical Directory of the American Congress
1774-1961, (Washington United States Government 
Printing Office: 1961).
Table II: The occupations of Southern representatives 1913-1917
(As declared in the Biographical Directory of the American 
Congress 1774-1961)
Lawyer
Lawyer and editor
Lawyer and planter
Lawyer and banker
Editor
Planter
Journalist
Educator
Other
103
2
9
4
4
8
2
3
7
142
%
71
6
4
3
6
2
3
6
100
83%
Source ; Biographical Directory of the American Congress 
1774-1961, (Washington United States Government 
Printing Office: 1961).
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Carolina had owned 1,000 acres and over 100 slaves. As 
James Tice Moore has pointed out, even though a planter and 
his son could move to the city and begin a new career with 
relative ease, it proved harder to abandon "the ideological 
trappings of a lifetime". 18
Few challenged this ruling order in the 1910s: politics 
was stable. The blacks were largely disfranchised; the poor 
whites too disparate or uninterested to offer effective 
resistance; and business contented itself with lobbying. It 
is true that the early twentieth century saw a rise in the 
number of successful Southern demagogues. Appealing to the 
"wool hat boys" and rednecks it appeared as if their racist, 
anti business, anti elitist rhetoric was the true voice of 
the Southern proletariate. Men such as Vardaman, Ed Smith, 
Bilbo,and Tillman protrayed themselves as true democrats 
struggling to wrench political control away from the aristo­
cratic Bourbons, and for the masses. Yet, as noted above, 
these demagogues came from wealthy backgrounds; in no sense 
of the word were they poor. An analysis by J.M. Kousser of 
those who voted for demagogic politicians concluded that 
few differences existed between the supporters of demagogues 
and more respectable politicians. What set the demagogues 
apart was not the content of their speeches, the issues they 
raised, or the character of their support, but their style. 
Jefferson Davis is one of the best examples of a man from a 
wealthy patrician background who adopted the manners of the 
redneck in order to win votes ; yet once in office as 
governor of Arkansas he did little of consequence to aid 
the rural poor of his state. Vann Woodward chose to portray 
Davis/
40
CVS
Davis^a comic rural bumpkin: "Karl Marx for Hill Billies"; 
but Davis was anything but comic, he was a calculating and 
ruthless politician who respected nothing in his desire to 
gain more power. He opposed any moves to improve rural 
conditions of the less well off at the expense of his own 
kind: "I used to hate the Populists worse than any man in 
the state: I used to fight them". 19
Davis and his ilk had little to fear from the descend­
ants of the Alliance. As an effective political party or 
movement it had long since been shattered. Some of its 
members rejoined the Democratic fold; others remained inde­
pendent of the Southern mainstream, forming embryonic 
socialist parties in the Southwest; the majority drifted 
out of politics altogether. The most effective and active 
descendant of the populists was the Farmers' Educational 
and Cooperative Union. The Union though was determined not 
to make the same mistakes as its predecessor. Its President, 
Charles S. Barrett, told the members to cease complaining 
about what they had lost in the Alliance: "In the first 
place, but a few lost anything. In the second place, the 
few that did lose have no-one to blame but themselves". 
Individual members, Barrett warned, should keep an eye on 
fellows who raved about organising an independent party 
outwith the Union. Remembering one such man in his local 
Farmers' Alliance, Barrett related how the would be acti­
vist was wooed by the local Democrats, offered a menial 
patronage post and lost to the Alliance; such was the inevi­
table outcome of political involvement. Barrett was a 
shrewd man who became a very effective political lobbyist. 
His/
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His resolve to keep the Union out of politics guaranteed 
its survival, and it accomplished much good in the South­
west by its self-help marketing projects. The Union's 
withdrawal from politics however removed the last radical 
and informed alternative to the ruling elite from the 
Southern political arena. 20
The Southern politician controlled his constituency 
through his lieutenants. The crux of Southern politics,
Key demonstrated, lay at county level. Through control of 
the rural counties came control of the state legislature, 
and through this control of federal elections. The urban 
vote was weak and its influence highly localised. New 
Orleans, the largest city in the South, has never domina­
ted Louisianan politics. Carl Harris in his study of 
Birmingham, Alabama, showed how Birmingham industrialists 
tolerated a Socialist mayor, realising that real power in 
Alabama lay in Montgomery. 21
Few records survive of the men who ran the court house 
cliques. The papers of every Southern politician contain 
letters from these men asking their patron for positions, 
offering their opinions on how he should vote, and informing 
him of the local political climate; but they rarely illus­
trate how an activist worked at local level. Such men per­
formed most of the groundwork leading up to an election and 
were indispensable. Edwin Yates Webb, a representative from 
North Carolinian constituency with a traditional Republican 
vote wrote to his henchmen in October 1914 urging them to 
ensure that all their people were registered. The impression 
is given that local men were allowed a considerable amount of 
independence ;/
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independence; they were by no means the blind tools of the 
successful politician. In the same campaign Webb had to 
send out 200 letters and 3,000 postcards to his voters him­
self; this was not the job of the man in the county. By and 
large the politician in Washington allowed the local boss 
to rule his little kingdom, providing the votes were deliv­
ered on time. In return, the local boss was rewarded with 
a patronage position. The various levels of the Southern 
political pyramid appear to have operated with only the 
most slender of links. They were undoubtedly machines with 
recognised heads and surrogates, but they operated in a 
decentralised manner coming together only at elections, 22 
This model is borne out by the testimony of Roger
ii >1 II
Stephenson, a county boss from eastern North Carolina,
' Stephenson" was a tobacco planter with only modest political 
ambitions of his own: he once wanted to become a state 
congressman but he made his wishes known to the state bosses 
after they had drawn up their list of preferred candidates
I. "
for the primary election, Stephenson's political career 
began with his, involvement in the campaign to deny blacks 
the vote in 1900, His reward for this was the position of 
electoral registrar, a position he filled in accordance with 
the wishes of the local machine: "Some wrote the Constitu­
tion, I reckon, as good as a lot of white men, but I'd find 
somethin' unsatisfactory, maybe an i not dotted, or a t not 
crossed, enough for me to disqualify 'em", 23
When William Kitchin was elected governor in 1909, 
Stephenson became justice of the peace. He held this posi­
tion for many years; his power was entirely local. Offering 
the/
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the candidate of his choice 340 of the township’s 700 vote, 
Stephenson claimed that the town had never voted against 
the candidate of his choice. His methods were not that of 
the demagogue: he claimed to have made only one speech in 
his life. Rather he worked quietly, continually talking to 
his people ensuring that they kept to the party line. When 
elections came along he could keep out of the fight, know­
ing that the precincts were already lined up for his man.
In return for this hard work the politician offered 
him through being justice of the peace, complete control of 
his township. This Stephenson achieved, and according to 
his account, carried out with considerable skill and com­
passion, Few financial rewards came from this, but the 
deference due in small communities must have been immense. 
Men like Stephenson were the most important cogs in the 
political machine, and as long as they were allowed their 
own little sphere, they permitted the smooth running of the 
larger apparatus. They were more concerned with leaving 
things as they were, rather than introducing sweeping 
changes that could jeopardise their position within the 
community.
As such there was little that the county politician 
could do to influence the vote of a United States senator 
or representative. Business however could strongly influ­
ence the politician either by effective lobbying or judi­
cious cash payments. Some politicians such as Carter Glass 
of Virginia and Duncan Fletcher of Florida did have commer­
cial backgrounds, and most of the politicians with planter 
backgrounds had business interests, but businessmen usually 
recognised/
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recognised that politics was the function of the politician. 
It was not the duty of business to run the state or the 
union. In the 1910s there was little need for Southern 
business to continually influence politics. The extent of 
state and national authority although growing was limited. 
State legislatures met infrequently for only brief periods, 
and in the South their statutes were enforced by poorly paid, 
understaffed bureaucracies that were used more for political 
patronage than efficient government. While state legisla­
tures were more active than is commonly supposed, the issues 
that affected commerce such as child labour regulation or 
workmen's compensation could be handled more effectively by 
selective lobbying as opposed to a complete take over of the 
political system.
Opinion has changed on the influence wielded by business 
over Southern politics. To Southern historians writing in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s Southern progressive history 
was the story of the recapture of politics from commerce by 
the masses; the political and economic reforms of the period 
could be directly linked "to the wishes of the Southern 
masses". The progressives operated in a well established 
tradition that included the populists, Jackson and Jeffer­
son, their slogans being pro-democracy and anti-business,
Vann Woodward writing in the 1950s modified this view. He 
considered that Southern reform despite its rhetoric was 
essentially urban, middle class, and business dominated. 
Furthermore, Woodward forcibly and necessarily asserted that 
although Southern progressivism did have its triumphs, it 
did not fill "the political aspirations and deeper needs of 
the mass of people", 24 
Subsequent/
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Subsequently works on national progressivism have 
further stressed the importance of extra-political forces, 
mainly commercial, in the drafting and passage of legisla­
tion, The underlying assumption has been that the politi­
cian acted as the docile and willing servant of business 
especially when confronted with highly technical legisla­
tion such as banking reform. Certainly there are well 
documented examples of Southern congressmen voting against 
their party and conscience because commerce dictated to 
them how they should vote. The Louisiana congressmen voted 
against placing sugar on the free list during the tariff 
debates, thus endangering the bill, because this was what 
the Cane Growers Association wanted. Similarly many sena­
tors from the textile states voted against their own human­
itarian feelings when voting against the Federal Child 
Labor bill in 1916, 25
The relationship between business and politics was 
complex: it was not a simple case of one wrestling to con­
trol the other. Not all congressmen bowed to commercial 
pressures and not all businessmen saw anything to be gained 
through politics. The Florida senators for example were 
under pressure similar to their Louisianan colleagues to 
vote against placing citrus fruit on the free list, but they 
did so gaining the gratitude of the White House, The anti 
business rhetoric of politicians such as Tillman and Var- 
daman was matched by anti politician rhetoric from business 
publications. Whereas Southern politicians reserved their 
attacks to non Southern industries, Southern business pub­
lications specifically attacked the region's politicians.
New/
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New South literature stressed the need for business, 
agriculture, and politics to work together but criticised 
the interventions of politicians in a commercial world that 
they knew little of: one newspaper warned farmers to ignore 
"the rantings of the politician against the railroad", and 
to help advance the cause of the railroads. Another jour­
nal complained that constant political agitation was injur­
ious to the business and agricultural needs of the people; 
the greatest possible reform in American would be to ensure 
that Congress met once every four years and state legisla­
tures once every ten, Richard Edmonds, the most prominent 
New South journalist, wrote that there was a better chance 
of politics spoiling a good farmer than of a good farmer 
bettering politics, 26
The less strident banking journals agreed with this. 
Regarding cotton, the journal of the Bankers' Association 
claimed that politicians had no understanding whatever of 
the cotton planters' needs and if they did then they would 
not know what to do about them: the world would be a better 
place if only there were fewer politicians. The same jour­
nal had earlier considered politicians and demagogues to be 
synonymous: both portrayed bankers as evil men of great 
wealth thus damaging the standing of the average banker, 27
Business however was careful in its criticism; poli­
ticians may have undesirable tendencies but they were 
savable. The politician could do much good, but only if he 
adopted a more professional and business-like attitude.
One journal proposed that there should be a school for 
legislators providing the necessary training and weeding 
out/
47
out the dangerous and the radical, Edmonds hoped that one 
day the men in Washington would have business experience, 
rather than be lawyers. The ideal planter, according to a 
Southern Farm Magazine writer, would take an interest in 
politics but would never abandon his agricultural pursuits 
for political honours: "In this, he displays his wisdom", 28 
Despite the rhetoric and the occasional ruffled 
feathers, neither side could afford to completely ignore or 
alienate the other. Business needed the politician's vote 
to enact or oppose législation affecting its interests, and 
it was this vote that counted in the last analysis. The 
politician by voting for or against child labour regulation, 
workmen's compensation, minimum wage legislation, anti­
immigration statutes, and measures related to working con­
ditions directly influenced an industrialist's labour costs. 
By imposing strict railroad regulation rates, or alternative­
ly by financing highway or canal improvements, the politi­
cian could affect transportation costs. The state legisla­
tions by deciding the levels of corporation and privilege 
taxes could determine how much of its profits a company 
could retain. These were all popular issues during the pro­
gressive era that politicians could vote on, and in which 
business had a vested interest. As Kousser has noted, in 
most of the economic decisions made by state legislatures 
the interests of the locally established power prevailed, 29 
Politicians needed business for financial support. 
Southern elections were expensive and well beyond the re­
sources of an individual politician unless he had consider­
able private wealth. Telegram and telephone bills had to 
be/
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be paid; offices had to be rented; advertising space had to 
be purchased or rented; stationery had to be bought; prin­
ters had to be paid; and the expenses of campaign workers 
had to be reimbursed. Considerable organisation was re­
quired to fight a federal election, necessitating the 
employment of many people. The recorded expenses for Hoke 
Smith's 1920 senatorial primary against Tom Watson ran to 
310,365, The total cost would be higher as this excluded 
the payment of campaign workers and the rental of an 
Atlanta hotel suite, which Smith used as offices, 30
The payment of campaign debts could come from several 
sources. The Smith papers reveal the contributions of the 
various Hoke Smith Clubs toward the expenses, but the money 
involved was less than #1,000, Smith ended up owing 
#150,000 after his political career ended. Some politicians 
tried to meet their expenses out of their own pockets,
Edwin Yates Webb incurred a debt of #2,000 in the 1914 elec­
tion; one of his county chairmen lost #90, Clearly most 
elections were beyond the personal resources of a congress­
man whose annual salary was #7,500 and whatever he could 
make through journalism, lecturing, and legal work, 31 
Business usually filled the gap. This varied from 
state to state: in Virginia the railroad companies were pro­
minent financiers of Senator Thomas Martin's machine; alle­
gations of payments from lumber companies followed Furnifold 
Simmons of North Carolina during his career; the Texan poli­
ticians, notably Joseph Bailey the minority leader in the 
Senate until 1913, received money from the oil companies; 
and the Kentucky distillers financed their politicians. Such 
practices/
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practices were not restricted to the South, David Graham 
Phillips, the journalist, in his influential series "The 
Treason of the Senate", picked upon Senator Aldrich of 
Rhode Island as the most corrupt member of the upper cham­
ber, Phillips believed that the greatest single hold that 
business had over politicians was through their campaign 
contributions; in Aldrich's case capital came from the 
Rockefeller empire. The men who footed the bill, warned 
Phillips, made sure that they got their money back "with 
interest, compound upon compound". Phillips's view was 
jaundiced, but it was true on many important matters. How­
ever, as one Southern congressman declared during the 1981 
debates on the Stockman budget, his vote was not for sale; 
it was merely for rent. This attitude would appear to have 
been true for Southerners in 1913, 32
A politician could offer patronage as well as his vote 
to financial backers. The traditional patronage posts such 
as postmasterships were usually reserved for political 
managers, but personal secretaryships, office positions in 
Washington or consulates, and cadetships at West Point and 
Annapolis were acceptable rewards for businessmen and their 
sons. Politicians could also recommend office holders for 
the various federal and state regulatory boards, John 
Sharp Williams had eighteen positions to fill on the 
Mississippi Farm Loans Board in 1915, Many of Williams's 
recommendations were endorsed by the office holders of 
banks, trust companies, mortgage security companies, and 
"the prominent people of the state"; thus, the board was 
staffed by the businessmen of Mississippi, While this was 
not/
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not inappropriate as some professional expertise would be 
required, it illustrates how one politician provided busi­
nessmen with positions that could directly influence their 
enterprises. There are many such letters from businessmen 
in the Williams papers asking for and receiving such posi­
tions, 33
The weakness of other reform groups in the South, 
particularly the social gospel and the muckrakers, increas­
ed the influence of business and agriculturists on the 
politician. Neither group has been accorded much import­
ance by recent historians, the muckrakers being dismissed 
by one writer as "journalists rather than thinkers,,.incap­
able of serious or radical critiques". Nonetheless, social 
gospellers and muckraking journalists did affect popular 
feeling, and business could ill afford to be seen acting 
against the popular will. Their influence upon national 
legislation may have been minimal, but it did exist and 
could be effective on local government. As their effective­
ness in the South was less than in the North, so another 
possible outlet for alternative proposals was denied, 34
Few observers have credited Southern religion with a 
burning social concern at any time in its history. Woodward 
found few Southern proponents of the Northern theology of 
social awareness. Subsequent historians have found only 
the exceptions that prove the rule. The main reasons for 
this are sociological and theological, 35
Southern preachers had great influence over their 
congregations. For many rural Southerners the fortnightly 
or monthly visit of the preacher was their only contact 
with/
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with the outside world. Men interested in changing the 
South realised the importance of the preacher. Walter Hines 
Page wrote that although the politician had been the great 
popular hero of the South, the preacher had "much the 
greater influence". Edgar Gardner Murphy, Episcopalian 
minister and child labour reformer from Alabama, believed 
that the church was needed in reform, "to touch the Soul of 
the South". Eugene Branson, professor of rural economics 
at Chapel Hill, wished he "could stir up our preacher folk" 
with the economic and social ills that menaced the country­
side. 36
The major denominations were conscious of the condi­
tions of the rural poor. Baptist journals lamented the 
poor farmer, but Baptists proposed solutions as individuals 
and not as a denomination. Most agreed that spiritual well­
being had a direct relationship with economic prosperity 
and that the unequal distribution of wealth on earth was 
compatible with God's plan for men: "The rich and poor were 
obligated to each other and each benefited from the exist­
ence of the other". 37
All Southern protestant theology came from a common 
theology; the influx of zealous pro revival Calvinists to 
the South during the Great Awakening. Their emphasis on 
the importance of individual salvation remained the central 
concern of Southern protestants. The main content of South­
ern sermons was not, as in some Northern churches, on prac­
tical Christianity, but on the actual experience of salva­
tion. Southern politicians and businessmen who attended 
church regularly, as most did, would be told that as long 
as/
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as they maintained their vertical relationship with God, 
they could remain true to their faith even while ignoring 
their horizontal relationship with other men. 38
There were exceptions. Edgar Gardner Murphy and 
Alexander McKelway were churchmen and reformers, although 
both left their churches. The South Atlantic Quarterly and 
the Sewanee Review published by the Methodist Trinity Coll­
ege and the Episcopalian University of the South contained 
attacks on racism and the one party system. John Kilgo and 
Josiah Bailey rejected the doctrine that limited the church 
to spiritual matters and participated in North Carolina 
politics. William Louis Potent had been a strong advocate 
of Walter Rauschenbusch*s Kingdom of God on Earth during 
the 1890s. They remained, however, exceptions. 39
The only time when politicians and churchmen came 
together was over temperance reform. Yet even this can be 
easily overestimated, for once the rhetoric is stripped away 
there are few examples of temperance advocates having a 
decisive impact on elections. Bishop Cannon of Virginia did 
have one moment of political power when his endorsement 
decided who won the 1909 gubernatorial nomination in Virginia. 
The circumstances however were exceptional, and the political 
machines soon regrouped denying Cannon any further influence. 
Morris Sheppard the Texas senator became known as the father 
of national prohibition, but his stance was dictated purely 
by his own beliefs and owed nothing to temperance pressure. 40 
A similar situation existed with regard to Southern 
critical journalism. Historians have found few Southern 
muckrakers./
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muckrakers. Murphy and McKelway wrote profusely on reform 
matters but their concerns were national with relevance to 
New Jersey and Chicago as well as the South. J.W. Eastman 
proposed Claude L ’Engle of Jacksonville, Florida, as a 
muckraker, and his main publication the Sun as a "properly 
labelled muckraking journal". The Sun was pro income tax, 
pro inheritance tax, pro labour, pro "good government", 
anti monopoly, anti corruption, and anti black. His only 
comments on agriculture appear to have been a desire to 
see black tenants replaced with white immigrants. Doubts 
however can be raised as to the depth and breadth of his 
criticism: he was elected to the House in 1912. Clearly he 
had not completely alienated the powers that were. Other 
newspapers criticised poor child labour regulations and 
working conditions, but none offered a consistent and com­
prehensive critique of Southern society. 41
Southern newspapers were political platforms; they 
intended to attack political rivals, not the fundamentals 
of Southern society. William Skaggs, an ex populist mayor 
from Alabama wrote that the main difference between the 
Northern and Southern press was that newspapers in the 
North were "fearless and incorruptible", whereas those in 
the South were essentially "partisan and political". Con­
sequently, over three quarters of Southern society did not 
enjoy the same standards of acquiring knowledge that others 
did. Although there was plenty muck to rake in cities like 
New Orleans and Atlanta, there were few if any attempts to 
do so; the control of popular opinion rested with the 
politician/
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politician and his backers. 42
The vocation of the Southern congressman may have been 
politics, but his profession was the law. He spent his 
formative years neither in the cotton fields nor in a busi­
ness office, but in law school or a lawyer's office. A 
fledgling politician needed such experience. Although his 
aims on occasion may have been to benefit his constituents 
by any possible means, these had to be presented to Congress 
in proper legal terms: naked emotion was not an effective 
weapon in Congress. American government was a rule of law, 
not of men, and Americans took a justified pride in this; 
the politician who had a sound grasp of the principles of 
common law could impress his fellows and achieve much. How 
he perceived these principles affected not only his rhetoric 
but also his view of legislation.
Constitutional thinking was in a state of flux in the 
1910s. Historians concerned with the growth of federal 
government have viewed the progressive era as a convenient 
half way mark between the nineteenth century's emphasis upon 
state legislation and the New Deal's stress upon national 
legislation. At the base of this argument lies the assump­
tion that the late nineteenth century growth of the American 
economy meant that state legislatures were no longer ade­
quate: the basic problem faced by the progressive reformers 
was how to control a national economy through a localised 
political system. National legislation seemed the most 
obvious /
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obvious solution, but this had limited appeal to a genera­
tion raised in the small towns of rural America to have an 
instinctive distrust of government. A compromise was the 
result, the progressive era being characterised by an accep­
tance of the future and an attempt to control that future 
by tethering it to the virtues of the past. 43 
This model has remained despite considerable
L Morton Keller has shown that state legislatures 
were more active and effective than had been imagined pre­
viously. Rather than coming from a background alien to 
government activity the progressive would be used to inter- 
ventionalist government, particularly if he came from the 
Midwest or Northeast. William Graebner has identified a 
move towards uniform state legislation as the progressives' 
main structural and procedural solution to social problems. 
Acknowledging that there were groups who believed that 
national legislation was the desired aim, Graebner nonethe­
less considers that a larger body of opinion considered 
uniform state legislation to be superior and more accept­
able. The progressives therefore did not choose between 
state or nation as their focus of attention, as the tradi­
tional argument has it, but employed their own distinctive 
ideology of uniform state legislation. The ideology's 
stronghold was among the Taft Republicans but Graebner 
believes that it influenced Wilson and the Democrats. 44 
While such revisions shed light upon the complex 
nature of American government and its response to economic 
growth they do not alter the fundamental model of a smooth 
and gradual shift of emphasis from the state to the fedecal 
government/
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government as the most acceptable arbiter and regulator. 
While diversions may exist the most important part of the 
story is the increased willingness and necessity of the 
national authorities to undertake functions that the state 
governments had either neglected or were unable to act upon. 
The underlying assumption has been that an increase in 
federal power implies and necessitates a corresponding 
decrease in state power. Agricultural reform would seem 
to fit this model: any government intervention that did 
exist in the 1890s was limited to the state; the 1910s saw 
cooperation between state and federal governments as the 
national authority generously aided state legislatures; and 
the various measures of the New Deal involved major federal 
intervention without parallel state action.
This surface analysis conceals many important features. 
Certainly the role of the federal government with regard to 
agriculture increased in the 1910s; important precedents 
were created and the number of federal bureaucrats increased 
However it is questionable if this resulted in any meaning­
ful increase in federal power, especially relative to that 
of the state legislatures. The state authorities increased 
their functions as a result of the agricultural reforms, 
but as they held the initiative and controlled the finances 
they also increased their power. This was true both for 
the state's position in the federal equation and within its 
own locality.
This suggests that the structural problems of the 1910s 
were more complex than can be explained by the general 
model. The change in emphasis from state to national 
authority/
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authority was neither as inévitable nor as evenly graded as 
a surface description would suggest. The progressive era 
was one of an increase in government: the agricultural 
reform programme of the Wilson administration demonstrates 
that this could mean an increase in state as well as federal 
government. To understand why this is so it is necessary to 
look at how Americans, particularly Southerners, viewed the 
constitution in the 1910s.
The demise of the state governments since the Civil War 
has been one of the most exaggerated deaths in American 
history. Only recently has attention been focussed upon the 
powers that the states retained rather than those that the 
national authority gained. Although there have been many 
attempts to change it, the basic federal nature of the union 
has remained unaltered since the Revolution. The state is 
still regarded as a relevant and viable level of government 
in late twentieth century America despite inter state high­
ways , low price continental air travel, a completely national 
economy, and nationwide media coverage. The Republicans won 
the 1980 election on a platform containing a states rights 
plank that would not have been out of place in the 1912 
Democratic platform.
H.N. Scheiber stresses the need to analyse federalism 
as an institutional variable from the angles of "formal 
authority" and "real power". Formal authority is a juri­
dical concept of legitimacy concerning the allocation of 
policy responsibilities to either the national or state 
governments ;/
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governments; and the definition of the limitation of the 
exercise of government power. Supreme Court decisions can 
be taken as an accurate map of how politicians and judges 
perceive this, and this varies through time. For this 
study it is important to take account of how Southern poli­
tical and legal opinion viewed the state and its position 
within the broader constitutional framework. An over­
emphasis on formal authority however can mask the real pow­
er within the system: this is how institutions actually be­
haved. Every society tolerates illegal activity, and this 
must be remembered in order to gain a complete picture of 
how legal institutions operated. 45
Politicians and lawyers in America based their judg­
ments upon precedents. The legal debates of the 1910s were 
greatly concerned with the question of increased national 
authority and whether that authority had the right to act 
in areas previously considered to be within the reserved 
powers of the state. Southern legal debate had become in­
creasingly formalised and professionalised in academic 
journals: the Virginia Law Review was founded in 1912, the 
Southern Law Quarterly in 1915, and the Virginia Law 
Register was relaunched in 1916. Such publications allowed 
Southern accents to be heard in legal debates previously 
dominated by the older established national journals. 
Southern legal opinion became more organised, more easily 
available, and, it may be surmised, increasingly heeded. 46 
Most attention centred around the increased applica­
tion of the interstate commerce clause by Congress, the 
most important constitutional development of the late 
nineteenth/
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nineteenth century from the point of future trends. Prior 
to 1890 the Supreme Court generally ruled in favour of the 
state. \n Paul v The State of Virginia in 1869 the Court 
upheld state sovereignty by allowing discriminating taxa­
tion against out of state corporations, the reasoning being 
that a corporation was the creation of local laws. The 
immediate effect was to give control of the insurance indus­
try to state governments. 47
Yet prior to the 1880s very few cases of major import­
ance relating to the regulation of commerce came before the 
Court. The main exception was the series of decisions in 
1877 known as the Granger Cases, the most important being 
Munn V The State of Illinois. By this the Court held that 
state police power was supreme in respect to the regulation 
of public corporations, and that state legislation passed 
by virtue of that power did not infringe any provision of 
the constitution. 48
By Stone v Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, 1886, the 
validity of a Mississippi statute providing for a railroad 
commission with full regulatory powers was sustained, but 
an indication of future developments was given when the 
Court intimated that the question of what constituted a 
reasonable rate might be a question for the Court to decide, 
not ^ M o r e  important however was a
series of decisions that undermined the effectiveness of 
previous decisions, although not overturning them. 49 
The Granger cases were qualified by the Wabash, St. 
Louis, and Pacific Railroad Company v The State of Illinois 
decision of 1886. In this the Court held that a state had 
no/
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no power to regulate railroad rates for transportation with­
in the state when that transportation was part of an inter­
state commerce transaction. The importance of this decision 
is easily exaggerated. In real terms it did not restrict 
state power as greatly as would be imagined; the Court was 
careful not to impair the power to fix maximum rates or 
require that rates be reasonable in intrastate commerce. In 
most commerce cases however the Waite?si Court upheld the 
national authority, the only exception to this being those 
relating to the state's right to control bridges, wharves 
and ferries used in interstate commerce. The Court decided 
by Bowman and Chicago v Northwestern Railroad, 1888, and 
Leisy and Company v Hardin, 1890, that the states could not 
exercise their reserved powers against the importation and 
sale of goods in their original packages. This meant that 
prohibition states and counties could not prevent the import­
ation and sale of liquors. 50
The Court favoured the states when it voided the income 
tax amendment, but it also continued to restrict over zealous 
state legislatures. Oregon was stopped from enforcing an 
act concerning the sale of land; North Carolina had a federal 
injunction placed upon its railroad law; and South Carolina 
ran foul of the Court on a dispensary statute. By Houston 
Electric and Water Company v United States, 1914, the Court 
came down so heavily on the state regulation of railroads 
that the attorney generals of 42 states attempted to inter­
vene. James Jackson Kilpatrick, the conservative Southern 
writer, bemoaned this "melancholy tale" in which Congress 
and Court worked together "in beautiful harmony" to snatch 
from/
61
from the people almost the last vestiges of local control 
over local affairs. 51
Congress enacted a wide variety of measures once it 
became aware that the Court would uphold its right to reg­
ulate carriers engaged in interstate and foreign commence. 
The first important piece of legislation to be upheld by the 
Court was the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. The Sherman 
Anti Trust Act, 1890, soon followed, as did the Safety App­
liance Act and the Harter Act, which related to sea carriers, 
both passed in 1893. The 1900s saw further development of 
Congress's right to regulate commerce: the Automobile Coup­
ler Act (1903), the Hepburn Railroad Rate Act (1906), the 
Hours of Service Acts (1907 and.1916), the Boiler Inspection 
Acts (1911 and 1915), the Plant Quarantine Act (1912), and 
most radical of all, the Adamson Eight Hours Act (1916),
Only the Employers' Liability Act (1905) fell foul of the 
Court; the rest were upheld. 5 2
The onward march of the national authority was not all 
conquering however; the Court and Congress together placed 
definite limitations upon the federal use of the commerce 
clause. The Webb Kenyon Act of 1913 prevented the inter­
state transportation of liquor through prohibition communi­
ties, and thus by implication reducing the federal power to 
regulate interstate commerce by increasing the police powers 
of the state, Kenyon saw his bill as simply permitting the 
states to exercise their reserved police powers without 
interference by the federal government. Southern support 
for the measure was almost unanimous, John Sharp Williams 
offering as a precedent a law signed by Thomas Jefferson 
forbidding/
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forbidding the importation of free blacks into any state 
where they were not permitted to reside. Taft considered 
that the bill was unconstitutional, believing it to be a 
violation of the interstate commerce clause, and vetoed 
the bill. Congress however passed the bill over the veto; 
as such Congress went against the spirit if not the letter 
of Leisy and Company v Hardin. 53
Prohibition was socially and politically important, 
but it lay somewhat apart from the mainstream of constitu­
tional development. The Court’s decision to void the 1916 
Keating Owen Child Labor Act was more important in limiting 
federal power. By Hammer v Dagenhart the Court ruled that 
Congress did not have the right to regulate the terms where­
by commodities were manufactured, even if intended for 
interstate commerce. At the same time the Court reaffirmed 
the sole right of the state to regulate insurance. By 
German Alliance Insurance Company v Kansas, 1914, the Court 
broadened the foundation of state regulation by holding that 
the public interest was best served by such regulations as 
were determined by the state legislatures. 54
Strict limitations therefore were placed upon the fed­
eral powers to regulate commerce. Undoubtedly there was an 
extension of the federal authority, but not all bemoaned 
this, indeed many welcomed the general drift. One Mississ­
ippi lawyer saw this exercise of the federal power as a re­
dressing of an imbalance. Congress's previous failure to 
enact such legislation, he wrote, had the indirect effect 
of leaving such responsibility within the power of the 
state. When Congress acted under the commerce clause and 
the/
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the Court voided various state statutes and regulations, 
they merely overturned anomalies. Traditionally he argued 
it had been the state that was the aggressor; nearly all the 
Court's early decisions had turned not upon what the federal 
government might do but upon what the states should not do. 
Such an opinion hardly suggests total Southern gloom and 
despondency at the prospect of state functions being swallow­
ed by a malevolent federal government. 55
While the federal authority increased with regard to 
commerce regulation, its police powers remained almost non 
existent. Charles Warren the legal historian and assistant 
attorney general of the United States from 1914 to 1918, 
wrote that the Supreme Court's most remarkable feature had 
been its consistent support of the police power of the state: 
it constituted "a strong bulwark of the State police power". 
In the "twilight zone" between state and federal power Warren 
identified a strong desire to uphold state legislation passed 
in the exercise of state police power, as long as such legis­
lation did not interfere with the authority of the national 
government. He predicted that this support would continue as 
the justices increasingly recognised their duty to keep in 
touch with the "progressive economic, social, and philosophi­
cal needs of the day". 56
The retention of state police power had been^a major 
Southern victory for the battle had been fought over the 
exercise of the XlVth and XVth Amendments. The most vital of 
the civil rights cases had been the 1873 Slaughterhouse case. 
By this the Court held that the XlVth Amendment was not 
designed to alter the general features of the government, 
neither/
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neither was it intended to bring civil rights within the 
domain of the Court. Justice Miller declared that the 
broad police powers were reserved in the state and that to 
seize these powers would degrade and fetter the states. 5 7 
These attitudes prevailed for many years. In United 
States V Reese, 1876, the Court judged that it was uncon­
stitutional to penalise inspectors in state elections for
refusing to receive and count votes and for obstructing any
citizen from voting. In the same year, by United States v 
Cruickshanks the Court declared that the right to vote was 
not secured by the constitution: it came from the states. 
State power was similarly upheld in United States v Harris, 
1883, which voided the first anti lynch act to pass Con­
gress. The Court ruled that Congress could pass laws to
inhibit abridgements of immunities by a state, but it could
not legislate against ordinary crimes of violence. National 
authority was further reduced in the same year by the void­
ing of the 1875 Civil Rights Act on the grounds that it re­
presented an invalid encroachment upon the private domain. 
Definite limits existed on the state police powers however; 
by Yick Wo v Hopkins, 1886, the Court struck down a state 
law in which racial discrimination was alleged and proved. 
Yet the main assertion of state police powers as given in 
Mugler v Kansas, 1871, remained; the Court would uphold 
state police power in every case unless a statute bore no 
resemblance to its declared objective or was an invasion of 
rights secured by fundamental law. 58
Few could argue for anything else: the internal police 
powers of the state had never been surrendered or delegated. 
Congress’s/
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Congress's willingness to act under the interstate commerce 
clause had created a potential imbalance however: despite 
being able to regulate interstate or foreign commerce, 
Congress's right to enforce its regulations remained in 
doubto This was settled by Champion v Ames, 1903, whereby 
the Court upheld an act of 1895 that forbade the interstate 
transportation of lottery tickets. This decision effect­
ively created a federal police power. Prior to this it had 
been left to the states to decide what articles of commerce 
should or should not be brought within a state or produced 
within that state for transportation elsewhere. The Court 
decided that Congress could decree to what extent and under 
what regulations such articles could be transported, but 
only in severely qualified conditions. 59
This was an important decision, but Congress took 
little advantage of it at first, the Mann Act of 1910 pro­
hibiting the interstate commerce of white slaves being the 
only major application prior to the passage of the Keating 
Owen Act. Hammer v Dagenhart placed a severe limitation on 
the federal police power, even; more restricting than the 
decision's impact upon the federal regulatory power. The 
Court ruled that the interstate transportation of the pro­
ducts of child labour did not constitute an evil in itself; 
the crime had been committed at the place of manufacture, 
and this lay within the domain of the state, not Congress. 
The reverse was the case regarding lottery tickets: it was 
not an offence to produce lottery tickets but it was to 
transport them. Warren considered that Hammer v Dagenhart 
made the federal police power a dead letter and that in 
future/
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future the national government would have to invoke its 
taxation powers if it wished to regulate the production, 
sale, and transportation of goods within a state. Certain­
ly there were few restrictions on this idea. State police 
powers received another guarantee when in 1917 the Court 
decided that the states were an adequate base for all types 
of workmen's compensation laws. 60
One other constitutional trend remains to be covered, 
and this concerns interstate relationships. A sadly 
neglected aspect of constitutional development, interstate 
relations nonetheless provide a useful insight into how 
states perceived themselves. The picture in the 1900s re­
veals that states while prepared to surrender some degree 
of sovereignty, fought to preserve their own identities; 
the elasticity of federal state relationships with one side 
gaining then losing is mirrored in how states conducted 
their affairs with each other.
The majority of interstate compacts and disputes con­
cerned economic and judicial matters. A problem would 
arise necessitating extra state action but outwith federal 
authority; to overcome such problems, states entered into 
compacts many of which required the surrender of a state's 
exclusive control over its own territory. Requiring the 
consent of Congress, there had been eight such compacts 
between 1783 and 1880, but between 1880 and 1924 twenty four 
were approved. Most compacts involved boundary line dis­
putes: if the boundaries of two states ran through a river 
then under a compact each state had the right to serve 
criminal or civil process on, and to arrest persons who 
might/
67
might actually be outside its own territory and on the 
waters or shore subject to the jurisdiction of the other. 
This represented an institutionalisation of the "hot pur­
suit" argument. Such compacts were drawn up in 1909 be­
tween Mississippi and Louisiana, Mississippi and Arkansas, 
and Arkansas and Texas. While the economic and political 
impact of such compacts was not striking, the introduction 
of this new area of regulation midway between federal and 
state power seemed to represent a great advance to contem­
poraries. 61
An increase in interstate suits accompanied the in­
crease in interstate compacts. Eleven suits were brought 
before the Court between 1783 and 1880, but between 1880 and 
1924 there were twenty eight actions. These involved more 
serious issues than compacts although they also revolved 
around river and watershed disputes. In 1906, Louisiana and 
Mississippi each established armed patrols excluding oyster 
fishermen from the other state. The real danger of armed 
conflict moved the relevant state commissions to establish a 
neutral zone pending a Supreme Court decision. Earlier in 
1900 armed Texas guards sealed off the border with Louisiana 
on the pretext of enforcing quarantine laws. A single 
yellow fever victim in New Orleans provided the Texans with 
the excuse to lay an embargo on all goods between there and 
Texas. Louisiana sought an injunction against Texas on the 
grounds that this was really a move to direct Mexican and 
European commerce from New Orleans to Galveston, as it un­
doubtedly was as the Texans continued to import from yellow 
fever stricken Mexican ports. The Court found against 
Louisiana/
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Louisiana, mainly because there was no proof that the action 
of the health officer was the act of the state. This avoid­
ed the important issue that had been raised: to what extent 
could a sovereign state manipulate its domestic laws for the 
purpose of inflicting a direct injury on another state? The 
question remained unanswered, and demonstrates how even in 
the area of interstate relationships there were many grey 
areas in the 1910s: it would have been an unusually percep­
tive man who could have accurately predicted how future 
trends would unfold. 62
These cases and trends provided a congressman with the 
relevant precedents and trends upon which to base his argu­
ments. They presented the state as a stronger and just as 
active level of government as the union. Men who argued 
that the state should control reform were not acting in an 
anachronistic fashion. Yet these provided only the bare 
bones of a legalistic argument: constitutional doctrine pro­
vided the flesh. This was heavily influenced by legal 
training and, in the South, by historical circumstance.
By the 1910s lawyers were no longer the unchallenged 
aristocracy that they had been. The rise of new professions, 
particularly medicine, challenged their pre-eminence amongst 
the secular vocations. Woodrow Wilson had recognised this 
trend as early as the 1880s*when writing to his fiancee he 
predicted that the increased specialisation required by the 
lawyer would leave him no time to indulge in political 
activity. Wilson’s judgment was somewhat premature; lawyers 
continued to dominate political life in the 1910s. Foreign 
visitors/
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visitors marvelled at this: Lord Northcliffe wrote in 1917:
You do not make effective use of your aristocracy 
of birtho You do not make effective use of your 
aristocracy of business. You do not make effective 
use of your aristocracy of labour. You are govern­
ed to a degree, I never cease marvelling at it, by 
just one class - the lawyer politician. 63
If anything the Southern congressman was more likely 
to be a lawyer than the Northern: Skaggs found that in the 
Sixty Fifth Congress 92 of the 104 Southern representatives 
were lawyers, but taking twelve Northern states with 107 
members, he found that only 76 were lawyers. The quality 
of legal training that these men received varied consider­
ably: of the Southern representatives from 1913 and 1917,
64 were trained at law school and 39 passed their state bar 
examinations through apprenticeships and their own unsuper­
vised reading. Tables III and IV show where and how South­
ern congressmen received their educations. 64
Of those trained at law schools the most notable fea­
ture is the dominance of University of Virginia graduates, 
as well as the fact that almost all were trained at South­
ern colleges. A university degree was not necessary to 
pass the state bar examination but an increasing number of 
men found that it was an aid. It provided a more concen­
trated, wider ranging and better taught course for those 
who could afford the fees. All the graduates of the Univer­
sity of Virginia Law School who represented the South in 
Congress from 1913 to 1917 were taught common and statutory 
law by the same man: John Barbee Minor, He had graduated as 
an AoBo in law from Virginia in 1834, and after practising 
law/
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Table III: The legal training of Southern senators 1900-16
%
University of Virginia Law School 13 20
University of Georgia Law School 3 4
Vanderbilt Law School 3 4
Columbia Law School 2 3
Cumberland Law School 2 3
Tulane Law School 2 3
Washington and Lee Law School 2 3
Other law schools in the South 5 15
Other law schools outside the South 1 —
"Studied law" 30 46
63
Source : Biographical Directory of the American Congress 
1774-1961, (Washington United States Government 
Printing Office: 1961).
Table IV : The legal training of Southern representatives 1913-17
%
University of Virginia Law School 17 16
University of Alabama Law School 6 6
University of Georgia Law School 6 6
University of Texas Law School 5 5
Cumberland Law School 5 5
Tulane Law School 3 3
University of Mississippi Law School 3 3
Vanderbilt Law School 3 3
Other law schools in the South 15 14
Other law schools outside the South 1 1
"Studied law" 39 38
103
Source: Biographical Directory of the American Congress
1774-1961, (Washington United States Government 
Printing Office: 1961).
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law for several years in tidewater Virginia he was appoint­
ed professor of law at Charlottesville in 1845. He was the 
youngest man to occupy the position, and he retained it 
until his death in 1895. 55
Minor found a moribund department; few prominent South­
erners chose to stay in the South for their legal education 
before the war. Under Minor however, the standards and 
prestige of the Virginia law school rose and it began to 
attract ambitious men. In his views on federal state rela­
tions Minor was a complete Jeffersonian. A fellow lawyer 
wrote of him: "His system of introduction was that of 
searching analysis based upon the methods of Hale and Black- 
stone ... His zealous and almost fanatical love for the 
common law led him to oppose every contemplated change, 
therein his only defect perhaps as a teacher and an author". 
Thus while Northern law schools were breaking away from the 
classical rigidities of Blackstone, Hale, and Kent, and 
adopting the case method of teaching law the University of 
Virginia retained the older text book and lecture method.
At Harvard Law School the teaching of law had been revolu­
tionised by the arrival of Dean Langdale who sought to 
introduce scientific methods to law and to make his students 
understand how and why legal concepts came about. Minor 
preferred the older methods of teaching, and the publication 
in 1875 of his Institutes of Common and Statute Law confirm­
ed him as one of the old school. 66
Minor's students revered him as a teacher and took heed 
of his opinions. Writing soon after his arrival in 
Charlottesville Woodrow Wilson judged; "That the course in 
law/
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law is certainly as fine as could be desired. Prof. Minor, 
who is at the head of the school is a perfect teacher. I 
can say with perfect sincerity that I cannot conceive of a 
better". Wilson’s ardour for the law quickly cooled, but 
his admiration for Minor remained: " ... I cannot sufficient­
ly admire Professor Minor's methods of instruction, and I 
try to appreciate my advantages in spite of other things 
that are less admirable". 67
Obviously not all Minor's students accepted his opin­
ions, and not all those who did held on to them. Woodrow 
Wilson is an example of this. Care has to be exercised in 
not over estimating the influence of John Barbee Minor on 
his students' future lives. What is clear though is that it 
did exist, giving a degree of consensus among Southern poli­
ticians and lawyers, a continuity with the common law 
theories of the Old South, and, most importantly, a view of 
constitutional government that differed from Northern law 
schools. The effect upon the student of the textbook tui­
tion of common law was to give sound knowledge and clarity 
of thought at the expense of jurisprudence. The continual 
backward search for precedents to strengthen arguments could 
lead to inflexibility and a certain disregard for present 
and future applications of the law. Furthermore, lawyers 
were confronted increasingly with social and economic pro­
blems unheard of by Kent and Blackstone. In such cases, 
problems with few precedents could not easily be resolved 
by those taught under the older methods. Yet Minor's 
methods did have their relevance and they provided Southern 
congressmen/
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congressmen with arguments that they would present not only 
for emotional effect or economic gain tout because they had 
been taught that this was how the constitution should be 
interpreted.
The University of Virginia represented the top level 
of Southern legal education: the quality of education at 
the smaller colleges was less rigorous. Of the 30 law 
schools in the South, 18 were content with the old two years 
course while only six non Southern schools persisted in 
this; all other schools had adopted the three years course. 
According to one law professor the South's reluctance to 
change was caused by the low standards asked for by the 
Southern bar examiners. No Southern state required that a 
candidate furnish certificates of academic or professional 
competence as conditions to taking the examination. Most 
Northern states demanded this. Yet, while low standards 
may have been undesirable, they did not necessarily produce 
bad lawyers. Hoke Smith passed the Georgia bar examination 
at the age of seventeen having a knowledge of only Black­
stone with Kent's Commentaries and the Georgia state code; 
but his legal career was a success and he acquired an 
excellent understanding of railroad and workmen* s compensa­
tion laws. 68
As almost half of the South's representatives and 
senators received their legal education while working as 
legal clerks or else on their own the effect of this upon 
their theoretical understanding of law is worth considera­
tion. The necessity of working upon actual as opposed to 
model cases meant that the man who learned his profession 
"on/
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"on the job" would have a narrower frame of constitutional 
reference than a university trained lawyer, library facili­
ties would be poorer, and the new developments in legal 
thought took longer to percolate down to the small law 
offices of the South. The links between law office and law 
school did exist however: a legal system based upon prece­
dent demanded that the practitioner had some understanding 
of the principles as well as the details of those prece­
dents: "The result was to produce lawyers whose range of 
knowledge might be narrow but who grasped a few principles 
with great firmness". It may be safely surmised that one 
of the few principles firmly grasped in the South was the 
nature of the relationship between the state and the union. 69 
While the South and the Democrats were firmly identi­
fied with state authority, not all approved or welcomed 
this. Writing to a supporter in 1912, Theodore Roosevelt 
saw no possible good coming from the Democrats as they were 
tied to outworn principles, "especially the ruinous prin­
ciple of states’ rights". The Democratic platform was 
unequivocal on where the party stood: clause four of the 
1912 manifesto denounced as usurpation the Republican 
attempts to deprive the states of their reserved rights, 
thus indirectly magnifying the powers of the federal gov­
ernment. Many believed that Southerners used states rights 
arguments purely to mask their real aims, which were econo­
mic and short term. David Graham Phillips believed that 
Joseph Bailey, the Senate minority leader from Texas, 
deliberately befogged issues by dragging in constitutional 
irrelevancies. Phillips argued that Bailey did this solely 
to/
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to benefit the interests. Roosevelt concurred with Phillips 
He had been suspicious of Bailey’s enthusiastic defence of 
the Hepburn Railroad Rate bill in 1906, and was convinced 
that Bailey attempted to widen the powers of the measure in 
the hope that it would be declared unconstitutional. 70 
Southerners did not help their own case by dragging 
contrived arguments based upon the sanctity of the state 
into the most unlikely debates. In doing so they carica­
tured themselves in the eyes of the North. Senator Ellison 
Smith’s debating technique is described thus:
At some point in every speech the Lord’s will got 
mixed up with the boys in grey storming an impreg­
nable height, the purity of Southern womanhood,
Yanlcees, the glorious past and the still more 
glorious future including the white man’s sacred 
right to lynch. It was all very vague and 
inspiring.
Despite the effectiveness of such rhetoric on the Southern 
stump and its usefulness in a filibuster, it hardly helped 
the claim of states righters to be offering a concise 
doctrine. 71
That Southern congressmen used states rights in an 
unreasoned, pig headed, and emotional manner cannot be 
denied. Neither can it be denied that Northeasterners used 
higher moral authority of the union arguments in a similar 
fashion. Southern politicians however could use their 
legal knowledge in a constructive manner, contributing 
intelligently and informatively to debate. Behind the 
layers of verbiage and platitudes there existed a Southern 
view of the state and its role in the federal union that 
was constitutionally accurate as well as politically and 
economically/
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economically useful. The Southern states rights argument 
had its origins in the region's academic, legal and politi­
cal traditions, as well as being a weapon of the demagogue.
The marrying of this respectable tradition with the necess­
ity to compete in the political cockpit is best illustrated 
in the biography of Thomas Jefferson written by John Sharp 
Williams, a University of Virginia law graduate. 72
Williams was a plantation owner from Yazoo County, 
Mississippi, but he was also one of the best and most widely 
educated men of his generation. He attended the Kentucky 
Military Institute, the University of the South, the Univer­
sity of Virginia, the University of Heidelberg, and the 
College of France at Dijon. William McAdoo judged him to be 
a brilliant scholar and probably the best read man in either 
chamber. His biography of Jefferson grew out of a series of 
addresses given by Williams in the prestigious Blumenthal 
lectures at Columbia University in 1912. These were con­
ceived as a Southern reply to the earlier biographies of 
Alexander Hamilton and Daniel Webster written by Henry Cabot 
Lodge and of Gouverneur Morris by Theodore Roosevelt in the 
distinguished American Statesmen series. These had been 
written in a highly partisan and nationalistic fashion and 
Williams determined to redress the balance. He also intend­
ed it to be a contribution to contemporary political debate. 73 
Williams described the political battles of the pre­
vious century in terms of good against evil, and virtue 
against commerce. Hamilton, he wrote, had constructed noth­
ing except a scheme to tie the monied classes to the govern­
ment, and the government to them; in doing so he attempted 
to/
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to create a constitution that was alien "then and now" to 
all the habits and thoughts of America. Hamilton had dis­
trusted the masses of the people and wanted a strong 
government to restrain them: Jefferson had unbounded faith 
in the common sense of the people and their "essential 
rectitude of purpose". Because of this Jefferson had a 
permanent effect upon American life and institutions; he 
had sought to democratise industrial as well as rural con­
ditions; he was a moderate in his view of government, and 
no two men in all history had been further apart than he 
and John C. Calhoun. Jefferson had shown, Williams argued, 
that the A.B.C. of political reform consisted of the 
divorce of government from big business, and of big busi­
ness from politics. 74
Williams further asserted that the real balance in 
government existed not between the executive, legislative, 
and judiciary, but between the states, counties, and town­
ships on one scale, and the federal government on the 
other. The "lesser republics" were more important, for 
they had jurisdiction over ninety per cent of the questions 
affecting daily life. America must turn back to the states, 
Williams argued, for the whole fabric of the Republic would 
be threatened by an enlarged federal government. A reading 
of history had convinced Williams that most bad governments 
grew out of too much government. The correct and only 
answer was to return to principles of Thomas Jefferson:
It was essentially in keeping with all of his 
opinions and all of his future life that he should 
have begun the work of democratising American 
institutions, educationally, and socially, and 
industrially,/
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industrially, in the State because the State 
was, as he later expressed, "the surest safe­
guard of republican institutions". 75 
Popular orators carried the relevance of the state to 
America's future still further. Lloyd T„ Everett, address­
ing the Sons of Confederate Veterans in 1914, viewed the 
1912 election victory as a turning away from the principles 
of Lincoln and the North: it heralded the coming triumph of 
the principles of the Confederacy. Upon the application of 
the constitutional stance of the Confederacy depended "the 
true progress of our people". The Confederacy had had right 
on its side, and Everett argued, the ideals underlying its 
politics and institutions were vital to all ages and nations, 
Confederate principles he concluded formed a worthy goal to 
which the world should aim if it wanted "true liberty with 
progress". 76
Even half a century after the end of the war the South 
remembered the lesson with mixed pride and bitterness. If 
constitutional doctrine and legal cases provided the flesh 
and bones of the Southern states rights argument, then the 
perceived experience of the Civil War and Reconstruction 
provided the life blood. The Bloody Shirt argument may have 
disappeared from the floors of Congress by the 1910s, but 
the rhetoric, appeal, and memory remained in the South.
John Andrew Rice described how the Civil War still 
haunted the South Carolina of his boyhood in the 1900s. 
Wherever men and women gathered, he recalled, there was a 
veteran present to tell of how the South had been bilked, 
cheated and tricked out of victory, and all listened eagerly 
to/
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to the old men who had returned from the bright past where 
every man was brave, and every woman was a Helen: "Boys 
listened too. ’If we’d just ’a had one more company, we’d 
’a licked ’em’, the old man said, and the boy became that 
company". Reconstruction evoked the greatest horrors. The 
son of a prominent Redeemer wrote that Reconstruction had 
been so rotten and corrupt that the retelling of it dulled 
his sensibilities, wearied his indignation, and turned him 
away in disgust. What the North did to the South after the 
war, he wrote, constituted not only a crime against social 
decency, it was a crime against the principles of free 
government and a betrayal of constitutional liberty. One 
informed Northern observer sagely noted the South’s bitter 
resentment over Reconstruction, but considered that it over­
estimated the process’s duration and intensity. 77
All this produced an instinctive distrust of federal 
government, and a balancing love for the state. Reconstruc­
tion was firmly identified with an interventionalist federal 
government and Southerners developed an instinctive dis­
trust and fear of those in Congress who sought to increase 
federal power without any restraints. Southern whites in 
the 1910s genuinely believed Reconstruction to have been a 
disaster. It can hardly have been a coincidence. Southern­
ers thought, that the civil rights cases which returned 
government to a sound and decent basis had favoured the 
state over the union. One Southern academic speculating 
what would happen if the circumstances of 1861 were repeat­
ed in the 1900s, concluded that the men of the South would 
undoubtedly go with the state if compelled to choose 
between/
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between the state and the union. 78
Southern politicians shared this general feeling. Some 
had direct experience of the war, and all had had their 
careers shaped by Reconstruction. The number of Confederate 
veterans in Congress had fallen by 1913: whereas there had 
been thirteen such men in the Senate in 1900, by 1913 there 
were only five. Yet their colleagues had been alive during 
the war and could claim part of the tradition. Hoke Smith 
had watched Wheeler's cavalry retreat through Chapel Hill 
and had dropped his first name Michael in order to identify 
with Hoke, his uncle and Confederate major general; Benjamin 
Tillman would have joined the army but for illness; John 
Sharp Williams had buried his father, killed at Shiloh. 
Redemption also left scars: Furnifold Simmons's father was 
assassinated by a black during disfranchisement. Those with 
no battle wounds or memoirs publically bemoaned this, thus 
gaining identification with the tradition: Jeff Davis fre­
quently claimed that it was a continual source of regret to 
him that he was too young to fight in the war. 79
Politicians played upon the popular fear that the 
North would dispatch federal troops to enforce the XlVth 
and XVth Amendments in the South, even though the defeat of 
the Lodge Force bill almost quarter of a century before had 
rendered these dead letters in the South. Vardaman is well 
known for his open advocacy of repealing the amendments; 
others such as John Sharp Williams were less open but no 
less committed to the idea; Thomas Hardwicke of Georgia, an 
ally of Hoke Smith, introduced a joint resolution to the 
House at two year intervals for twelve years to accomplish 
the/
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the repeal. But states rights had applications to questions 
other than the race problem: business was equally wedded to 
the doctrine, although more concerned with its application 
to present economic reality.
Richard Edmonds argued that model state or uniform 
state legislation was ruinous, there being too great a 
tendency for states to rush through legislation on the sole 
grounds that similar legislation had been attempted else­
where. Greater regard, he argued, should be paid to the 
individual nature of each state. Other publications agreed 
with this. One Virginian newspaper friendly to commercial 
development hoped that the lines between the states would 
not be obliterated entirely: the states had an important 
function to perform, and the conservation of certain govern­
ment principles was as important as the duty to conserve 
material resources. 80
The centralising nature of much of the New Freedom 
legislation left Edmonds aghast. "How much further is the 
invasion of the States and the usurpation of their rights 
by the Federal government to extend?" asked one of his staff 
writers. Not only had the national government taken over 
many of the powers of the state, but in doing so it had 
acted unconstitutionally. If this tendency continued, the 
writer argued, the people of the state would no longer con­
sent to state government. 81
Much of this was hot air, but it nonetheless demon­
strates that certain of business's fundamental concerns 
were similar to those of the planter and the politician. It 
also hints at the undoubted economic benefits that came from 
advocating/
81
advocating state rather than federal authority. The South 
had never been averse to accepting federal aid for internal 
improvements. Federal monies had been awarded for levee 
building along the Mississippi; land grants were given for 
the Southern route to the Pacific; some federal aid had 
been given regarding highway construction and maintenance; 
Southern ports had been aided by the annual rivers and har­
bours appropriations; and federal funds and agents were 
used against the cotton boll weevil in the Southwest, Such 
aid was small scale, but so were the problems and this was 
as important a feature of the government as the slack en­
forcement of child labour regulations and maximum railroad 
rates. What was important for the South though was that 
these grants were for specific projects and the role of the 
federal authorities was limited. As such the central 
authority did not menace the sovereign powers of the state, 
Arthur Bestor has demonstrated how the South used such 
arguments in pre Civil War politics to defend promote
slavery, Bestor emphasised how states rights was not a 
doctrine of rights, or even a philisophical concept, but 
was "a doctrine of command and power", based upon legal 
postulates. The crux of the argument lay in who controlled 
the police powers, for this could repel all external con­
trols from state boundaries. Bestor acknowledges that the 
pre war concept of state sovereignty was quietly dropped 
during the war, due to military expediency, but notes that 
after the war the Confederate leaders successfully built up 
an apologia based upon the assertion that the South had 
fought for the constitutional principle of self government. 
The /
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The same arguments were used by the same elites in the 
1910s; local autonomy was constitutionally proper: central 
control was not. The aims of that argument were just the 
same in the 1910s: the safeguarding and advancement of the 
power of the regional elite, a power that was "absolute, 
unquestioned, and uncontrolled". 82
Southerners successfully reconciled their desire for a 
greater share of the federal cake to aid internal improve­
ments with their strict state sovereignty doctrine. Such 
funding would be acceptable providing that the police power 
of the state was not threatened. This waS accomplished 
under the pretext of cooperative legislation and the con­
cept of the matching fund grant.
Although cooperative legislation had been passed before 
1913, the idea had not been fully developed, and the acts 
that did exist were limited in their aims. The central 
element of the Carey Act, 1894, providing federal aid for 
irrigation,was that the state governments should submit 
plans to the national authorities for approval. The 
Newlands Act, 1902, carried this further by placing the 
revenues from land sales in the West in a fund that served 
as an independent source for financing state irrigation 
projects and other related public works. Cooperative regu­
lation began with the Lacey Act, 1900, that banned the 
interstate shipment of wild game taken in\ violation of state 
law. The Pure Food and Drug Act, 1906, developed this 
further. None of these measures required any large scale 
commitment/
83
commitment on the part of the federal authorities; neither 
did they encroach upon areas that had been considered pre­
viously the reserve of the states. 83
The first application of the principles of federal 
matching funds came in the White Mountains and Southern 
Appalachian Mountains Act of 1911. This intended to permit 
the federal government buy land in the White Mountain and 
Southern Appalachian Mountain watersheds, thus establishing 
federal national parks in the East comparable to those in 
the West. This had been debated since 1900, and although 
bills passed the Senate repeatedly they failed in the House 
where Speaker Cannon referred them to the committee on 
agriculture: and there they stayed. A new bill was intro­
duced in 1908, and eventually passed the Senate and House. 
Section 2 of this bill provided for an appropriation of 
#100,000 to allow the secretary of agriculture to cooperate 
with the states in the protection of the forested water­
sheds of navigable streams from fire. The intention of 
this was to encourage states to establish their own forest 
fire protection, the grant being made available only to 
those states with adequate safeguards. Where this money 
was to be allocated within the state was the state's respons­
ibility; the responsibility was theirs for the states had to 
raise half the necessary capital before a grant could be 
approved. 84
The measure was unimportant in itself: it did not 
involve any great expenditure, and conservation was very 
much a fashionable topic that touched little on the lives 
of ordinary Americans. The importance of the act lies in 
the/
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the clause regarding matching funds for this would be 
crucial regarding future trends in federal state relations. 
While there is no indication in the act's legislative 
history as to whose idea this was, what is striking is the 
great enthusiasm with which Southerners adopted the prin­
ciple, defending it vigorously in debate. Representative 
Asbury Lever of South Carolina, who with Hoke Smith would 
sponsor many of the agricultural reforms, believed that 
the White Mountains Act would be of greater importance than 
any other measure that had engaged the attention of the 
House since the Civil War. John Weeks of Massachusetts, 
who sponsored the bill in the House, considered that the 
bill finally passed the House committee on agriculture only 
because Hoke Smith, who was still the governor of Georgia, 
took command of the hearing. The precedent created by the 
act would be further developed by Smith and Lever, along 
with other Southerners, during the agricultural reform 
programme. 85
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CHAPTER II 
SOUTHERN AGRICULTURE
The period 1900-1917 is justifiably considered to be 
the Golden Age of American agriculture. These were the 
last years when agriculture would be more important than 
industry, and when those in the country outnumbered those 
in the towns. The perspective of these years is inevitably 
surrounded by a nostalgia created by subsequent generations 
of urban dwellers; but the image of the contented yeoman is 
based upon economic reality, for the achievement of 
American agriculture in the years preceding the first world 
war is impressive. The prices of farm produce tripled; the 
value of farm land and crops quadrupled; the period was one 
of unbounded optimism, even though it was clear that the 
area of exploitable land was limited. A new confidence 
exerted itself, especially when memories were cast back to 
the disastrous years of the 1890s. Despite the attractions 
of expanding industries, the American farmer chose to stay 
on his farm. 1
Not all benefited from this however, for great social 
and geographical differences existed within the general 
picture of growth and prosperity. Great advances were made 
in the Midwest and the West, but growth was low or even non 
existent in the older established Eastern states. The New 
England states all registered a decrease in the number of 
acres of improved land in farm between 1900 and 1910 as 
rationalisation of land use began as a result of industrial 
competition. 2 
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The South shared in the general growth, indeed in many 
indices the South was ahead of the national average. The 
price of cotton for example rose at a higher rate than that 
of other staples. The same was true for the smaller but 
locally important citrus fruit crop. The paradox of 
national development however was also apparent in the South. 
Many areas saw no growth and certain groups did less well 
than others. The South improved at a higher rate than 
other regions, but it was still the most backward. The 
growth of tenantry, the continued influence of the crop 
lien system of credit and a general lack of technological 
innovation meant that Southern agriculture never realised 
its full potential. 3
Southern agriculture was diverse. The possible divi­
sions are numerous, but the most important is that between 
the cotton dominated Lower South and the more diversified 
Upper South. Crucial differences can be drawn between the 
intensive farming practices of the Southeast and the more 
extensive cultivation of the Southwest. Howard Odum 
writing in the 1930s concluded that it was unrealistic to 
talk of the South any longer; rather it was more "authentic" 
to refer to a South East and South West. Another possible 
division between Southern agricultural practices is that 
between highland and lowland, the highlanders being the 
yeomanry living on small farms and the lowlanders being the 
cotton and tobacco plantation owners. Such states as 
Florida and Louisiana contribute to the confusion by refus­
ing to fit into any possible category. 4
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Despite these important divisions the South had a unity 
in its agricultural practices that was remarkable. This was 
due to one crop: cotton. While historians have quite 
rightly attacked the myth of the Cotton South as being too 
simplistic the fact remains that cotton grew throughout the 
region and was the source of most of the region’s wealth.
It had not only regional importance for it still constituted 
America’s most valuable export crop. The importance of 
cotton to both the region and the nation increased during 
the 1910s as the value of the crop rose. Cotton was subject 
to wilder fluctuations in price and demand than wheat or 
corn, but it did have the advantage for the producer of 
always having a market.
Cotton’s importance with regard to the reform legisla­
tion was heightened owing to its value to the men who con­
trolled Southern politics and society. The areas of the 
South that correspond least to the plantation South tended 
to be the areas that contributed least to the mainstream of 
Southern life in the 1910s. The influence of cotton was 
all pervading according to Clarence Poe, the editor of 
Progressive Farmer. Cotton, wrote Poe, was something that 
every Southern boy grew up with ; everyone in the South knew 
and talked about cotton: "When cotton prices drop every 
Southern man feels the blow; when cotton prices advance, 
every industry throbs with new vigour". 5
Cotton was more than a profitable staple: it was a 
symbol. Writers like Poe invested it with a mysticism that 
went far beyond the unromantic business of chopping cotton. 
It/
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It symbolised all things: the ante bellum South of magno­
lias, cavaliers and chivalry; the sturdy yeomanry of 
Jeffersonian democracy; and the coming triumph of Southern 
industry based upon cotton factories in the cotton fields. 
Politicians recognised the appeal of cotton, Ellison D . 
Smith the South Carolinian senator going as far as to 
habitually sport the unattractive cotton boll in the lapel 
of his suit. 6
The more prosaic facts, of the matter reveal that the 
twelve Southern states produced 95 per cent of the total 
cotton crop in 1909. The value of the crop in that year 
was ^664,773,820, more than double the value of the 1899 
crop. All Southern states with the exception of Louisiana, 
where the value of the crop fell by #6,198,339, shared in 
this increase. Upper South states such as Virginia, North 
Carolina and Tennessee where it might be thought that 
cotton was in steady decline doubled the value of their 
crops. The crop in Kentucky tripled in value. These 
figures reveal that confidence in cotton in 1909 was such 
that production was moving onto land hitherto considered to 
be marginal for cotton cultivation. 7
Although such increases reveal that not all perceived 
cotton to be the "white plague", to use the epithet beloved 
of some agricultural reformers, the absolute value of the 
crop in the Upper South remained low. The Virginian crop 
was only a tenth of the value of the Mississippi crop, 
which was #83,148,805, in 1909, and the Kentucky value only 
a third of the Virginian. It was in the Southwestern 
states/
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States of Texas, Arkansas and Oklahoma that cotton made its 
greatest advances, Texas producing almost a quarter of the 
American crop in value by 1909. Other states benefited as 
well. Georgia and South Carolina in particular where the 
value of the crop increased from #42,5 34,235 and #29,599,15 2 
in 1899,to #126,695,612 and #80,337,945 in 1909 respectively 
showed impressive improvements. In the process Georgia 
moved from third to second rank producer ousting Mississippi, 
and South Carolina moved from fifth to fourth rank producer 
displacing Alabama. 8
Cotton was becoming an increasingly popular crop with 
farmers for good economic reasons in the 1910s; while it was 
clear that the high prices of the 1840s would never return, 
a definite corner appeared to have been turned after the 
1890s. Yields were higher in the 1910s due to the increased 
use of fertiliser. Southern farmers used more fertilisers 
than anyone else in the Union, and although this was detri­
mental to the soil in the long run, the short term gains 
encouraged increased usage. The increased value of the crop 
is also partly explainable by the marketing of the cotton 
stalk to produce oil and animal feedcake: while common in 
1910 this was almost unknown in 1900. This added 10 per 
cent to the value of the plant. 9
This overview of cotton production in the 1910s 
although brief modifies two generalisations regarding cotton. 
There is a general impression that cotton became less and 
less profitable in the South from at least the end of the 
Civil War until the 1940s and the full scale introduction of 
mechani s ati on./
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mechanisation. Clearly this is not the case. Cotton was 
not quite the agent of doom upon whose declining fortunes 
all the failings of the South could be blamed, although it 
did provide an easy scapegoat. There were times as in the 
1910s when considerable optimism surrounded cotton. Men 
did not grow cotton for the sole reason that the credit 
merchant or the bank demanded that they do so, but because 
it offered the chance of a good return.
The second generalisation is a geographical one, and 
that is that the story of cotton is essentially the story 
of a westward movement. By the 185 0s Mississippi, not South 
Carolina, was the most dynamic cotton growing state; in the 
1910s it was Texas; by the 1970s it was California. Again 
although there is truth in this overview, important trends 
are hidden. In the 1910s cotton production expanded through­
out the South, not only in the Southwest, and some seaboard 
states such as Georgia and South Carolina expanded at a 
greater rate than their western neighbours.
Cotton was not grown in isolation. The term mono­
culture is often used to describe plantation agriculture, 
but this is misleading. The people who grew the cotton, 
whether landowners or tenants, had to be fed, and while the 
transporting of grains from the Midwest to the South was one 
of the great movements in American trade, much of what was 
eaten was grown on the plantation. While this may have been 
convenient and cost effective, it only remained so as long 
as labour was cheap. It is one of the most impressive 
accomplishments of Southern agriculture in the 1910s that in 
general/
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general food products it managed to keep pace with popula­
tion growth, and increase the value of other crops, even 
though there was little ground on which to expand production. 
Most grew their own vegetables, and also corn which was used 
to maintain a few livestock, usually hogs and mules. In bad 
times corn could provide a reserve for human consumption, 
and in upland areas away from the eyes of revenue men it 
provided a thriving,illicit,distilling industry. 10
Tobacco was the South’s second most important cash crop. 
By 1910 it was becoming increasingly concentrated on the 
Upper South, especially in Kentucky where 38 per cent of the 
United States crop was grown. About 30 per cent of the crop 
was grown there in 1899. The value of the Virginian and 
North Carolinian crops although significant were becoming 
relatively less important. Both states produced around 14 
per cent of the United States crop in 1899, but the Virginian 
share had fallen to 10 per cent by 1909 while the North 
Carolinian dropped to 12 per cent. North Carolinian planters 
had begun to grow new finer strains, but these did not 
produce economic success until the 1920s. They could only 
be used in cigarettes which in the 1910s were regarded very 
much as being the poor man's smoke. Most tobacco, like 
cotton, was exported, usually to Britain and Germany. Like 
cotton it was not true monoculture but was usually grown on 
small farms along with vegetables and corn. Tobacco market­
ing was organised on much the same lines as cotton, although 
the risks of over production were less. There were fewer 
tobacco buyers than cotton buyers, and the market therefore 
found it easier to regulate itself. 11 
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Tobacco grew in every Southern state, although the 
value of production dropped considerably in the Southwest. 
The value of the American crop in 1909 was #104,303,856, an 
increase of 54 per cent over the 1899 value of #56,98 7,902. 
The value of the Kentucky crop in the same period almost 
doubled from #7,210,195 to #12,169,086; the Tennessee crop 
more than doubled from #2,748,495 to #5,661,681. The most 
surprising and dramatic increase occurred in Florida where 
the introduction of new seeds resulted in a small share of 
#254,211 mushrooming to #1,025,476 by 1909. Florida became 
one of the most important sources of seed tobacco as a 
result of this. The older tobacco areas of Virginia and 
North Carolina despite registering more modest increases 
were still above the national average. The value of the 
Virginian crop rose from #7,210,195 in 1899 to #12,169,086 
in 1909, an increase of 69 per cent; the value of the North 
Carolinian crop increased by 72 per cent, from #8,038,691 
in 1899 to #13,847,559 in 1909. 12
The same picture emerges regarding sugar cane pro­
duction. Heavily concentrated in Louisiana where 67 per 
cent of the national production originated, sugar cane 
recorded a lower growth rate than the other Southern cash 
crops, but the overall increase in value of 29 per cent in 
the first decade of the century remains considerable. The 
Louisiana crop was valued at #17,75 2,537 in 1910, an 
increase of 21 per cent on the 1899 value of #14,627,282. 
The most dramatic expansion occurred in Georgia, the second 
rank producer, where the value of the crop increased from 
#1,480,704/
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#1,480,704 to #2,268,110 in 1910, an increase of 53 per 
cento Similar growth rates were recorded in Mississippi, 
Alabama and Texas. 13
Sugar cane differed from cotton and tobacco in that it 
did not provide the South with a large say in national or 
international markets. The United States grew only 4 per 
cent of the world's sugar cane crop, and had to import 80 
per cent of her total needs. The Louisiana growers were 
also coming under increasing domestic competition from the 
sugar beet producers of Idaho and Montana. Sugar further 
differed from the other crops in being a highly capital 
intensive industry, relying heavily upon research and expen­
sive machinery in order to remain competitive with Caribbean 
producers. Attempts at diversification did occur, the 
introduction of rice being the most successful. The rice 
could be grown in small paddy fields while the sugar cane 
grew on the surrounding levees, but in general the sugar 
plantations of Louisiana corresponded the closest to mono­
culture. 14
The heavy concentration of the industry upon one state, 
along with the considerable capital involved, combined to 
produce the most influential special interest group in 
Southern politics. The sugar trust dominated Louisiana 
politics from an early date, and although the trust allowed 
state politicians to vote as they wanted on most occasions, 
they cracked the whip with considerable effect when corpor­
ate interests were at stake. 15
Lumber is the often forgotten agricultural product of
the/
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the South, yet it had considerable importance in the Upper 
South, it was the second ranked cash crop in the Lower South, 
and through its relationship with the naval stores industry 
of the Carolines it provided the United States with a 
strategic resource. The South did not monopolise American 
production as it contributed only 44 per cent of the total 
national production of #195,306,283. Its position had 
improved relative to 1899 when the region supplied only 34 
per cent of the total national value of #109,864,774. North 
Carolina was the largest producer in the union, contributing 
#11,364,134 in 1909; this was only 6 per cent of the national 
value however. Virginia was the third largest producer, 
with a crop valued at #10,118,851. 16
Lumber was important throughout the South: it was 
important in every state and in only three. South Carolina, 
Florida and Louisiana, did its value in 1909 fall below five 
million dollars. Concentrated in the upland and tidal 
regions of the Lower South, lumber had considerable local 
importance. It was the only major Southern cash crop that 
did not rely upon the crop lien credit system, it being 
rather unrealistic to offer credit on a crop that could not 
be harvested for twenty years. The industry though was not 
free of labour problems: many of the most violent labour 
disputes of the South were associated with the timber 
industry. 17
These then were the main cash crops of the South, the 
crops that legislation could most help or hinder. Although 
differences existed between them in organisation and produc­
tion methods, considerable similarities existed between 
them/
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them especially with regard to marketing. Legislation 
conceived specifically to aid the cotton producer was rele­
vant and appropriate to the needs of the tobacco producer.
All could benefit from better roads from the plantation or 
farm to the market place, from increased warehouse facilities, 
from a more active and effective agricultural educational 
system and above all, from a more rational system of credit. 
Another similarity was that they all had their main markets 
outside the South, indeed outside the nation. Federal legis­
lation therefore was the only suitable level of reform to 
solve their marketing problems.
The Southern recovery from the depression of the 1890s 
had been laudable; but no amount of figure juggling or 
rhetorical flourishes from either politicians or journalists 
could disguise the absolute poverty of the region. No other 
region was as backward. Southern planters made much of 
their image as the cultured, well bred cavaliers of old, but 
compared to their Northern equivalents they were poor indeed. 
In absolute terms few landowners could be called rich, 
although relative to their tenants they were kings. One 
Northern observer considered that measured by New York 
criteria, there were few wealthy people in the South. Oscar 
Ameringer, the German born socialist, was more contemptuous; 
the war between the planters and sharecroppers he wrote, 
was one between "bankrupts and paupers". 18
The value of Southern farms was less than elsewhere, 
and they were less advanced technologically. The average 
value of land and buildings per farm in the United States in 
1910 was #6,289; the equivalent Southern figure was #3,050. 
Only/
109
Only Texas with an average value of #6,203 came close to 
the national average, presumably because of the larger size 
of farms. Although the South did not require such substan­
tial buildings as farmers in the Midwest or New England the 
general picture is clear: Southern agriculture was poor. 
States such as Alabama and Mississippi which had once been 
boom areas had average farm values of less than #2,000 in 
1910, Farm values in the United States had increased by 82 
per cent between 1890 and 1910, but Southern values rose by 
only 49 per cent. Only in Texas and, surprisingly, South 
Carolina did values increase by more than the national 
average, 19
This had two important effects. As all farmers 
depended upon credit and the amount of credit depended upon 
how much collateral could be offered, a farmer's standard 
of living and ability to make improvements was directly 
related to the value of his farm. Southerners obviously 
lost out on this: banks were unwilling to lend large sums 
on the sole collateral of a lowly valued farm. The other 
effect was upon state taxation, and thus upon the ability 
of the state to provide needed services. Low land values 
resulted in low tax bases, and this combined with Southern 
landowners* dogged refusal to pay property taxes meant 
that Southern state legislatures were starved of funds,
A similar position appears when the average value of 
farm land per acre, and the average value of implement per 
acre are considered. In 1900 every Southern state had an 
average value of less than ten dollars an acre with the 
exceptions of Virginia and Kentucky where values were 
higher,/
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higher. The average values in the rest of the union were 
greater than twenty dollars an acre, the highest being in 
Illinois where the average value was forty dollars per acre. 
By 1910 although Southern acreage values had risen to an 
average of twenty dollars an acre, they were still the low­
est in America, The Mountain states had been closest to 
the South in acreage values in 1900, but by 1910 they all 
exceeded twenty dollars an acre, and in Idaho and Nebraska 
the values were more than forty dollars. The South there­
fore although it was improving its absolute position, was 
losing ground relatively to other regions, 20
The main feature of pre war American agriculture was 
increased mechanisation, horses, mules and oxen being 
displaced by steam tractors and combine harvesters. In 
1910 the national average value of implements per acre of 
farm land was #1.44: the Southern average was 87 cents.
Only in South Carolina, Louisiana and Tennessee did it rise 
above one dollar. Southern landowners could plead that 
they did not need mechanisation: they had a cheap and pliant 
labour source. It does say much however about the general 
levels of efficiency tolerated in Southern agriculture, 21 
Other regions were aware of Southern rural problems, 
Southern congressmen making sure that they were continually 
heard in Washington, The result was a considerable wave of 
sympathy for the South which affected the legislation. It 
was the deans of the American agricultural colleges for 
example and not the Southern politicians who proposed that 
the allocation of the appropriation under the Smith Lever 
Agricultural Extension Act be weighted in favour of the 
South./
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South. Goodwill towards the South was not confined to 
academics. Senator Henry Hollis of New Hampshire, one of 
the sponsors of the Federal Farm Loans Act, proposed that 
there be more land banks in the South at the expense of 
his native New England, as the greatest problem was in the 
South. Very few men condemned the South and its agricul­
tural problems, and all viewed them sympathetically. 22 
The greatest single problem in Southern agriculture 
was the continued increase in tenantry. This was a nation­
al problem, but it was most acute in the South, and 
although the rate of increase had slowed down by 1910 it 
remained considerable. In 1890, 886,95 7 farms in the 
United States were mortgaged; by 1900 this had risen to 
1,127,749 farms; and by 1910 to 1,327,439. This represented 
a 27 per cent increase between 1890 and 1900; and an 18 per 
cent increase between 1900 and 1910. There were 205,586 
mortgaged Southern farms in 1900, a massive 385 per cent 
increase on the 1890 figure of 42,799 mortgaged farms. By 
1910 the South had swung closer to the national average, 
there being 301,794 mortgaged farms, an increase of 46.5 per 
cento There was no Southern state below the national 
average in either 1900 or 1910. 23
Taking out a mortgage on a property is by no means a 
bad thing in itself: it can indicate an innovatory society 
using sophisticated means of credit in order to advance 
itself. It developed to an unhealthy extent in the South 
however: economists continually warned small farmowners not 
to mortgage their farms, knowing that the chances of a 
tenant regaining ownership were small. Many had no 
alternative/
112
alternative though: they did not mortgage their farms to 
raise investment capital, they did so to survive. This was 
especially true in the Southwest. Gradually the old three 
class rural society of the South, isuij the planta­
tion owners, the yeomanry and the landless labourers, 
became polarised between those who owned land and those who 
did not.
This development was potentially beneficial as it 
increased managerial control over Southern agriculture thus 
allowing more efficient and regulated practices. It also 
reduced labour costs for those who owned land, but ultimate­
ly it was ruinous for it encouraged rural overpopulation. 
Too many people lived in the South: it was, in the words of
the Frenchman Brantôme, as "full as an egg". Tenantry
encouraged this by giving landowners an incentive to retain 
large labour forces even though this would be wasteful and 
inefficient in the longterm. The problem would only be 
solved by the massive out migration caused by New Deal 
policies.
Such opinions however are with the wisdom of hind­
sight. For the Southern planter in the 1910s tenantry 
represented the best answer to his labour problems. It is 
in the proportion of farms operated by tenants that the
division between Upper and Lower South is most marked. This
is mainly a reflection of differing agricultural patterns, 
cotton being the most suited to tenantry. In the Lower 
South, over half of all farms were operated by tenants in 
1910, this rising to 65 per cent in Georgia and 66 per cent 
in Mississippi and South Carolina. By comparison 27 per 
cent/
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cent of Virginian farms, 42 per cent of North Carolinian 
farms and 34 per cent of Kentuckian farms were operated by 
tenants. 24
Why this system emerged was due to many factors. In 
many ways it was the only means in the 1870s whereby the 
South could finance agriculture, and the implied blame 
placed upon the North by this theory provided an easy justi­
fication for continuing the practice. Ironically, the first 
landowner to introduce sharecropping did so in the tobacco 
plantations of Maryland's Eastern Shore, an area almost 
untouched by the Civil War. As many have observed, tenantry 
proved to be a very efficient instrument of social control, 
although many tenants retained complete control over their 
own lives, roaming at will throughout the South in search of 
better prospects. 25
The effect of tenantry was to re-establish the ante 
bellum plantation in a social and economic sense. The plan­
tation had not been abolished by the Civil War or Reconstruc­
tion. The planter's mansion may have decayed, the slaves 
freed, and the family silver stolen or pawned; but the land- 
holding remained intact. And it was the size and nature of 
the landholding rather than the nature of the labour force 
that characterised the plantation. Vital to any form of 
plantation agriculture was a high degree of managerial con­
trol. In order to run successfully,the type of crop to be 
grown, how it was grown and where it was grown on the planta­
tion had to be closely monitored by either the landowner or 
his managers. Tenantry allowed this to happen. 26 
Conditions of contract between the tenant and the landowner 
varied/
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varied according to the means of the tenant and local 
economic conditions. Contracts were usually verbal, were 
renewed annually, and could be made or broken at will by 
either the landowner or the tenant. Under sharecropping 
the landlord provided the land, a house, implements, work 
animals, seed and half the required fertiliser. The 
cropper provided the labour, half of the fertiliser and 
half the cost of ginning if cotton was grown. The crop was 
divided equally between the owner and tenant although in 
the 1910s it was common for the tenant to surrender two 
thirds of the crop. Often the landowner managed the con­
tract so that he received differing shares of each crop.
Thus, in Georgia the landlord might receive a quarter of 
the cotton, a third of the grain and half of the small grain. 
In Texas it was common to base the contract on what was 
known as the "third and the fourth", whereby the landlord 
received a third of the grain and a quarter of the cotton. 
Share renting was similar to cropping except that the tenant 
provided his own implements and perhaps some work animals.
In return he was entitled to two thirds of the crop. Money 
rarely entered into these transactions: if the tenant 
required anything he went to the landowner. Cash renting 
though did introduce cash in that the tenant agreed to pay 
a stipulated rent, either at a fixed price per acre or else 
in a lump sum, for the entire farm. Renters were entitled
to keep the entire crop. 27
Sharecropping involved the greatest risks to the land­
owner, Close supervision had to be maintained in order to
get the most out of his investment. Renting by comparison
involved/
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involved very little risk on the part of the landowner. The 
greatest returns were offered by sharecropping though. A 
study of Mississippi Delta farms in 1915 concluded that the 
landowner was assured an annual return of 6-7 per cent on 
land operated by cash renters no matter the yield of the 
crop or the income of the tenant. Returns for share- 
cropping could be as high as 20 per cent per annum when good 
yields were combined with careful management. On average 
the rates of return from sharecropping were 13.6 per cent 
per annum; from share renting they were 11.8 per cent; and 
from cash renting 6.6 per cent. The greatest returns were 
made when the landowner rented on a different system of 
shares. While much of the literature on tenantry has con­
centrated upon its tally demoralising effect upon the
tenants very little has emphasised the economic attractions 
of the system for the landowner. These certainly existed, 
and go a long way to explaining why there was so little in 
the way of legislation to aid the tenant, despite the con­
siderable clamour for such reforms from economists. 28
Sharecropping represented a safe option to the tenant; 
it carried little financial risk and assured the tenant of 
an average farm hand’s wage. The share renter had a better 
income, but at the same time stood to lose more. Cash 
renters ran still greater risks of failure if the crop was 
poor, but he had the greatest opportunity of raising his 
income and buying his own land. A renter's income could be 
as high as #1,000 a year. For most tenants the ultimate 
objective was to own land. A study conducted in north 
Texas in 1916 discovered that all the tenants who were 
interviewed/
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interviewed expressed a wish to own their own homes, but 
sadly few expected to become home owners» They complained 
that their landlords discouraged thrift and profitable 
agriculture, holding out no encouragement to the tenant to 
improve himself* Illness and the payment of medical treat­
ment, which a landowner might provide for a cropper but not 
a renter, was the most common blow to a tenant's budget*
The general decrease in land availability in the 1910s with 
its resultant price rises further pushed the hope of land 
ownership away from the tenant* It is little wonder that 
many preferred to spend their money on automobiles, alcohol 
or whatever else pleased them* 29
Some landowners treated their tenants well, some did 
not* Many took the time to ensure that their investments 
had good accommodation and medical care* They treated their 
tenants as children, despairing when their efforts were 
rewarded with either ingratitude or the tenant moving away*
One North Carolinian landowner complained that he had to 
repair broken buildings, damaged forests, keep a constant 
eye open for theft and ensure that seed and fertiliser was 
not going to waste* Another wrote that the tenant problem 
would be solved when the tenant realised that there was a 
responsibility upon him as well as the owner* In nine cases 
out of ten he continued, the landowner was prepared to help 
the tenant when he found the tenant willing to help himself* 30 
There is a reasonableness in these opinions, but this 
was not shared by all* Lower South plantation owners, the 
men who had the most to gain or lose by legislation, revealed 
little in the way of humanitarian concern for their poorer 
neighbours*/
117
neighbours* John Andrew Rice, the nephew of Ellison D, 
Smith, and an educated, literary man, referred to white 
tenant farmers as "the scum of the earth", who in their 
behaviour and intelligence were "really amoebae". The 
prejudices of the South that Rice found distasteful were 
those of the landless whites* They were mean, cowardly, 
cruel, and had ruined the whole state of South Carolina and 
its culture* Blacks,Rice added by way of comparison,were 
gentle, hardworking children "who love the sun"* 31
William Alexander Percy, the son of the Mississippi 
planter and United States senator Leroy Percy, and another 
well educated man, concurred in this view* He considered 
the poor whites to be "probably the most unprepossessing 
breed on the broad fact of the ill populated earth"* While 
prepared to give them credit for their folklore, Percy none­
theless declared that he could never admire, trust or love 
them* The only way to deal with them was by sharecropping, 
a system which Percy thought was "the most moral system 
under which human beings can work together", indeed all the 
problems of the world would soon be solved if the principle 
was adopted by capital and industry* 32
These then were the type of opinions held by the men 
who dominated Southern society* Others with a different 
world view saw the position of the tenant in a more sympa­
thetic light* Oscar Ameringer, brought up along Marxist 
lines that taught him to view farmers as petty capitalists, 
was shocked on discovering tenant conditions in the South 
west* "I had come upon another America" he wrote* A 
Federal Writers Project worker had the same experience in 
the/
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the 1930s:
It is unreal, almost theatrical when Joe Fielding 
like a Coralina playmaker made up to play the 
role of a sharecropper, steps into the parlor in 
his sock feet after having received his curtain 
call. A tee shirt, both sleeves of which are 
torn from the elbow down ... and a pair of denim 
overalls cover the tall lank figure. A slight 
deafness which necessitates a frequent "Mo'm?", 
a cast in one eye that gives the effect of a 
twinkle, a chew of tobacco in one cheek, a slow 
hesitating drawl, and - enter the Southern share­
cropper o
The irony and shock to the worker came from the discovery 
that Fielding was not a cropper, but a cash renter, the 
supposed elite of the Southern peasantry. 33
Tenant farmers rarely sought the ear of the politician, 
seemingly having accepted their situation with stoicism. 
Religion and alcohol provided consolation, and there was 
always the prospect of a better tenancy down the road. The 
introduction of textiles to the piedmont counties of the 
Carolines, Georgia and Alabama provided another alternative. 
Mill villages were hardly model dwelling places, but they 
were an improvement on rural life. Tenants did form "self 
defence" organisations, but their importance was usually 
local, and they rarely became political. The best known 
was the Farmers' Union, founded in and strongest in north 
east Texas among small-farm owners, in an area where 
tenantry increased more rapidly than elsewhere. The Union 
accepted/
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accepted the system as it stood,choosing to limit its 
activities to self help ventures. Its leaders strongly 
warned the members against politics and the temptation to 
re-attempt a third party. 34
Politicians were vague upon the structural problems in 
Southern agriculture. The question of sharecropping never 
arose in debate. Platitudes on the virtues of agrarian 
life abounded. Even the supposed defenders of the "poor 
folk" such as Benjamin Tillman, James Vardaman, Jeff Davis 
or Otis Wingo rarely even mentioned the terms of share­
cropper or renter. The problem simply did not exist in 
their minds. If they thought at all of the tenant farmer, 
then it was with feelings of distrust, suspicion and hatred, 
Neither did politicians from outside the region raise the 
matter in an informed manner. During the debates on the 
Agricultural Extension bill for example, Albert Cummins 
coming from Iowa where tenantry was widespread, gave the 
impression that all sharecroppers were black. As a result 
of his error,which was quickly fastened upon by Hoke Smith, 
a potentially damaging argument against the racist over­
tones of the bill was lost. 35
Commerce and industry were further factors in the 
Southern agricultural equation. The South had experienced 
a moderate industrial growth since 1865, but in many ways 
Southern industrialisation was neither outstanding nor 
l.O'.'Aii cv^ l<L .. New South rhetoric claimed that from 1880 a 
revolution had occurred in the South without precedent or 
parallel: but this did not reflect economic reality. 
Commerce was important in the South, as it had always been, 
and/
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and industry was becoming increasingly so, but neither had 
displaced agriculture as the leading activity of the South. 36 
Despite the confident predictions of twenty years 
before, the vast majority of the Southern population was 
engaged in agriculture. Of those gainfully employed in the 
United States in 1910, 33 per cent were in agriculture.
The Southern average was 60 per cent, ranging from 77 per 
cent in Mississippi to 43 per cent in Florida. On average,
14 per cent of the workforce were in manufacturing in the 
South compared to 28 per cent in the Union. The weakness 
of Southern industry relative to agriculture is further 
revealed when the leading industries of each state are 
looked at. In none of the twelve states was the leading 
industry by value of product a manufacturing industry inde­
pendent of agriculture: in Alabama the leading industry was 
lumber; in Georgia it was cotton goods; in Texas it was 
slaughtering. Industry would play a vital role in the 
future story of the South, but its greatest impact would 
not be until the 1940s. 37
Industrialists however took a very active interest in 
agriculture. Railroad companies for example published 
journals designed to attract migrant farmers to the South.
The Southern Railroad Company had a well known and efficient 
migrants bureau. Agricultural education, better highways 
and improved warehouse facilities were all encouraged by 
businessmen. Most of their work was rhetorical however - 
come to the "land of opportunity" where abundant opportuni­
ties exist for "a great variety of interests" urged the 
Southern Field, the house magazine of the Southern railroad 
system/
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system. 38
Few businessmen or industrialists either perceived or 
offered any alternative to the tenant system, the strong 
anti commerce bias of the Farmers' Alliance having made them 
wary of tenant intentions. Industry was content to lend 
support to the landowners by improving the present system, 
preferably by impressing upon planters the need to adopt 
more business like methods of management. The Southern 
Field blamed tenants for the poor state of agriculture, 
maintaining that "the rundown, unkempt appearance of many 
sections which are naturally well endowed with fertile soil" 
was caused by the poor management of shiftless tenants. 39
By the 1900s a body of consensus composed of journa­
lists, economists and sociologists was beginning to emerge 
in the South. They took a more scholarly and scientific 
look at Southern agriculture which was heeded, though not 
always obeyed by the politicians. These men invariably 
agreed on the broad issues although disagreeing on minor 
details. They corresponded with each other, and printed 
voluminous papers and articles on the problems of the rural 
South. While their solutions were essentially those of the 
uplifter they were suspicious of the intentions of business­
men, and had a profound distrust of the politician. Their 
dream was to apply urban, middle class, business orientated, 
values to Southern agriculture. Clarence Poe, one of the 
most ardent of agricultural journalists, wrote that although 
rural credits legislation, longer leases and better educa­
tion had something to do with solving the problem, the most 
important thing was for a tenant to be a "good farmer", but 
more/
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more importantly, he was to be "a saving farmer". Every 
young tenant, argued Poe, who started to save at 21 would 
by the age of 35 have enough to buy his own land. Tenantry 
was to be regarded as a transitional stage, and the tenant 
should always aim to be a landowner; "personal property 
gradually acquired is the way to home ownership". Tenants 
usually considered that agricultural papers were pro-owners, 
and anti-renters. 40
The rural press was only one part of the agricultural 
debate, and its impact upon legislators was minimal at the 
federal level, but it was important. It was dynamic in 
every sense. Numerous publications existed, and almost 
uniquely in the South, it was free from the stagnating 
effects of political partisanship. They were mildly Demo­
cratic in outlook, being in favour of a low tariff, but the 
journals rarely made political comments. Many of the publi­
cations were very local, covering a state at the most, but 
others were sold throughout the South and took a regional 
view. Some such as the Progressive Farmer, which was the 
most widely circulated journal, published different editions 
for the various sub regions of the South. Most of the 
articles provided sensible and practical advice on how to 
improve crops, and how these crops could be best marketed, 
although there was less emphasis upon this. The main crops 
upon which attention was focussed were soft fruits, legumes 
and afalfa, for the journals wanted to woo the South away 
from its marriage to cotton. Readers'letters, which were 
optimistic and recounted success stories, were another 
feature, as were the articles and stories meant to alleviate 
the/
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the feelings of isolation that were common on Southern 
farms. Certain of the journals such as the Southern Culti­
vator struck a more religious note with articles from the 
rural clergy, and the Progressive Farmer provided separate 
sections for children and women.
The advice offered by such journals was eminently 
practical and doubtless aided many farmers and widened 
horizons that would otherwise have remained narrow. Quali­
fications have to be made however in order to place these 
otherwise admirable journals into _ context.
They were only of use to those men who were not only willing 
to change, but who also had the means to do so. Given that 
the average tenant was barely literate anyway, their direct 
benefit to him was limited, even if he had by means of con­
tract or circumstances the necessary managerial control to 
do something for himself. Furthermore, the journals would 
seem to have been directed not at the black belt planter, 
but at the small propertyowner. In this sense it is inter­
esting to note how these journals shied away from the very 
word "planter", using the more general term of "farmer".
It is not as if the information provided by the agricultural 
press would have been of little use to the black belt 
planter, but the suspicion lingers that the men who mattered 
in Southern rural society subscribed to Manufacturers Record 
or South Atlantic Quarterly rather than Progressive Farmer. 
The editors presumably considered that those already uplift­
ed would resent the uplifting spirit.
The Southern academics although less numerous than 
journalists had a greater influence upon legislators. The 
correspondence/
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correspondence of Eugene Cunningham Branson, the professor 
of rural economics at the University of North Carolina, 
contains letters from North Carolinian congressmen solicit­
ing his advice. Branson's opinions were too radical for 
many politicians so it is unlikely that they were heeded by 
the politicians, but the direct link existed and was main­
tained. Chapel Hill was the most noted centre of agricul­
tural economics and sociology in the South, although the 
Texas state system of education was also prominent in pub­
lishing research monographs. Chapel Hill in the 1910s was 
by no means the influential think tank that it would become 
in the 1930s under Howard Odum, Rupert Vance, Thomas 
Woofter, and the Southern Regional Committee, but it did 
treat rural economics as a legitimate academic discipline 
and had considerable success in galvanising the North 
Carolina legislature into action. This started with 
Branson's arrival in 1912 from the Georgia State Normal 
School. 41
Few Southern academics took an interest in agriculture 
until the 1930s; classicism still dominated Southern 
higher education. Some young Northern academics such as 
Albert Hart of Harvard and Frank Tannenbaum of Columbia ran 
critical eyes over the region, but academic opinion outwith 
the South remained ignorant of conditions within the region. 
Branson proved to be a considerable propagandist throughout 
the South however. His voluminous and meticulously kept 
correspondence reveals a man prepared to travel considerable 
distances to lecture to small town businessmen and church 
groups on the tenancy problem, who wrote to all levels of 
politicians/
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politicians on agricultural matters, and who published 
widely on all aspects of rural life. He had a wide and 
informed knowledge of Southern life and was not afraid to 
venture out of the academic cloisters and into the field in 
the course of his researches. This was an uncommon virtue 
among Southern academics.
Better informed and more sophisticated in his world 
view, Branson also had more time to gather, collate and 
present his facts than the average journalist. He was one 
of the few to realise the complexity of the problem, being 
less tempted than most to adopt a single easily remedied 
cause attitude, as most of the journals did. This single 
cause varied from journal to journal and issue to issue.
The choice usually consisted of: longer term leases, more 
diversified crops, better highways, more economic activity 
and less political agitation, more livestock, more north 
European immigrants, and less alcohol. There were few 
attempts to integrate these causes however. Branson sought 
to develop a practical plan which would end tenantry.
Seeing the rural problem as the gravest faced by the nation, 
the economist believed that the salvation of the South 
depended upon "a multiplied host of small farmers who live 
on and cultivate the farms they own”. Peasant proprietor­
ship was to be the answer, although the more communistic 
implications of this were carefully defused by Branson's 
continual repudiation of revolutionary change. The present 
political system, he reasoned, would be adequate. 42
The first practical step, Branson proposed, would be 
to abolish the one year contract system, the effect of which 
was/
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was "to strip us bare and leave us more and more defenceless 
as modern civilization develops". From this would come a 
more stable farm population and more "progressive communi­
ties", and this would be the first step to better cultiva­
tion, improved educational facilities, and more effective 
highways. Abolishing the one year contract was something 
that a state legislature could accomplish, but Branson had 
very real doubts as to the value of politics. He wrote to 
a newspaper editor that he believed "with all my heart that 
an ounce of economics is at present worth a whole ton of 
politics". From his position he was probably correct, but 
to his credit he did not use this as an excuse but attempted 
to win the friendship and favour of politicians. 43 
The problem of black tenancy was a considerable 
obstacle for Branson, as it was for all who thought about 
Southern agriculture. Many whites wished the blacks well, 
the seemingly wide acceptance of Booker T. Washington's 
Atlanta Compromise having dulled their fears and hatred; yet 
the establishment of the segregated South was taken as an 
excuse to completely forget about the black. Reading through 
Progressive Farmer one could be excused for thinking that 
there were no blacks at all in the South, the eight million 
Southern blacks being completely ignored. Poe planned to 
extend the mental segregation in his journal and introduce 
segregated land ownership, the effect of which would have been 
to deny the chance of landownership to blacks. Nothing came 
of his idea, although it did receive widespread discussion 
and the endorsement of the North Carolina Farmers' Union.
Other journals were even more brutal than Poe. An editorial 
in/
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in Southern Cultivator claimed that in order for Southern 
agriculture to rise to its true level, the less intelligent 
blacks had to be "eliminated", as they were incapable of 
learning scientific farming. 44
Branson's opinion was more sophisticated, but ulti­
mately similar. He wished to keep the blacks on the land, 
bemoaning their drifting towards the cities; this he 
believed would have a dissipating effect upon their souls. 
Their best hope, Branson argued, lay in their rejection of 
the ballot box in favour of the barn and the bank book, for 
only by this would the blacks be able to emerge from 
"darkness" and "jungleism". He emphasised the role of 
education ,, although Branson was unable to concede
that the blacks could ever rise to the level of whites in 
this. The economist however was prepared to allow the 
blacks the right to landownership, hoping that 
would develop a certain sense of "personal worth and 
dignity"; indeed Branson was envious of the success that 
Washington appeared to have had in impressing the desira­
bility of landownership upon black tenants. Branson's 
dilemma over black tenants was the same that all Southern 
liberals faced: how could the black progress, as they 
believed he should, if white values were best, but the 
black was irrevocably biologically inferior? Branson 
tacitly acknowledged his problem by transferring its solu­
tion to a higher level: "The negro problem will be settled 
upon no plane lower than the Ten Commandments and the 
Sermon on the Mount". 45
Agricultural legislation was more directly influenced
by/
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by the bureaucracy, in particular the United States and the 
various state departments of agriculture. These burgeoned 
during the 1900s, taking new tasks upon themselves and 
generally attempting to impose standards upon the haphazard 
and occasionally wayward advance of American agriculture. 
Their main functions were advisory and educational although 
they gradually acquired a political role. Both the federal 
and the state authorities would be major beneficiaries of 
the reform legislation as this considerably enlarged their 
spheres of action.
In 1862 Congress created the United States department 
of agriculture under the Morrill Land Grant Act. Many 
feared that this would be a serious drain on national 
resources, and a dangerous precedent, but unduly low budget 
provisions restrained the department’s activities to seed 
distribution and data collection. As one historian has 
remarked, it was "muscleless". This was the situation 
throughout much of the late nineteenth century. Secretaries 
of agriculture remained largely anonymous, and although the 
department turned its attention towards more practical 
matters in the 1890s, its influence upon the national life 
was minimal. Change began under the secretaryship of James 
Wilson (1901-13), for he concentrated the department's 
activities upon encouraging production, and later develop­
ing social studies of rural life. In this he received the 
active cooperation of Theodore Roosevelt, whose champion­
ing of rural life led to the publication in 1911 of the 
influential report by the Country Life Commission. This 
opened the eyes of many to conditions in the American 
countryside,/
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countryside, and provided a useful spur to apply to negli­
gent legislators. 46
The main change in the department's nature came as a 
result of the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act, for this vastly 
increased its regulatory duties. Previously the department 
administered the fund created by the Morrill Act to aid the 
state agricultural college, but this was routine work 
carried out well away from the public eye. Regulating the 
food industry however was fashionable, and increased the 
department's standing amongst the other bureaucracies. In 
1908 it undertook the regulation of the dairy industry. By 
the Boll Weevil Protection Act the department appropriated 
monies to aid the fight of counties in the Southwest against 
the weevil. The sums involved were not large, but it was a 
major expansion of the department's activities: for the 
first time its agents were seen working away from desks in 
Washington. The Southwest received additional aid from the 
bureau of animal industry's work against ticks which carried 
fever among Texan cattle. The other main activities of the 
department related to the South were the continued provision 
of free seed to help diversify crops and encourage experi­
mentation, and research publications with the aim of devel­
oping Southern livestock. 47
By 1913 the department was a fast growing component of 
the federal bureaucracy whose opinions were increasingly 
heard and heeded. In 1916 it needed to move into a new 
office building on a prime spot in the Mall costing one 
million dollars. In 1917 the department was larger still as 
a result of the reform legislation; and after its truly 
remarkable/
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remarkable success in raising food production during the 
first world war it became one of the most influential 
departments in Washington. A journalist wrote with con­
siderable foresight in 1914 that there would be "tremendous 
openings" in Washington for young men with vision in rural 
economics. 48
Most farmers were content with the work of the depart­
ment, although they were prone to grumbling about the poor 
quality of seed distributed free by the bureau of plant 
industry. They were less pleased about Woodrow Wilson's new 
secretary of agriculture, David M. Houston. Many, according 
to the Southern Planter, had hoped that Wilson would have 
picked someone with a more intimate knowledge of agricul­
tural affairs. The journal dealt Houston a further blow by 
considering that doubts regarding his appointment would be 
somewhat allayed by the appointment of Dr. Galloway as his 
assistant secretary. Criticism followed Houston throughout 
his career as secretary of agriculture. He aroused consid­
erable resentment over his refusal to endorse the wilder 
demands of the South during the 1914 cotton crisis. When he 
refused quite correctly to re-establish the War Finance 
Committee, an agency which had greatly aided Southern cotton 
growers, one Georgian planter wrote of him as being dis­
honest and that the people of the South "almost as a unit" 
believed him to be the "most sinister figure" in the United 
States. J.Jo Brown, the Georgia commissioner of agriculture 
agreed with this, believing that Houston had damaged Ameri­
can agriculture more than any single factor since 1917. 
Houston by standing in the way of the South's more outrageous 
demands/
131
demands never won the plaudits of its leaders. 49
Many of the criticisms were unfair, motivated more by 
frustrated greed rather than objective opinion. David 
Houston was Colonel House's protege and owed his seat in 
the Cabinet as much to this as his knowledge of farming 
problems; indeed his appointment was so managed by behind 
the scenes politics that the first he knçw of his new posi­
tion was upon reading the newspapers. Houston was born in 
Monroe, North Carolina, and after an education in economics 
at Harvard, engaged upon an academic career. He became 
president of the Agricultural and Mechanical College of 
Texas and the University of Texas during which time he 
involved himself in the U.S. department of agriculture!s 
campaign against the boll weevil. He subsequently became 
chancellor of Washington University in St. Louis. 50
Link described Houston as an "unimaginative classical 
economist" who despite himself managed to make a sizable 
contribution to New Freedom legislation. He was however "a 
misfit in a progressive administration". While the sub­
stance of this criticism is accurate, it is somewhat unfair: 
Houston had many admirable qualities which require just as 
much stressing as do his deficiencies. Link is correct to 
say that Houston opposed direct federal involvement, but it 
should be noted that Houston opposed the details of this 
involvement rather than the principle. As will be seen with 
regard to the Federal Highways Act of 1916, Houston was 
against giving the states a say in where aid should be 
given, but he favoured the broad principle of federal aid, 
especially when its supervision was by his department. 
Houston/
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Houston had considerable experience in Texas of how state 
governments could squander federal aid, and his concern was 
more that this should be avoided rather than that the 
federal authorities should act a passive role in agriculture. 51 
Neither is it entirely fair to label him "unimagina­
tive": however limited his economic ideas may appear by 
Keynesian standards, they were as advanced and learned as 
most of his contemporaries’. Furthermore, he had little 
time for political platitudes, his attitude towards agricul­
ture being blunt, honest and uncompromising: "Farming must 
pay" he wrote. He also realised the complexity of the 
agricultural problem, urging his department to publish on 
and publicise the social as well as the economic aspect of 
rural life. 52
Link however is correct in the poignant picture he 
paints of the man: Houston was "one of the loneliest members 
of the Wilson circle". He had no intimates in the Cabinet, 
partly due to his own cold, uncommunicative nature, and 
partly because of Wilson's rather aloof attitude to the only 
other academic on his Cabinet. The only social relation 
between the two men occurred near the end of the administra­
tion when they played a game of golf but, "we did not have 
a very easy time of it". Houston resented this social cool­
ness, but it is to his credit that he concealed this con­
cerning himself with the administering of his department as 
well as the wider activities of the administration. Wilson 
for his part trusted Houston, and rarely interfered with 
agricultural policy. This would have an important effect 
upon the agricultural legislation, for it rather left 
Houston/
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Houston out on a limb when it came to dealing with politi­
cians. The secretary of agriculture on his own did not 
carry enough weight to overturn all the demands of con­
gressmen. Houston realised better than most the importance 
of where the ultimate control of the appropriations under 
the reforms lay, and although he provided the most effect­
ive opposition to the South's more obvious pork barrel 
politics, he could only achieve so much on his own. 5 3
The state departments of agriculture supplemented the 
federal agency. They were reticent during the reform 
debates, curiously so considering the effect that the pro­
posed legislation would have on their duties. The state 
departments did not possess the initiatory ability of the 
federal authority, and they did not go out of their way to 
create such a role.
State departments though were open to political 
suasion in a way that the federal department was not. The 
papers of the Georgian commissioner of agriculture, J.D. 
Price, are almost entirely patronage letters, for even the 
most specialised and responsible positions. Price arranged 
through an Atlanta attorney that the position of physician 
at the state prison farm should go to "a mutual friend".
The state inspector of fertilisers had been adjudged insane, 
thus losing his position, but his banker arranged with 
Price that the family could draw the salary until the 
vacant position was filled. When the new man was appointed, 
it was on the recommendation of the same banker. Such mis­
uses of office may speak a lot for Price's humanity, not to 
mention political acumen, but little for his sense of 
professionalism./
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professionalism. Much of the Georgian commissioner's time 
was taken up on such matters, others higher up the politi­
cal ladder leaning on him to fill positions for them. 
Representative Dudley Hughes, whose son was the assistant 
commissioner of agriculture, often asked Price to find 
positions for men that he could not find postmasterships 
for. The nature of these positions may be wondered at, it 
being rather doubtful if Georgia required a guano inspector 
and two assistants. It is not surprising that a time and 
motion expert recorded in 1917 that there existed an 
"appalling" lack of efficiency in the department, and that 
it should be completely re-organised and several divisions 
eliminated. 54
Doubtless, not all the work of the state departments 
was politically motivated. Theoretically the main 
dichotomy between the state and federal authorities was 
over education: the states provided agricultural education 
while the federal authorities administered the monies. By 
1913 however both had taken on new functions and consider­
able overlap existed, and in certain fields such as weevil 
prevention they actively cooperated with each other. The 
Texan state department in particular appears to have been 
well run, contributing to the development of the state's 
agriculture. The corrupt and inefficient Georgian depart­
ment also played a positive role: it gave advice to a 
farmer on how to grow his tomatoes; it supplied another 
with bacteria to innoculate his legumes at a reduced cost; 
it supplied various cotton mills with estimates of the 
Georgian crop; and it dealt with the enquiries of prospective 
immigrant/
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immigrant farmers. Such were the bread and butter tasks of 
the state departments. 55
Southern departments had to contend with a problem
that most Northern and Midwestern departments did not: they
received only parsimonious budgets. Meaningful reform was 
difficult to achieve. Whereas it was relatively inexpen­
sive to reorganise credit legislation, highway improvements, 
better educational facilities and scientific marketing 
bureaus required the state legislatures to make regular 
appropriations; and this Southern state legislatures were 
loath to do. It is noticeable that the Georgia department 
could do little itself to aid enquirers, but rather referred 
them to local chambers of commerce or the railroad companies. 
Walter Hines Page, no stranger to the difficulties faced in 
trying to spur Southern legislators to action, lamented the 
fact that the South's quarrel with George III had been over
taxation, "so great was the dread of taxation that was
instilled into us". Southern legislatures were dominated 
by black belt planters who were reluctant to raise revenues 
which would ultimately come from their own pockets. When 
criticised for this, the Southern politician could easily 
blame the traditional scapegoat - the regional poverty 
created by the carpetbaggers, scalawags and Northern armies. 56 
Heavy taxation was one of the most heinous crimes laid 
at the door of the reconstruction governments by the early 
twentieth century South. James Hemphill, a South Carolinian 
representative, had written that as soon as the Republicans 
had come to power in his state they became too accustomed to 
appropriating monies from the state treasuries for useless 
expenditures./
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expenditures. They had spent $95,000 in decorating the 
legislative hall: the Democrats spent only $3,061. Such 
myths grew and found acceptance. Southern taxation 
remained the lowest in the union as it still does, with 
various states competing for the"honour"of having the 
cheapest government. Reformers, realising that the tax 
rates had to be raised to effect change, pressed for new 
legislation, or else tried to ensure that existing statutes 
were heeded. Opposition to such moves was fierce. 5 7
Politicians rarely raised the matter: long discourses 
on complicated tax problems were hardly likely to grip the 
imagination of a Southern gathering. If taxation was 
mentioned, it was usually in connection with the tariff.
One professor of economics bemoaned this, claiming that 
there was insufficient attention paid to state, county, 
municipal, school or highway district taxes. The result 
was that his state. North Carolina, had an "astonishingly" 
ineffective and unjust system of taxation. 58
Various components made up the North Carolinian tax 
system. The general property tax was . the most important, 
contributing 5 2 per cent of the state’s revenue; 71 per 
cent of the municipalities’ revenue; and 90 per cent of the 
counties’ revenue for schools and highways: it was also the 
most open to abuse. The state constitution had placed a 
limit of 66-f- cents on the $100 for tax rates, but as the 
actual rate varied from county to county this limit was 
often flouted. In 1911 the rate was as low as 60 cents on 
$100 in the black belt Martin County; but in Mitchell 
County in the extreme west of the state it was $1.43 on the 
$100./
137
$100. Municipal taxes also varied considerably from eight 
cents on the $100 in Hassell County to $1.75 in Canton; 
the total general property tax in Canton County was $2.85. 
The overall impression is one of chaos and general 
inefficiency. A constitutional limit on tax rates, while 
common in the South, was unknown in the North. 59
Corporation and privilege taxes on railroad, telegraph 
and utility companies, were less easy to evade: but they 
accounted for only 25 per cent of the state's revenue. Few 
wanted to increase these. Economists argued that as these 
industries had been attracted initially by low taxation, 
then industrial growth would be hindered if they were made 
to carry a heavier burden. The remainder of the state's 
revenue was comprised of various taxes, the most economi­
cally useless of which was the poll tax. 60
Prominent amongst taxation reformers was Charles Lee 
Raper, professor of economics at Chapel Hill. State taxa­
tion reform was a national concern, much of the drive and 
impetus coming from Winconsin where tax rationalisation was 
such that state taxation was virtually nil. Raper, while 
acknowledging that the Winconsin model was the best, 
realistically set his sights lower for North Carolina. He
wanted to abolish the constitutional limit, introduce a 
uniform system of valuation, and establish a state tax 
commission with permanent county assessment officers. To 
this end an amendment to the state constitution was intro­
duced in 1914, but it was soundly defeated. 61
Most reformers were content with the basic taxation 
system as it stood; what they objected to was how it 
operated./
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operated. Those with landed wealth found it simple to 
wriggle through the system and pay very little. While the 
average landowner doubtless had some humanitarian concern 
for his tenants this did not extend to encouraging the 
state legislature to expand its welfare provisions. The 
cheapest government was the best government. Southern 
landowners were most opposed to those reforms that a legis­
lature could only provide for by increasing taxation. While 
accepting that a state legislature had the right to tax 
personal, corporation and real property, landowners none­
theless went to considerable lengths to evade these tax pay­
ments. As with many statutes in the South, lax enforcement 
virtually nullified the tax codes.
There were many ways this could be achieved; all 
depended upon local autonomy. Most common were the in­
correct returns of the value or acreage of taxable land. As 
land had always been the principal source of revenue in the 
South, its undervaluation caused considerable dents in a 
state's budget. This could reach ludicrous proportions. In 
1896, the 83 Georgian counties returned 722,205 acres less 
than they did in 1895. As a result the state lost about 
$2,500,000 in revenue. The land returned for tax purposes 
in Georgia in 1897 by the tax assessors was 1,177,158 acres 
less than the total acreage of the state as assessed by the 
United States census bureau. The same situation existed in 
Mississippi. There, in addition to such illegal returns of 
land, there was an almost total concealment of personalty. 
Consequently, land speculators paid virtually no tax and 
the tax burden fell heaviest upon those farmers with 
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depreciating land values. This invariably meant those who 
farmed the upland counties, or those investors in heavy 
timber lands; it did not mean the black belt cotton planters 
as one observer pointed out. As in North Carolina, tax 
rates varied between the various counties making for in­
efficiency and creating incentives for dishonesty. The 
situation in municipalities was similar but less marked as 
in the cities the valuations were made by municipal assess­
ors and were more accurate. Nonetheless, corrupt practices 
persisted: in 1897 the census bureau valuation of real 
property in Atlanta, Augusta and Macon was $58,486,866, 
while the assessment on the three county digests, which 
were used for tax valuation, registered only $51,780,85 3. 62
It was control of the political system that allowed 
such ineffective tax policies to continue. Tax assessors, 
receivers and collectors were either political appointments 
or else they were voted in. Mississippi taxes for example 
were collected by the local sheriff, who also had the 
right to assess land in certain circumstances. In Georgia 
the administrators of the tax system were not paid by 
salary, but rather by commission. The tax collectors 
received remuneration in proportion to the actual monies 
that they gathered, and the tax receivers were paid a 
commission equal to half the collector. It may be thought 
that this would encourage a vigorous and effective tax 
system, but this was not the case. A tax collectorship 
represented the bottom rung of the patronage ladder. Those 
who received it saw a collectorship as a stepping stone to 
another position and endeavoured to placate his electorate 
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by making their tax burden as light as possible, or else 
were the slowest witted members of a political machine and 
were destined to rise no further; they rarely had the 
ability to administer the system adequately. One commenta­
tor estimated that about 60 per cent of the tax in Georgia 
was collected. In Mississippi in 1897, out of a capita­
tion of $529,694 for the poll tax, only $250,057 was 
collected. 63
The picture did not change in the 1910s or 1920s. This 
is shown by the example of South Carolina. The state prided 
itself on having the cheapest government in the United 
States, its average per capita cost of $2.40 being less than 
half the national average of $6.05. The average for the 
South Atlantic states was $3.88. In the words of a Univer­
sity of South Carolina economist, this was because the state 
taxation amounted to "an absolute outlaw system". Inaugur­
ated in and unchanged since 1895, the system required that 
all property, real estate, personal and possessory be listed 
and taxed at their actual value in money, but evasions and 
undervaluations were common. In 1910 the United States 
census assessed rural property at $18,368,419 in Greenville 
County; it was returned for taxation at $8,873,715, the 
worth of mortgages and securities not even entering the tax 
books: "You will find farm land returned for $10 an acre 
that you could not buy for $100 or $300 an acre" reported 
one economist. Greenville County was an Appalachian county 
where it may be presumed that tax assessment and collection 
would prove hazardous under any system, but similar evasions 
were frequent in black belt counties. In Sumter County the 
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assessed value of an acre of land was $1^91 while the United 
States census valued an acre of land at #78o51. In the 
adjoining Kershaw County the average tax return was 25 per 
cent of the census valuation» 64
Such undervaluations, and the state legislatures'tacit 
condoning of them were common throughout the state» The 
effect was that the corporations who could not hide their 
wealth so easily and the small property owners who had 
little political say ended up carrying "the heavier end of 
the log"o Neither was this the complete picture of the 
South Carolinian tax system, for there were fewer additional 
taxes in this state than elsewhere» Of the total revenue of 
the state, 90 per cent came from property taxes compared to 
the national average of 65 per cent » As with North Carolina, 
most economists in the state considered that the existing 
system would be adequate if it were revised, although a 
minority proposed that there should be a state income and 
inheritance tax» 65
Despite being committed to cheap government at all 
levels, including a tariff for revenue raising purposes only. 
Southern politicians were not averse to passing taxation laws 
against others» An income tax law had been passed by the 
Cleveland Democrats, although this was later voided by the 
Supreme Court» In 1913 however the Democrats with South­
erners in the vanguard successfully passed the first income 
tax under the provision of the XVI Amendment» Southern 
mavericks such as James Vardaman ensured that the final 
taxation rate was higher for upper incomes than the admin­
istration intended originally» A federal income tax did not 
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affect a plantation owner however» The tax rates were low, 
but as John Sharp Williams, the Yazoo County planter, dis- 
armingly admitted during the Senate debates on the income 
tax clause, a planter's income varied so enormously from 
year to year that any income tax, no matter how high the 
rate, would be meaningless» The Southern planter, depend­
ent as he was upon bank credit for nine months of the year 
was more concerned with the value of his real estate, which 
provided his collateral, rather than the size of his income, 
Consequently, a properly assessed and collected system of 
state property taxation represented a greater threat to a 
planter's profits than a federal income tax, which was 
directed more at the businessmen and industrialists of the 
North east» 66
There are several reasons for giving an extended 
account of Southern taxation systems» It demonstrates how 
useful it could be to control local politics, for not only 
did it permit some degree of social control, it also had 
very definite financial benefits for the groups who won the 
elections, thus controlling the various tax appointments» 
Furthermore it reveals the vast difference between passing 
a law in the South, and then attempting to enforce it »
While this fact is well known with regard to child labour 
regulations and factory inspection these were in many ways 
extra-ordinary measures passed by a legislature in order 
to comply with certain economic and social conditions» 
Consequently not all accepted their validity or appro­
priateness, and in this sense their deliberate non imple­
mentation is understandable» They were also fashionable 
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subjects, and this encouraged a polarity of opinion as to 
whether or not they were a suitable area for legislation» 
Taxation however was an accepted function of government; 
not even the meanest of Southerners expected a completely 
free system of government » That Southern taxpayers in all 
sections of the region found it so easy to avoid tax pay­
ment says little for the state legislature's ability or 
even desire to police its own statutes» Southerners in 
debate argued vigorously in favour of the state police power, 
but in many cases they were arguing for a non enforceable 
power» Although the state was the most desired level of 
reform for the majority in the South, local autonomy and 
control could negate even the most rudimentary of state 
functions »
Its implications for reform were more important, for it 
meant that a state's action in a particular field would be 
severely limited through financial restrictions» Those 
interested in improving rural conditions realised this, and 
while continuing to lobby the state authorities to take 
action, they increasingly focussed their efforts upon the 
federal agencies» It is noteworthy that while Eugene 
Branson advocated increased federal spending on agricultural 
education, he nonetheless preferred to reform rural credit 
through the states; such a reform did not involve the legis­
lature committing itself to regular appropriations» South­
ern landowners also preferred this, as quite naturally they 
wanted improvements, but they did not want to pay for them 
themselves» If federal funding of highway improvements, 
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agricultural education and warehouse building could foe 
reconciled with state or local autonomy, then this would 
be the perfect solution» It is not coincidental that much 
of the strongest opposition to the agricultural reform 
programme came from states, particularly in New England, 
who had performed their duties diligently and in an 
efficient manner» They resented, with considerable justi­
fication, the federal government's subsidising of states 
that had neglected their responsibilities»
145
Notes :
1 Harold Uo Faulkner, The Decline of Laissez Faire: 1897-1917, 
(New York and Toronto Rinehart and Company; 1951),
pp. 315-317, 320-321.
2 United States Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of 
the United States, 1910, V (Agriculture), p. 35.
3 Faulkner, The Decline of Laissez Faire, p. 323.
4 Howard Odum, Southern Regions of the United States, (Chapel 
Hill University of North Carolina Press; 1936), p. 5.
Odum used objective data only in drawing his boundaries.
This created anomalies. Louisiana and Florida for example 
did not satisfy enough criteria to be considered Southern 
but were included in the Southeast as Odum did not wish to 
create separate regions for them. The reverse occurred 
with Delaware. It did satisfy enough criteria to be con­
sidered Southern, but was included in the Northeast as it 
was separated from the Southeast by the "non Southern" 
Maryland.
It should be noted that the majority of Odum's indices were 
the indices of poverty.
5 C.H. Poe and C.W. Burkett, Cotton; its Cultivation, Market­
ing, Manufacture and the Problems of the Cotton World, 
(London Archibald Constable and Company; 1906), pp. 53-55.
6 Sheldon K. Smith, "Ellison Durant Smith - A Southern 
Progressive 1909-1929" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
South Carolina, 1970), p. 11.
7 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census, V, p. 681.
The Louisiana economy in the 1900s presents a problem. Not 
only cotton declined in value for below average returns 
were recorded in the value of vegetables, corn and sugar 
cane production. Tobacco increased its value considerably, 
but its total output remained low. Soil deterioration, the 
arrival of the cotton boll weevil in the state and increased 
competition in the case of sugar probably all contributed
to this decline.
Despite this, Louisianan industry made impressive advances. 
In terms of absolute increase of value of production the 
state/
146
state was ranked third behind Texas and North Carolina in 
1910.
Ibid., VIII, (Manufacturing), p. 61.
8 Ibid., V, p. 681.
9 The best account of the role of fertiliser in the expansion 
of cotton is:
Richard C. Sheriden, "Chemical Fertilisers in Southern 
Agriculture", Agricultural History, 55 (1979), 308-18.
10 Faulkner, The Decline of Laissez Faire, p. 323.
11 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census, V, p. 678;
Fred. A. Shannon, The Farmer's Last Frontier: Agriculture
1860-1897, (New York and London Farner and Rinehart 
Incorporated: 1945), pp. 118-119;
Tobacco was similar to sugar cane in that farmers in the 
new areas of cultivation took full advantage of research 
techniques often demanding that the agricultural colleges 
establish experimental stations specifically to aid them. 
Cotton planters who had lost their crop to the boll weevil 
often grew tobacco as an alternative.
A.P. Brantley to Georgia State A. and M. College, 26th 
November 1916, Hoke Smith Papers, (University of Georgia, 
Athens Georgia). (Hereafter cited as Smith Papers).
12 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census, V, p. 678.
13 Ibid., V, p. 685.
14 Rice was very much a minor crop in 1910. The Carolinian 
rice plantations which had been so profitable before the 
war had collapsed. One rice planter attributed this to 
expensive and unreliable labour as a result of emancipation, 
Certainly rice was more labour intensive than any other 
Southern crop.
Arney R. Childs (ed.). Rice Planter and Sportsman: The 
Recollections of J. Motte Alston 1821-1909, (Columbia 
University of South Carolina Press: 1955), p. 41
15 V.O. Key blamed the direct and indirect causes of the 
viciousness of Louisiana politics upon the sugar trust. 
Populism was put down with more brutality in Louisiana than 
elsewhere and in the 1930s "seamy" Louisiana had more pro­
fessional politicians in jail, more extortion and bribery, 
and/
147
and more political thievery than any American state.
V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, (New York 
Alfred A. Knopf: 1950), pp. 156-183.
16 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census, V, p. 729.
17 Ibid., p. 729.
For an account of the brutal labour relations in the South­
ern lumber industry see:
Merl E. Reed, "The Industrial Workers of the World and 
Individual Freedom in West Louisiana, 1913", Louisiana 
History, 10 (1969), 61-69.
18 Albert B. Hart, The Southern South, (New York Appleton 
and Company: 1910), p. 62;
Oscar Ameringer, If you don't Weaken, (New York Henry Holt 
and Company: 1940), p. 456.
19 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census, V, p. 46. 
Louisiana is omitted from these figures, due to an anomaly 
in the census. In 1900 the value of the sugar industry's 
machinery was included in the table for the average value 
of implements and machinery per acre of farm land. The 
1910 census included it under manufactures.
20 Ibid., p. 45.
21 Ibid., p. 47.
22 Congressional Record, 63rd Congress 2nd session, (1914), 
2735;
Cong. Rec., 64th Cong., 1st sess., (1916), 6697.
23 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census, V, p. 165.
24 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census, V, p. 125-
126, 127.
25 The best account of the origins of sharecropping is:
Ralph Shlomowitz, "The Origins of Southern Sharecropping", 
Agricultural History, 53 (1979), 557-575;
A rather more speculative account that analyses share- 
cropping in a cultural sense, attributing cropping to the 
Southerner's descent from the "lazy" Scots Irish is:
Forrest McDonald and Grady McWhiney, "The South from Self 
Sufficiency to Peonage: An Interpretation", American 
Historical Review, 85 (1980), 1095-1118;
For an account of the fortunes of the Maryland merchant, and 
how/
148
how his use of the tenant system made him a millionaire 
inside five years see:
WoFo Massey, "A Renting System that Makes Men Millionaires", 
Progressive Farmer, 30 (11th July 1915), p. 4.
26 A geographical account of the survival of the plantation 
as an economic and social institution from the Civil War 
until 1950 is given in:
Merle Prunty, "The Renaissance of the Southern Plantation", 
Geographical Review, 45 (1955), 459-491.
2 7 The most comprehensive contemporary account of the varia­
tions possible within the tenant system is provided by: 
William Bennett Bizzell, Farm Tenantry in the United 
States, (College Station Texas The State of Texas: 1921), 
pp. 97-102.
It may be assumed that under the "third and fourth" 
arrangement that the landowner varied the proportions 
according to how he thought prices would rise or fall in the 
year.
Tenantry was not confined to the South of course, but in 
other areas the tenant had more control over his farming.
In Iowa and the Dakotas, for example, where wheat was grown 
then the crop was owned by both the tenant and the land­
owner, even when the landowner owned the house, the imple­
ments and the work animals. Better credit facilities also 
improved the lot of the Midwestern and Prairies tenant.
28 Ibid., pp. 99-102, 110.
The survey of Mississippi farms considered 878 plantations 
and was carried out by the Texas State department of agri­
culture. It must be qualified by noting that the area 
under consideration was one of the most lucrative in the 
South. Plantations in this area would have higher returns 
than those in mid Georgia or South Carolina owing to the 
more fertile Delta soils and lower transport costs. The 
greatest returns on cotton in the 1910s were possible in 
Texas because of cheaper costs of production. Texas 
however was also subject to the greatest price fluctuations. 
Rupert B. Vance, Human Factors in Cotton Cultivation,
(Chapel Hill University of North Carolina Press: 1929), 
pp. 129-132.
29/
149
29 Bizzell, Farm Tenantry in the United States, pp. 101-102, 
110, 228.
Thomas J. Edwards, supervisor of coloured public schools 
in Tallapoosa County, Alabama, agreed with the opinion 
that more croppers did want to own their own land: 
"Regardless of the success croppers may make with their 
crops, while working on shares, there is a burning desire 
among them for less supervision and more freedom in 
managing their own affairs". He concluded that a cropper 
should remain on the same plantation, in the same house, 
if he wanted to become a renter.
Thomas J. Edwards, "The Tenant System and Some Changes 
Since Emancipation", Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 49 (1913), 38-46, p. 43.
30 Tom E. Terrill and Jerrold Hirsch (eds.), Such as us: 
Southern Voices of the Thirties, (New York and London 
W.W. Norton and Sons: 1979), pp. 6471;
"Landlord's Side of the Renting Question", Progressive 
Farmer, (29 3rd January 1914), p. 8.
A sociological interpretation of the consequences of a 
tenant system for economic growth stresses the self right­
eousness of the elite. This comes not so much from self­
ishness, but from an ample capacity for escaping the con­
sequences of being devoid of meritorious qualities by 
attaching enough importance to their own deeds to convince 
themselves that they have a natural right to their status. 
Consequently, most of the elite's reform "conceptualisa­
tions" remain at the paper and ink stage as their complete 
implementations require the elite to dislodge itself. 
Although this model was drawn from African and Asian 
examples, there are obvious parallels with the Southern 
elite.
John M. Brewster, "Traditional Social Structures as 
Barriers to Change", in Herman M. Southwarth and Bruce M. 
Johnson, Agricultural Development and Economic Growth, 
(Ithaca Cornell University Press: 1967), 66-106, p. 87.
31 John Andrew Rice, I Came Out of the Eighteenth Century,
(New York Hillary House Incorporated: 1957), pp. 65, 132-33
32/
150
32 William Alexander Percy, Lanterns on the Levee: Recollec­
tions of a Planter's Son, (New York Alfred A. Knopf:
1953), pp. 19-20, 278, 282.
Percy's views require qualification. His father was the 
junior senator from Mississippi until his defeat in 1912 
by James Vardaman, who was considered to stand for all 
that was "vulgar and dangerous". Percy viewed this as the 
beginning of the end of civilised life: "The herd is on 
the march, and when it stampedes, there's blood galore, 
and beauty is china under its hoofs".
Considerable bitterness pervades the book and its tone is 
hardly moderate. Nonetheless it is a remarkable example 
of the thinking of a Southern conservative at its least 
restrained.
Ibid., p . 153.
33 Ameringer, If you don't Weaken, pp. 229, 265;
Federal Writers Project, These are our Lives, (Chapel Hill 
University of North Carolina Press: 1939), pp. 37-38.
34 Charles S. Barrett, The Mission, History and Times of the 
Farmers' Union, (Nashville Marshall, Bruce and Company: 
1909), pp. 41, 49.
35 Cong. Rec., 63rd Cong. 2nd sess. (1914), 2519-20.
36 Henry Grady, The New South, (New York Robert Bonner's 
Sons: 1890), pp. 191-5.
37 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census, IV, pp. 44-45;
Ibid., VIII, pp. 63-65.
38 "The Land of Opportunity", Southern Field, 11 (1907), p. 3. 
The Southern Field was issued by the Southern railroad 
system free of charge, and was devoted to "the development 
of the South and all its productive activities". It was 
principally directed at prospective migrants from the Mid­
west and Northeast.
39 "Tenancy and Agriculture", Southern Field, 9 (1905), p. 10.
40 Poe corresponded regularly with Eugene Cunningham Branson, 
professor of rural economics at Chapel Hill. They had a 
high regard for each other's work. An example of this is: 
"Poe's vision and spirit are beautiful and his attitude 
towards you and the University is fond and affectionate". 
E.C. Branson/
151
EoCo Branson to E . Graham, 24th January, 1914, Eugene 
Cunningham Branson Papers, (Southern Historical Collection, 
The Library, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina). (Hereafter cited as Branson Papers). 
Edward Graham was the president of Chapel Hill and one of 
Branson’s main supporters on campus;
"More Suggestions for Renters", Progressive Farmer, 30 
(18th September 1915), p. 13;
"An Open Letter to the White Renters of the South", 
Progressive Farmer, 30 (11th September 1915), p. 13;
Poe’s very optimistic and seemingly naive view of how easy 
it was for tenants to become landowners was influenced by 
the fact that he himself had made the transition while 
young. Certainly some tenants did become owners, and were 
well feted for this, but they were few and far between.
41 Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, p. 126.
Tindall considers that the activity in Texas was a direct 
response to tenant agitation.
42 E.C. Branson to J. Gray, 28th January 1911, Branson Papers.
43 "Farm Tenancy: the Problem of Problems in the Southern 
States", Address given 12th March, 1912, Branson Papers; 
E.C. Branson to J. Gray, 28th January 1911, Branson Papers. 
Gray was the editor of the Atlantic Semi Weekly Journal.
44 Tindall, The Emergence of the New South, p. 145;
Clarence Poe, "Rural Land Segregation Between Whites and 
Negroes", South Atlantic Quarterly, 13 (1914), 207-15; 
Southern Cultivator, 69 (15th April 1911), p. 9;
In fairness to Poe it should be noted that his views were 
not unique. He merely had the means to express them better 
He also can receive some credit for having been one of the 
few to face the problem squarely.
45 Branson's views on black tenancy are contained in:
"Negro Farm Ownership: the Facts and their Significance", 
Address to the Presbyterian Assemblies, Atlanta (18th May 
1913), Branson Papers;
The dilemma faced by Southern liberals on racial questions, 
and their meek capitulation to white supremacist dogma is 
detailed in:
Bruce/
152
Bruce Clayton, The Savage Ideal: Intolerance and Intellec­
tual Leadership in the South 1890-1914, (Baltimore The 
Johns Hopkins University Press: 1972).
46 Harold Hyman, A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil 
War and Reconstruction upon the Constitution, (New York 
Alfred Ao Knopf: 1973), p. 388;
Faulkner, The Decline of Laissez Faire, pp. 342-35 2.
47 Ibid., pp. 347-52.
48 Honore Willsia, "Secretary Houston: Cotton and Corn", 
Harper's Weekly, 59 (14th February 1914), pp. 12-14.
49 "The New Secretary of Agriculture", Southern Planter, 75 
(April 1913), p. 427;
"Dr. Galloway: Assistant Secretary", Southern Planter, 75 
(April 1913), pp. 459-60;
T. Shackelforth to H. Smith, 29th December 1920, Smith 
Papers ;
JoJo Brown to H. Smith, 14th December 1920, Smith Papers.
50 The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Charles Seymour, 
(ed.), (Boston and New York Houghton Mifflin Company: 
1926), I, pp. 181-182;
Arthur So Link, Wilson: the New Freedom, (Princeton 
Princeton University Press: 1956), pp. 137-139.
William McAdoo, who was prominent in Democratic circles, 
had never heard of Houston until House suggested him for 
the position. McAdoo did not consider Houston to be a wise 
choice: he did not have any political sway to bring to the 
President, nor did he seem to be in contact with the 
farmers :
My first impression of Houston was disappointing.
He was cold and uncommunicative, and his person­
ality was not engaging. Despite his taciturnity 
I felt that he was a man of intellectual force 
and solid information. He seemed to me to be a 
conservative of a rather conventional pattern.
William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years: The Reminiscences of 
William G. McAdoo, (London Jonathan Cape: 1931), p. 181.
51 Ibid., p. 137.
5 2 David M. Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet,
(New/
153
(New York Doubleday Page and Company: 1926), I, p. 200.
53 Link, Wilson: the New Freedom, p. 139;
Houston, Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, II, p. 176.
54 AoEo Barnes to J.D. Price, 2nd November 1914, John Judson 
Brown Papers (Southern Historical Collection, The Library, 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, North Carol­
ina). (Hereafter cited as Brown Papers);
C.M. Furlow to J.D. Price, 28th December 1914, Brown Papers;
D.M. Hughes to J.D. Price, 11th February 1915, Brown Papers; 
L. Cheatham to J.J. Brown, 3rd March 1917, Brown Papers;
The time and motion study was initiated by Brown when he 
took over the running of the department from Price in 
February 1917.
55 W. Grice to J.D. Price, 10th June 1914, Brown Papers;
P. Gilseath to J.D. Price, 28th June 1915, Brown Papers;
J.D. Price to J.C. Hutchins, 5th January 1915, Brown Papers; 
Fulton Bay Cotton Mills to J.D. Price, 15th November 1915, 
Brown Papers.
56 Walter Hines Page, "The Forgotten Man", in The Rebuilding 
of Old Commonwealths, (London Doubleday Page and Company: 
1902), p. 12.
57 Hilary A. Herbert (ed.), Why the Solid South or Reconstruc­
tion and its Results, (Baltimore R.H. Woodward and Company; 
1890), p. 89.
58 Charles Lee Raper, "Our Taxation Problem", South Atlantic 
Quarterly, 12 (1913), 314-326, p. 314.
59 Ibid., pp. 317, 318, 319, 323-326.
60 Ibid., p. 322-3.
61 Charles Lee Raper, "North Carolina's Taxation Problem and 
its Solutions", South Atlantic Quarterly, 14 (1915), 1-14; 
The Wisconsin plan involved the total separation of state 
and local taxation. In Wisconsin this resulted in the 
virtual disappearance of state taxation as the various 
municipalities raised their own revenue for improvements. 
This model was best suited for areas with a high percentage 
of urban dwellers, but its proponents accurately claimed 
that it produced a more efficient tax system under any 
circumstances.
T.S. Adams/
154
ToSo Adams, "Separation of State and Local Revenues", The 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Sciences, 15 (1915), 131-139.
62 Herbert Baxter Adams (ed.), The Johns Hopkins University 
Studies in Historical and Political Studies, (Baltimore 
The Johns Hopkins University Press: 1900) XVIIl "Taxation 
in Southern States", pp. 230, 202, 231;
The total acreage of Georgia is 37,584,000 acres.
63 Ibid., pp. 198-210, 234, 237, 213.
64 0. Johnson, P. Meeks, L.B. Cox, and A.M. Bowen, "Anderson 
County: Economic and Social", University of South Carolina 
Bulletin, 126 (July 1923), pp. 63, 64;
GoA. Gullick, "Greenville County: Economic and Social", 
University of South Carolina Bulletin, 102 (July 1921), 
pp. 56, 57;
R.H. Ramsay and A.H. Green, "Sumter County: Economic and 
Social", University of South Carolina Bulletin, 112 
(August 1922), p. 46;
G.H. Wittkowsky and J.L. Moseley, "Kershaw County: Economic 
and Social", University of South Carolina Bulletin, 120 
(April 1923), p. 34;
In 1915 an independent state tax commission realised the 
uselessness of their task and proceeded to assess South 
Carolinian property at 42 per cent of the United States 
census bureau valuation in order to preserve some 
credibility.
65 Johnson et al, "Anderson County: Economic and Social", 
p. 64;
R.M. Hope, F. Kelley, C. Cree, and D. Jeter, "Union County: 
Economic and Social", University of South Carolina Bulletin, 
128 (August 1923), p. 55.
66 Cong. Rec., 63rd Cong. 1st sess,, (1913), p. 3802, 3849.
155
CHAPTER III 
EDUCATIONAL LEGISLATION
Walter Hines Page wrote in 1902 that the most sacred 
objects in the South were the children, whether they were 
the children of the middle classes or those of the dull 
faced mothers of the hovels: all were precious, for in 
them lay the future fortunes of a revitalised South. 
Educators, Page considered, had a far wider role to play, 
involving far more than the teaching of youth; they were 
to build a new social order, and through this they were to 
be the rebuilders of the old Southern commonwealths* 1
Page's words were braver and more convincing than the 
South's educational record. Southern education in the 
1910s and for decades after was the worst in the union.
No matter what index of educational ability is considered, 
at no matter what level of education, the South stands 
either top or bottom of the regional league table, 
depending on which is worse. Variations existed between 
and within the Southern states, the Upper South being less 
unimpressive than the Lower South, but in few indices were 
the most advanced states even close to the national average, 
The most basic index of educational ability, that of 
literacy, reveals how backward Southern schools systems 
were relative to the rest of the nation. In 1910,
3,909,273 people over the age of ten corresponded to the 
United States census's definition of being illiterate in 
the South; this included all those unable to write, 
regardless/
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regardless of their ability to read. The national 
illiteracy rate was 7.7 per cent; the Southern rate was 18 
per cent. Although the South contained no sizeable non- 
English speaking immigrant population, its white illiteracy 
rate was still higher than elsewhere. An average of 3.7 
per cent of whites in the union were illiterate; 8.8 per 
cent of Southern whites, 1,130,689 people in total, were 
illiterate, and this went as high as 15 per cent in 
Louisiana. Not surprisingly black illiteracy rates were 
higher. Southern black illiteracy rates varied from 24.6 
per cent in Texas to 48.4 per cent in Louisiana, but the 
regional average was 33 per cent; this meant 1,988,846 
people. The national average was 30 per cent. 2
Fewer went to school in the South than elsewhere. Only 
55 per cent of the 8,598,144 between the ages of 6 and 20 in 
the South in 1910 attended school. This ranged from a high 
in North Carolina of 61 per cent, 785,583 children, to a low 
of 43 per cent, 5 75,860 children in Louisiana. This compares 
with the United States average of 62 per cent at school in 
1910. Blacks again fared worse than whites, the by now 
completely segregated black school system being attended by 
only 46 per cent of blacks between the ages of 6 and 20 in 
1910, while on average 5 7 per cent of white children attended 
their better funded and equipped system. 3
The schools attended by Southern children were invar­
iably inadequate for either Page's grandiose purpose or 
providing a well rounded basic education. This is especially 
true when they are compared to the well developed public 
school/
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school systems of states such as Massachusetts or Michigan. 
Southern schools in the main were "miserably supported, 
poorly attended" with "wretched teaching". The blame for 
this can be laid squarely at the door of the state legis­
latures. Virtually all the money collected by state taxes 
went on education, but the amounts involved were pitifully 
low. Southern education had suffered considerably from 
the drastic reductions in public expenditure carried out by 
the post reconstruction legislatures. The virtues of cheap 
government invariably resulted in inferior public school 
systems. In 1900 the Alabama legislature spent #3.10 per 
annum on every child attending school; the North Carolinians 
spent #4.56 on each child; and the South Carolinian legis­
lators appropriated #4.62 for each child at school. The 
regional average was #4.92 for every white child at school, 
and #2.21 for every black child. No Southern state spent 
even a half of the national average of #21.14 per child. 4 
Southern school systems had to cope with problems that 
were less pressing in other regions. As the South had a 
higher birth rate than elsewhere, meaning a higher child/ 
adult ratio, there were more children to deal with relative 
to the available resources. Furthermore, the Southern pop­
ulations were more rural, and thus the population distribu­
tion was more scattered making the provision of school 
houses and teachers more expensive. The total bill for 
Southern education was further increased due to each state's 
completely racially segregated educational systems which 
resulted in an inefficient duplication of resources and 
effort. Teachers in the South faced a shortage of teaching 
materials/
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materials which was less pronounced in the North. Although 
the school laws of the Upper South had been considerably 
revised by 1910, it was still common for schools to operate 
without the aid of compulsory education acts in the Lower 
South. Vigorous campaigns had been fought by educational 
reformers throughout the 1900s, but the effect had been 
minimal. The length of the school term was still the 
shortest in the union, and in rural areas only a token 
effort was made to observe even these short terms. 5
Public education was a realm that the federal govern­
ment could not enter in the 1910s. Firmly within the 
reserved rights of the state, no Southern politician would 
countenance the idea of Washington having any say at all 
in the administering or financing of a state educational 
system. The future for Southern education would have been 
bleak without aid from any other source, but Northern 
businessmen and philanthropists had become sufficiently 
interested in Southern schools by the 1900s to invest some 
of their fortunes in the region's children. The most 
prominent were John D. Rockefeller, William H. Baldwin and 
George Foster Peabody. Their funds were channelled through 
the General Education Board, which became an effective 
propaganda agency, spurring reluctant legislators to action. 
The total public expenditure in the South on education rose 
from #21,372,543 in 1900 to #71,420,338 by 1912 largely due 
to their urgings. This advance was most notable in North 
Carolina where expenditure more than quadrupled under the 
reform governorship of Charles B. Aycock. 6 
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The effect of such philanthropy upon Southern 
education was considerable; it achieved as much, if not 
more, than could be reasonably expected of it. Yet it 
could do little but dent the problem; the deficiencies were 
too great. Not all welcomed outside interference. Benjamin 
Tillman for example perceived it as a threat to white supre­
macy. Soon, he wrote, the General Education Board would be 
controlled completely by blacks such as Booker T . Washington. 
Oscar Ameringer at the other end of the political scale 
commented ironically that it was better that Southerners 
remained uneducated, and that their native intelligence be 
protected "against the flood of lying propaganda with which 
their "betters" of press, pulpit, and rostrum deluged the 
country". 7
Important differences existed between agricultural and 
general education, but the general picture was the same: 
Southern agricultural colleges were poorly supported by 
their state legislatures, especially when compared with 
other agricultural regions such as the Midwest. As with the 
public school systems, the agricultural colleges were 
completely segregated. The black colleges tended to be even 
more dependent upon private philanthropy than the black 
schools were although they received some money from the 
Morrill land grant fund. White colleges received a greater 
degree of federal aid through this fund, but even they 
received little in the way of aid from the state legis­
latures; agricultural and mechanical colleges were very much 
the poor relations of the Southern higher education system. 
One/
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One veterinary student at a Mississippi agricultural college 
had to enlist the aid of his senator in obtaining textbooks 
published by the United States department of agriculture as 
his college could not afford to buy them. The Georgia state 
college was unable to pay an architect's bill of #308 for 
three years as the college had no more available funds, the 
appropriation from the state legislature having been spent 
on necessities before it was received. The president of the 
University of Arkansas complained bitterly to the Senate 
committee on agriculture and forestry that he had the 
greatest difficulty in securing funds from the Arkansas 
legislature to help agricultural research. 8
Agricultural colleges were not completely vocational; 
the men who attended them took courses in subjects besides 
agriculture, learning by the well-tried methods of the 
lecture and the classroom. While the colleges did have 
research stations, for which federal funding was available, 
there was little attempt at providing an education that was 
practical. Few presidents or deans in the Southern colleges 
had an academic knowledge of agricultural science or econo­
mics; most of the colleges had strong classical departments 
whose voices were loud and influential in college politics. 
Many of the men who attended the colleges paid little or 
no attention to agriculture, a credit in the subject rare­
ly being necessary for graduation. The situation had 
improved since 1885 when only 13 of the 120 students at 
the Alabama Agricultural and Mechanical College studied 
agriculture, but agricultural science was still an unfash­
ionable and unpopular subject. The agricultural colleges 
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were the only alternative to men who could not enter the 
more prestigious state universities of the South, for either 
financial or social reasons. To a large extent this isolated 
the colleges from Southern agriculture; those who did study 
agriculture and tried to apply their knowledge were often 
considered too academic and aloof by those they tried to 
help. A Northern academic considered that this was the 
reason why Southern colleges had less impact upon everyday 
life than their counterparts in the North and the Midwest. 9 
The colleges were aware of their deficiencies. They 
engaged in research and gathered useful information, but 
this had only a limited application. The president of the 
North Dakota Agricultural College realised that farmers 
could make little or no use of the knowledge collected by 
his college for farmers were not conversant with the 
language of science. One of David Houston's first priori­
ties in office was to hire Walter Hines Page to translate 
agricultural handouts into simple English in the hope that 
they would reach a wider audience. The college educated 
teachers were similarly unsuccessful in their attempts to 
disseminate their knowledge among the dirt farmers. Senator 
Bristow of Kansas related that tenant farmers in the Mid­
west regarded agricultural educators as mere nuisances who 
would do best by staying away. 10
Such attitudes are understandable. Tenant farmers 
often worked very marginal lands that did not allow failure, 
and their families had been farmers for as many generations 
as the family genealogist could trace. It was only natural 
that they should resist the advice of an outsider. The old 
and/
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and tried methods meant hard toll and low returns, but they 
did represent security. Those who did make use of the 
college's new discoveries were those with either the cash 
or the credit raising ability to cushion the impact of 
failure. Tillman for example made full use of the improved 
root crops and fencing methods as suggested by Clemson 
College, a college he helped to found. Not all his experi­
ments were successful, but the financial loss incurred did 
not threaten the viability of his plantation. Dudley Hughes, 
a representative from Georgia, commented that it was the 
large property owners in his state that benefited from the 
state agricultural colleges. He himself was a planter and a 
trustee of the Georgia State Agricultural College. Few 
planters attended the agricultural colleges, their cavalier 
minds tending to scorn the more plebeian agricultural 
colleges, but they were willing to apply the new techniques 
to their own practices providing it seemed to be a good 
investment. Tenant farmers, possessing little or no control 
over what they grew, had little interest in abandoning 
cotton growing for citrus or soft fruit or in keeping more 
livestock as the colleges exhorted them to do. That required 
considerable capital, something the tenant lacked. Improved 
methods of cultivation certainly could aid the tenant, and 
simple demonstrations on how to cultivate and protect the 
cotton plant had a very definite value. The major problem 
of how to get the message across remained. 11
To their credit the colleges by means of extension pro­
grammes, and with the aid of private and commercial money, 
did attempt to reach the ambitious tenant farmer. Realising 
that/
163
that few Southern farmers by nature of their work and the 
often very hazardous nature of intra state transport in the 
South could find the time or means to attend the colleges 
on even a part time basis, the agricultural colleges taking 
their idea from the Midwest went to the farmers. Such 
extension movements had been long established in Europe, 
and were much admired by American agriculturalists. Some 
Americans went so far as to give extension work the sole 
credit for having transformed Belgian agriculture from 
being "deplorable and discouraging" to ranking among the 
foremost of agricultural nations. 12
Railroad companies were particularly keen to aid this 
work. Ever eager to improve their relationship with South­
ern farmers, they also sought the advantages offered by a 
more productive and diversified agricultural system. They 
were especially anxious to encourage the growing of citrus 
and soft fruits as this would spread their business more 
evenly throughout the year, one of the many drawbacks of 
cotton cultivation being that it placed severe pressure on 
the railroads for three months of the year. Clemson 
College sponsored an exhibition train in 1907, the coaches 
for which were provided by the Southern Railroad Company, 
and drawn free of charge by the Southern Atlantic Coast and 
the Charleston and Western Carolina railroads. Inter 
company rivalries similarly vanished in Georgia where rail­
road companies in the same year combined to furnish a train 
and coaches for the Georgia State Agricultural College, 
instructing farmers on the best use of fertilisers. 13 
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Many people came to see and learn from such promo­
tional trains. The Clemson College train visited thirty 
seven places, being visited by several thousand people. A 
Georgian train in 1911 toured the state for forty seven 
days and was met by 350,000 people. The college president 
wrote that at every stop the farmers were inspired and told 
how they might better their conditions and improve their 
yields. The arrival of such expeditions in small often 
quite isolated communities was a great social event, 
attracting farmers from far afield as much for the event as 
for the learning, but it is questionable how much of last­
ing value came from such efforts. While it was sensible to 
persuade farmers to diversify their crops and keep more 
livestock, it was hardly practical from the farmer's point 
of view in areas where communications were dubious. Much 
of the achievement of the promotional trains was wasted by 
the lack of any follow up work; the wondrous effects of 
growing alfalfa or legumes which were so impressive when 
detailed by an eager and articulate young demonstrator on 
a day out at the local railroad halt, lost their appeal 
when considered the next morning on the farm. 14
Again, while educators were aware of this there was 
little that could be done due to the scarcity of funds.
Many of the men trained by the colleges had to leave the 
South. In 1908 this was true for 250 graduates of Clemson 
College. By 1913 progress had been made; over 1,000 
demonstration agents were at work throughout the South, but 
this covered only 60 per cent of the Southern counties.
Very little of the funding for this came from the states. 
The/
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The first demonstration agents in the South had been pro­
vided to prevent the spread of the boll weevil by the 
federal government, but they were not available for educa­
tion until the General Education Board decided in 1906 to 
supplement the federal funds and sponsor agents specialis­
ing in education. By 1908, 54 per cent of demonstration 
agents were paid for by the General Education Board. Their 
activities however continued to be criticised by those in 
the South for being too Washington controlled with little 
relevance to Southern conditions. 15
One demand that the General Education Board was unable 
to meet was the great need for black demonstration agents.
In 1906 there were two such men, and this had risen to only 
thirteen by 1912. The demand for this was created largely 
by Tuskegee and Hampton, the other black agricultural 
colleges being too impoverished to even contemplate exten­
sion work. They also had to work against the white belief 
that a black learnt best from a white demonstrator, and re­
sented being taught by a black teacher. White influence 
over the black colleges generally extended to the board of 
trustees. Tuskegee used a wagon to promote its findings, 
but this would seem to be the limit of black extension work. 16 
That change occurred allowing the colleges to have 
more influence among the Southern farmers can be attributed 
largely to the work of Seaman Knapp. He was exactly the 
sort of man Henry Grady had in mind for the New South.
Knapp was a successful capitalist. A self made millionaire 
from Iowa, his fortune having been made in business and 
agriculture, he moved to Louisiana in 1885 to oversee the 
colonisation/
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colonisation of land, by Midwesterners, which was owned by 
an English land speculation company. Becoming interested 
in the highly speculative rice industry, he also established 
enough local contacts in order to be employed by the United 
States department of agriculture. He eventually managed its 
campaign in West Louisiana against the boll weevil. He also 
discovered that the most successful way to get local farmers 
to take his advice on the superiority of scientific farming 
methods was to demonstrate them in a practical fashion in 
the field. Louisiana’s farmers took notice of this, but it 
was not until it was shown that Knapp's fields resisted the 
boll weevil better than their own that they threw away their 
distrust of college methods, and adopted Knapp's techniques. 17 
From his first local success Knapp expanded his scheme.
The two keys to his success were directness and simplicity.
His instructions to farmers were concise and easy to follow, 
requiring little in the way of capital. Called the "Ten 
Commandments of Agriculture", they concentrated upon a few 
fundamentals: the preparation of a good seed bed, deep 
autumn ploughing, the careful selection of good seed, and a 
shallow but intensive cultivation. There was no attempt to 
blind with science. In practice a local committee would 
select a farmer and guarantee his losses if he planted 
certain seeds upon his land and followed Knapp's instruc­
tions faithfully. The farmer was allowed to keep the profits. 
Railroad companies, impressed by this,donated land beside 
their tracks to allow Knapp spread his gospel wider. The 
claims made for the success of his methods were grandiose.
The average acre of land in Mississippi yielded 228 pounds of 
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lint cotton, whereas the demonstration acre yielded 445 
pounds. In Georgia, 100 bushels of corn were produced on 
an acre using Knapp's methods, compared with the state 
average of thirteen bushels. Hoke Smith in a rhetorical 
flourish reckoned that if Knapp's methods were put into 
effect then the agricultural production of the nation would 
be doubled, with lower production costs. Knapp is an easy 
man to criticise. His ideas did not confront the economic 
and social structural problems in Southern agriculture, 
indeed by encouraging production at the expense of market­
ing it is possible that he contributed to them. His concern 
for the Southern farmer was genuine though, and his efforts 
did ameliorate conditions for some. 18
Despite the proven success of demonstration work and 
the interest shown by private corporations, state aid was 
not forthcoming in any considerable or reliable form. Most 
of the funds continued to come from the General Education 
Board. Mississippi passed a law in 1909 which permitted a 
county to pay part of an agent's salary if it wanted to, and 
between then and 1915 every Southern state passed such a law, 
The first state appropriation for this work was not until 
1911 in Alabama. The salaries paid to such men were not 
particularly generous, it being reported that they served 
more for the "love of the service" rather than monetary 
gain. 19
One major reason why the states were so reluctant to 
finance agricultural education was that federal funds were 
available in a way that they were not available for general 
education. Congress had passed the Morrill Land Grant Act 
in/
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in 1862 without the presence of either Southern voices or 
votes. Introduced in 185 7 by Justin Smith Morrill, a 
Vermont representative, it was offered partly as an educa­
tional measure, and partly as an unashamed effort by a 
Republican to further the Republican cause among farmers. 
Southern politicians opposed the bill charging that it was 
an unconstitutional robbing of the treasury to bribe the 
states, and that it was intended to strengthen the artisan 
and labouring classes of the North. The bill passed both 
chambers, but was vetoed by Buchanan. Resubmitted in 1862 
it became law, but its obvious links with the Homestead Act 
meant that its educational qualities were overlooked in 
debate. 20
The Morrill Act provided each state with 30,000 acres 
of land from the public domain or the equivalent in scrip 
for each senator and representative it had in Congress. The 
proceeds from the sales of these grants were intended to 
finance agricultural education* In many respects the act 
was suspect and its terms were vague. The colleges that were 
thus endowed were meant to be "agricultural and mechanical", 
yet no guide lines were laid down as to which of these 
activities was to be emphasised. There were no indications 
as to whether new colleges were to be established, or whether 
existing ones were to be expanded; in practice the colleges 
created by the act were most successful when they were part 
of a comprehensive educational system as at Cornell or 
Wisconsin. Additionally the act said little on how respons­
ible the colleges were to be to their communities: were they 
designed merely to collect or were they to disseminate 
knowledge?/
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knowledge? This lack of a central governing policy explains 
why Southern colleges in particular failed to live up to the 
spirit of the act in the nineteenth century, 21
As has been noted by Harold Hyman, the main omission in 
the act was that it committed neither the union nor the 
states to any budget. The proponents of the act had hoped 
that it would lead to the growth of central government power 
over the states, but they were to be disappointed. Southern 
states were not forced to accept a fait accompli served to 
them by anti states rights Northerners when applying for re­
admission to the union. No constitutional dilemma was 
involved for even the strictest Southern constructionalist 
as the Morrill Act did not encroach upon the reserved powers 
of the state in any meaningful way. 22
Despite its déficiences the measure was a genuine 
entering wedge; the federal government had adopted a 
limited responsibility for education. Southern legislators 
were eager to take advantage of the new fund and soon estab­
lished colleges that were eligible. Black colleges in 
Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina and Virginia received 
the benefits of the fund, but in total only #291,285 of the 
#3,408,885 allocated to the South went to black colleges. 
Federal money continued to trickle into agricultural educa­
tion throughout the nineteenth century but the amounts were 
not as great as those expended by European governments. The 
United States government spent less on agricultural educa­
tion in proportion to its agricultural population than any 
nation in Western Europe with the exception of Spain. Acts 
passed after the Morrill Act did not commit the federal 
government/
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government to any large financial undertaking. The Hatch 
Act, passed in 1888, appropriated federal monies to estab­
lish experimental stations at the various colleges. The 
Adams Act of 1906 increased this commitment. While inno­
vative, Table I illustrates that comparatively little was 
appropriated to aid agricultural research. Of the total 
budget of twenty million dollars administered by the United 
States department of agriculture in 1912, less than 10 per 
cent was spent on experimental stations, the most valuable 
component of the system. The states by comparison spent 
eleven million dollars in 1912 on experimental stations.
As much of the states money was required for the upkeep of 
existing facilities, little expansion was possible. The 
Morrill Act was re-enacted in 1890 and 1907, but although 
this increased the percentage of money available to black 
colleges from 8 per cent to 28 per cent, it did little to 
increase federal responsibility for education, 23
Southern proponents of agricultural education realis­
ing how low their chances were of obtaining financial aid 
from their legislature turned to the federal government 
for aid. To a man the chancellors and deans of the Southern 
agricultural colleges were in favour of an increased commit­
ment by the federal government to aid what they saw as 
essential work. The final act was to a large extent the 
product of their efforts. They were supported by all other 
regions of the union, even those where agricultural educa­
tion was well provided for by the state. Bills had previous­
ly been introduced in Congress with this aim but they had 
lost because either there was too little time to allow 
proper/
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Table I; Money expended by the federal government under 
the Hatch Act, 1888-1911, and the Adams Act, 1906-1911; 
and money expended by federal government on agricultural 
colleges, 1890-1912°
STATE EXPERIMENT STATIONS
Total expended under the Hatch Act
1888-1911 #16,807,338.94
Total allotted under the Hatch Act
for 1912 540,000.00
17,347,338.94
Total expended under the Adams Act
1906-1911 2,828,665.21
Total allotted under the Adams Act
for 1912 540,000.00
3,368,665.21
Total for state experiment stations
under both Acts #20,716.004.15
STATE AGRICULTURAL COLLEGES
Total amount expended from 1890-1912 #28,802,000,00
Proceeds from the sale of land 13,348,041.00
Value of unsold land 5,042,388.00
Total for state agricultural colleges #47,192,429.00
Total for state experiment stations 20,716,004.15
Total for agricultural colleges 47,192,429.00
Grand total #67,908,433.15
Source: United States Congress, House, Establishment of
Agricultural Extension Department, 62nd Congress 
1st session, Report No. 546 (13th April 1912), 2
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proper consideration of the proposals or else they had been 
pigeon holed into a committee and conveniently forgotten. 
This had been the fate of a measure proposed by Asbury 
Lever, of South Carolina, in the House of Representatives 
in 1912. Although it passed the Democratic controlled 
House with ease, the Republican dominated Senate declined to 
accept the bill, and it died in the Senate committee on 
education. 24
The new Democratic administration was determined that 
this would not happen again. Identical bills intended to 
increase the federal commitment to agricultural education 
were introduced simultaneously in the House by Asbury Lever 
and in the Senate by Hoke Smith. This was an astute tactic 
on the part of Smith and Lever, designed to minimise the 
time taken to approve the statute. Once one bill had passed 
the chamber it was introduced to, it was a relatively easy 
matter for managers in the other chamber to adopt this as a 
substitute. Consequently,the substitute bill did not spend 
any time in committee, where it was most vulnerable. In 
this case, Lever's bill passed the House while Smith's was 
still in the early stages of debate. Smith adopted the 
House bill, thus forcing its Senate opponent to attack it in 
debate rather than in committee; it being presumed that this 
would be less damaging. Time was important for this bill.
As it involved the active co-operation of the states, it 
required that they ratified the terms of the bill before 
they could utilise the appropriation. State legislatures 
met infrequently; in the South some met only biennially. For 
the measure to be fully effective it was important that it 
be/
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be approved by the President as soon as was possible. This 
priority was uppermost in Smith's mind.
This legislation was important to Smith. Although 
elected to the Senate^in 1911, his previous political 
experience ensured him an influence in the upper chamber 
proportionately greater than his length of service. His 
position as chairman of the Senate committee on education 
and labour gave him a considerable say in the social legis­
lation of the New Freedom. Born in Newton, North Carolina, 
in 1855 he had moved to Atlanta where having passed the 
Georgia bar examinations he established himself as a pros­
perous lawyer, specialising in railroad law. Acquiring the 
ownership of the Atlanta Journal, and the friendship of 
Henry Grady, he embarked upon a political career. He was 
elected chairman of the state Democratic convention in 1888 
becoming one of the first in the South to support Grover 
Cleveland and sound money. His reward for this was his 
appointment in 1893 as Cleveland's secretary of the interior, 
a relatively minor position in the cabinet, but he was one 
of only five Southerners since the end of the Civil War to 
reach such a position. His rise had been meteoric. Falling 
out with his state Democratic party over the nomination of 
William Jennings Br^an. in 1896 he spent several years in a 
political wilderness. His political ambitions were not 
satisfied however and, entering into an unlikely alliance 
with Thomas Watson, he won the gubernatorial election in 
1907; although defeated in 1909 he regained the governor­
ship in 1911 before being elected in the same year to the 
Senate. 25 
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Smith therefore had considerable political experience 
at all levels of government; he was one of the few Southern 
politicians with a national reputation. He also had an 
interest in educational reforms this having been one of his 
main concerns while governor of Georgia. The state schools 
had received 30 per cent more money from the state in 1909 
than in 1907. He had also recommended larger appropriations 
for the state agricultural colleges, although nothing came 
of this. Above all. Smith brought a sense of personal 
mission to the Senate. His early rise combined with his 
mixed fortunes in state politics had combined to produce a 
great sense of thwarted ambition: he perceived himself as a 
national politician and very much desired some recognition 
of this. This produced a great determination in him to 
ensure that the bills he had control of in the Senate, espec­
ially those bearing his name, passed unamended and as smooth­
ly as possible, even when this entailed ungentlemanly 
conduct and breaches of trust. A measure of the man's 
vanity can be gauged by the Agricultural Extension Act being 
known as the Smith Lever Act. It is customary for an act to 
be named after the representative and then the senator who 
sponsored it in Congress. Smith insisted on changing the 
order, presumably to gain greater recognition of his 
achievement. 26
Asbury Lever was less flamboyant, less strident, and a 
more effective political manager than Hoke Smith. The 
efficiency with which he steered measures through the House 
contrasts vividly with the confusions and delays that 
occurred in the Senate. In part this was due to the 
different/
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different rules in each chamber, but it also reflected the 
political skills acquired by Lever since being elected to 
the House in 1901. Lever had known little else but 
politics. Graduating from Newberry College South Carolina 
in 1895, he had taught in the public schools until 1897 
when he became private secretary to Representative J.
William Stokes of South Carolina, a Cleveland Democrat.
Lever was elected to fill the vacancy caused by StokeG' 
death in 1901. He became chairman of the House agricultural 
committee in 1913. 27
The bill as it came out of committee was identical to 
that sponsored by Lever in the previous Congress, but lost 
in the Senate agricultural committee, except that it intro­
duced the principle of matching funds. The earlier measure 
proposed that the appropriation be administered along the 
lines of the Morrill Land Grant Act. The administration 
welcomed this new development. David Houston wrote that he 
was especially impressed with the cooperative features of 
the bill, believing that this would secure a better under­
standing and coordination of effort between the federal and 
state agencies. Although the principle of matching funds 
legislation was not new, its application on the scale pro­
posed by the Smith Lever bill was; the White Mountains and 
Southern Appalachian Mountain Act had appropriated only 
#100,000, but the Smith Lever bill proposed to appropriate 
#3,000,000 from the national treasury. 28
Lever's committee was aware that it was treading on 
new constitutional ground. Declaring in an unusually long 
preamble to its report that opposition was expected to the 
bill on the grounds that this was an area that the federal 
authorities/
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authorities should leave to the states, the committee none­
theless believed that its action was justified. Lever 
wrote that the demand for federal money from the states on 
this matter was becoming increasingly vocal, and was likely 
to increase rather than diminish; and as it was the duty of 
the federal government to recognise and act where possible 
upon such public sentiments, it was proper that funds 
should be appropriated to satisfy such demands. Any action 
however that would lead to any centralisation of power in 
Washington should be avoided, warned Lever, for such a move 
would only lead to chaos, duplication and waste as the 
federal agencies attempted to undertake the work already in 
progress in the states, 29
The practical components of the bill, such as the size 
of the appropriation, how this was to be allocated, what 
colleges were to be eligible and how the implementation of 
the bill was to be timetabled, were agreed upon by the 
National Soil Fertility League, the Association of American 
Colleges and Experiment Stations, and the United States 
department of agriculture. These were the same bodies as 
approved the previous bill. The matching funds principle 
would appear to have been the suggestion of the politicians. 
Certainly it was not the idea of the deans of the agricul­
tural colleges: they were content to receive more aid and 
cared little about how this was organised. The Senate 
committee reprinted the comments of forty five deans and 
chancellors of agricultural colleges, all endorsing the 
measure, but none commenting upon the cooperative aspects of 
it. Similarly, while a series of resolutions passed by the 
Association/
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Association of American Agricultural Colleges and Experi­
ment Stations approved heartily of the progress made with 
the Smith Lever bill, it did not mention the new principle 
of matching funds, Houston favoured cooperation and 
matching funds legislation, but not in the form proposed 
by the bill. He preferred that the federal government, 
through the department of agriculture,have a greater say 
in deciding how the money should be spent: the Smith Lever 
bill was too heavily weighted in favour of the state. 
Houston's opinions on how matching funds legislation should 
be administered are best documented regarding the Federal 
Highways Act, and as the secretary's experience with that 
act proves, his opinions could be ignored with impunity by 
a strong willed congressman, 30
The rhetoric of the bill was that it was a cooperative 
venture between three equal partners : the agricultural 
colleges, the state legislatures and the federal authori­
ties, The bill proposed that #10,000 be given to each 
state as a straight unconditional grant to promote agricul­
tural extension work. An additional #300,000 was to be 
appropriated annually for the next ten years, to be divided 
among the several states according to the percentage of 
rural population relative to the total population of the 
United States, No payment could be made from this fund 
until an equal amount was provided by the state legislature, 
This could come from state, county or municipal taxation or 
from private bodies; this latter provision was included to 
take account of the funds in the South from the General 
Education Board, Colleges were to be responsible for 
submitting/
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submitting any proposed projects, but these were to be 
approved by the secretary of agriculture before any federal 
money was granted. The committee considered that the 
colleges and the secretary would speedily come to a mutual 
agreement over this in practice, 31
It seemed as if a healthy system of checks and 
balances had been built into the bill: the colleges held 
the initiative, the state legislatures the purse strings, 
and the federal government,through the department of agri­
culture, the veto power. Yet the bill was not cooperative 
in any real sense. That it was not is due to the Southern 
view of states rights, and how Southern politicians per­
ceived the future workings of the measure. The South was 
willing to widen the role of the federal government, but 
unwilling to increase the power of the federal authorities 
over the states. As a result of this determination, the 
first clause of the bill declared that in a state where 
there were two or more colleges eligible to receive aid 
under the bill, the state legislature was to decide which 
college should benefit. This changed the whole tone of the 
bill. It became a measure that would benefit markedly the 
budgets of the Southern state legislatures while not insist­
ing that they increase their own spending the General 
Education Board being allowed to continue its interest in 
education. This would increase the power of the state 
legislatures within their own areas, as it added a regula­
tory power to its already existing legislatory duties. It 
also provided more patronage positions, a thought never far 
from the Southern politician's mind. While it is true that 
the/
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the secretary of agriculture continued to have a say in how 
the money was to be used, this was small in comparison to 
that held by the Southern state legislators. Southern 
agricultural educators were unlikely to worry too much about 
this clause. They were still allowed a certain degree of 
independence; they were content that something was being 
done; and they were probably as eager as the legislators to 
ensure that no money was given to the black colleges. 32 
Unlike several of the other agricultural reforms, a 
rival Republican measure existed. Springing from the 
recommendations of the Country Life Commission and sponsored 
by Senator Carroll Page of Vermont it envisaged a greater 
role for the federal government. Theodore Roosevelt, the 
National Society for Industrial Education, the American 
Federation of Labor, the National Grange and Farmers' Union 
all endorsed Page's bill. Page introduced his bill in the 
Senate on 5th June 1912, but soon found that Southerners 
employed delaying tactics, similar to those the Republicans 
would later adopt. The bill proposed that Congress appro­
priate #16,000,000 to establish a truly comprehensive system 
of agricultural education including the high schools as well 
as the colleges. Page said that he was more concerned with 
educating the farmer; and that the Democrats were only 
interested in aiding the teacher; their proposals were too 
timid, and were bound to fail. Hoke Smith, newly arrived in 
the Senate, leapt to the defence of the Democratic bill. The 
Republican bill,he declared would introduce national control 
over all secondary schools, and had nothing to do with the 
course of study taught in colleges, but was meant to benefit 
those/
179
those who did not attend college. Such a bill, he correct­
ly predicted, would never pass the House. Page accepted 
political realities with good humour, even though this 
represented an unfair end for seven years work. He had 
hoped however that he and Smith would have sponsored a 
compromise bill, indeed the two men had conferred upon the 
matter, and Page believed that they had come to a mutual 
understanding to do this. Smith had no intention of carry­
ing this out, nor of sharing any glory. He informed Page 
that a compromise had never been approved by him; and that 
he had merely made suggestions as to how Page could improve 
his bill. Many in the Senate including several Southerners 
regretted that this had occurred, but there was little that 
could be done. 33
The eventually successful Democratic bill was intro­
duced to the House by Asbury Lever on 19th January 1914; it 
passed the same day without any amendments. This was due to 
efficient floor management by the Democrats. Ensuring that 
a rule was passed limiting each speaker to twenty minutes 
they guaranteed that no opponent could develop any criticism, 
and that no time consuming arguments on details evolved. 
Opposition to the bill was well mannered, the representa­
tives speaking only "for the Record"; the considerable 
Democratic majority already guaranteeing the bill's passage. 
There was little to argue about on the bill's principles. It 
was a good, solid progressive reform that would outrage very 
few; it was sponsored and approved by responsible profess­
ional men, and was intended to aid those willing to improve 
themselves. By no stretch of the imagination could it be 
termed/
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termed a socialistic handout. 34
Madden, a Republican from Illinois, while declaring 
himself in favour of the bill's aims, attacked the proposed 
distribution of the appropriation. It would, he said, un­
duly discriminate against urban states; Illinois he noted 
would put #400,000 into the fund, but would get back only 
#130,000. He thought it would be fairer if the distribu­
tion was on the basis of a state's total population; as the 
responsibility to aid the farmer was the state's, then this
was only proper. Mann, an Illinois Democrat, countered
i L t  a - > . e ,
by saying that the national treasury could afford , and
that financial quibblings could only hinder the success of 
this important work, A more emotional criticism came from 
Haugen, an Iowan Republican. Attacking the "vicious Demo­
cratic caucus system", he claimed that the recently approved 
Underwood Simmons Tariff had ruined the American farmer by 
exposing him to unfair competition, while placing everything 
the farmer had to purchase upon a high tariff schedule. 
Besides this, Haugen argued, the Smith Lever bill was a mere 
palliation that would accomplish little, Haugen overran his 
twenty minutes limit, and was forced to print the rest of 
his argument in the House appendix but the point he raised 
would be further developed in the Senate by James McCumber 
of North Dakota, The only Democrat to express his opposi­
tion to the bill was John Fitzgerald of New York, a 
Tammanay Hall affiliate alienated from the administration 
over Wilson and McAdoo's insistence that federal patronage 
in New York should go to anti Tammanay men. Fitzgerald's 
argument was constitutional: he believed that education in 
any/
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any sphere was of such vital importance to the states that 
it should not be encroached upon by the federal government ; 
the measure as it stood was wholly obnoxious to the American 
system of government. It may be presumed that Fitzgerald 
was speaking more out of spite than personal conviction.
The opposition to the bill had been well conducted, and had 
raised relevant objections; but it was futile. The bill 
passed the House without a yea or nay vote, and its sponsor 
had had to play only the smallest of roles in ushering it 
through, 35
The debates in the Senate provided a complete contrast 
to the well mannered and parliamentary proceedings in the 
House. Although the measure could be identified as more of 
a Democratic than a Republican bill, the partisan division 
over agricultural education was not marked. Neither was the 
subject particularly fashionable, certain to rivet the 
attention of constituents. Despite this, the debates on the 
Smith Lever bill were to be the most ill-mannered of the 
Sixty Third Congress, the language and behaviour of some 
participants owing little to the traditions of Senatorial 
parliamentary conduct. Why this was so is due to the cir­
cumstances in the Chamber in early 1914, and the rules of 
the Senate, 36
Smith had introduced his bill to the Senate on 17th 
January 1914, at the very beginning of the second session of 
the Sixty Third Congress, the reason for this priority in 
the legislative timetable being the necessity to pass the 
bill while many of the state legislatures were still in 
session. The activities of the previous session had been 
devoted/
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devoted almost entirely to the divisive and highly partisan 
tariff debates. From mid July to 9th September 1913, 
senators were concerned with the intricate financial, legal, 
and political deals that were necessary to placate strong 
sectional interests while preserving the basic fabric of a 
highly controversial measure that overturned decades of 
previous policies. The result was a major Democratic 
triumph, in many ways the most impressive congressional 
achievement of the New Freedom. The struggle had honed and 
bonded the hitherto rather disparate Democrats in the 
Senate, giving them a tremendous sense of cohesion and 
purpose; this was of the utmost benefit for Democrats who 
attempted to pass subsequent legislation.
The effect upon the stunned Republicans was similar; 
few commentators had given the Democrats much chance of 
passing the Underwood Tariff in its entirety, but they had. 
Individual Republican senators felt personally hurt by the 
ease with which the Democrats had achieved their tradition­
al goal. This was particularly true for Midwestern and 
Mountain Republicans. Led by Borah of Idaho and LaFollette 
of Wisconsin they had operated very much as a party within 
a party, studying the details of the schedules due to be 
debated the next day long into the night. It was a heroic 
attempt, but it gained them little. Their cohesive sense, 
born in defeat, wished to embarrass the administration 
seriously at the first possible opportunity, both to salve 
their understandably wounded pride, and to vent the feelings 
of outrage in the Midwest concerning the effects of the new 
tariff.
Midwestern/
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Midwestern Republicans in the House felt similarly, 
but had fewer opportunities to express their outrage. Argu­
ments in the lower chamber were severely limited by the 
time limit rules that managers normally insisted upon; con­
sequently a proportionately greater time was spent in de­
bating procedure, rather than the substance of a measure.
Most speeches were carefully prepared and heard with mini­
mal interruption; there was little spontaneity in debate. 
Senators however were allowed to develop their arguments, 
each member being allowed to speak as long as he wanted, or 
was physically able to, on any subject he wished. Party
discipline, although increasing, was less strong. The idea
that a man was elected to the Senate not as a Republican or 
a Democrat, but as an ambassador from his state, although 
decreasing rapidly, still persisted; the Louisiana senators 
for example used this argument to justify their stance 
against the party caucus during the tariff debates. A cer­
tain waywardness therefore was permitted by Senate managers, 
that would be frowned upon by their counterparts in the 
House. Maverick behaviour was common in the Senate, and 
there was very little that a party manager could do about 
it, apart from ensuring that those he could count on remained 
loyal and were in the chamber at the correct time. 37
The tariff debates themselves had been conducted in a 
gentlemanly manner, indeed the minority leader in the
Senate, Jacob Gallinger of New Hampshire, went as far as to
congratulate Furnifold Simmons on his management of the 
bill. Gallinger said that he could recall no instance in 
which a bill had been managed with greater consideration 
for/
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for the minority. While Gallinger*s unusually generous 
remarks masked a great deal of bitterness and partisan 
tension, there is no doubt that a sympathetic and tolerant 
management of debate by an experienced sponsor could go a 
long way to defusing potential controversies,thus easing a 
measure's passage. Hoke Smith, unfortunately, was too 
involved personally with his bill to take the detached 
stance necessary to conciliate opponents. 38
The debate on the bill lasted seven consecutive days, 
an unusually long timey emerging amended but not damagingly 
so. Under the circumstances the Democratic managers had 
performed their duties well. The Smith Lever bill was the 
first major test for the principles upon which much of the 
agricultural reform programme would be based. Points scored 
in this debate could be put to good use in the months to 
come. And, as the Democratic majority in the Senate was 
unreliable, and the legislative timetable crowded, managers 
were forced to accept amendments because they could not 
afford the time to debate and criticise them fully.
The first day of debate was taken up by Hoke Smith's 
exposition of the bill, how it would improve American agri­
culture and education. He also declared that he wanted to 
have the bill disposed of that day, and to this end he agreed 
to accept an amendment that included Hawaii within the pro­
visions of the bill without debate. Less welcome however was 
an amendment proposed by Simmons that would have increased 
the appropriation under one clause from #300,000 to #3,000,000. 
Smith saw that to accept this would be a grievous tactical 
error; it would mean that the bill would have to go to a 
House committee losing vital time. The argument then 
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reverted to the tariff question, and an internecine squabble 
broke out between James Vardaman and James Bristow. This 
became fruitless, and the rest of the day was devoted to 
this, much to Smith's chagrin. By the time agricultural 
education appeared next on the Senate calender, 28th January 
1914, the Lever bill had passed the House; Smith lost no 
time in having this accepted as a substitute for the Senate 
bill. 39
The Midwestern Republicans developed their attack on 
the bill, continuing to wage the battles on the tariff of 
the previous session. James McCumber of North Dakota, one 
of the most experienced senators,having occupied his seat 
since 1899, was particularly scathing in his remarks. He 
declared that he would vote for the bill - "this sop to the 
American farmer" as he called it— because in their misery 
the Midwestern farmers would think that they were getting 
some solace or benefit from it, and McCumber was willing to 
extend to them that little courtesy. If the Democrats 
brought back the Republicans' tariff, then they would re­
store the farmers market, and McCumber predicted they would 
put back #3,000,000,000 into farmers' pockets. He claimed 
that since the Underwood Tariff had gone into operation, the 
prices in the North had gone down from 50-100 per cent; this 
was not the case in the South as Southerners faced no com­
petition in cotton, and tobacco growers were protected by a 
very high internal revenue as well as import duty. 40
McCumber's language was highly charged, but he was 
experienced enough to realise that it could do little to alter 
the bill; it was meant to reassure constituents that McCumber 
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did represent their interests, as well as acting as a suit­
able preamble to his main attack. After his attack on the 
Underwood Tariff, McCumber switched his attention to the 
bill's first clause, that which gave a state legislature 
the right to decide which college should benefit from the 
legislation when there were two or more colleges in the 
state. McCumber reckoned that from his knowledge of states 
with segregated black and white colleges, this would go to 
the white colleges only, 41
Smith countered this with the stock Southern argument: 
that Georgians worked fully and thoroughly "without discrim­
ination" to make the blacks better farmers. This bill he 
said was the best way to help the black farmer, for he was 
certain that blacks were allowed to watch demonstration work 
being attempted on whites' farms. Blacks, Smith continued, 
would not accept instruction as readily from those of their 
own race as they would from trained white men. Besides, he 
pointed out, when blacks sought advanced education they 
invariably sought classical colleges. 42
The following days of debate concentrated on the allo­
cation of the appropriation, although the race question 
lurked close to the surface. John Sharp Williams for 
example, normally one of the most courteous and considered 
men in his language, spoke of how Georgian agriculture was 
backward not because of its nature but due to the "presence 
of a backward, uninitiative, unintelligent, incapable black 
race". These were unusually candid and strong words for 
Williams. During Albert Cummins's speech on the appropria­
tion, James Vardaman sniped at him with largely meaningless 
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and flatulent comments. These so outraged the Iowan 
senator that he refused to yield the floor to Vardaman, a 
very rare event. 43
The race issue became the focus of the debate when 
Wesley Jones of Washington, a progressive Republican, had 
read into the record a request from the North Californian 
branch of the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, asking for an amendment that would ensure 
no discrimination against blacks when the appropriation was 
made in a state with segregated colleges. Jones according­
ly tabled such an amendment, and the argument rapidly assumed 
partisan lines with Western, Midwestern and Northern Repub­
licans seizing the opportunity to taunt the South; Northern 
Democrats remained neutral, although O'Gorman of New York 
said that education was peculiarly a state function, and 
should remain so, even though the federal authorities had 
the right to aid agricultural education, especially in those 
states that had not fulfilled their duty adequately, A 
prior attempt to ensure that blacks would receive some of 
the appropriation had been made by Thomas Sterling of South 
Dakota, a political ally of Jones. He had introduced a 
substitute bill during the first day of debate designed to 
strike out "cooperative" from the original bill, the effect 
of this being to leave the United States department of agri­
culture in complete control of the system, while giving all 
the initiative to the agricultural colleges. This had been 
easily dismissed. The president pro tempore, Thomas Martin 
of Virginia, had ruled that amendments to the original bill 
should be heard before a substitute was offered, and in the 
confusion/
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confusion the Sterling Bill foundered. The Jones amend­
ment offered a far more serious challenge to the bill. If 
accepted, it was highly unlikely that Southern state legis­
latures would ratify the legislation, and it would re­
present a damaging blow to the Democrats and Smith. 44 
For a supposedly deeply split party, the breadth of 
the Republican support for the Jones amendment is impress­
ive. Jacob Gallinger, a conservative Republican, said that 
the Northern states wanted to pass this amendment, because 
they generally desired that blacks should be given an equal 
share of the fund. Moses Clapp of Minnesota, an insurgent 
Republican, believed that the final say of where the money 
should go was the federal government’s, not the states; 
this was only proper as it was federal money that was to be 
spent. Jones attempted to keep the debate above the level 
of personal abuse that it was almost inevitably doomed to 
descend to when the Southern race record was mentioned. 
Paying tribute to the progress that blacks in the South had 
made under the guiding hands of such white men as James 
Vardaman, Jones nonetheless argued that when appropriating 
money from the federal treasury the government had the 
right and the duty to ensure that part of this appropria­
tion went to those who needed it the most. Jones clearly 
had no illusions concerning the charity of Southern state 
legislatures. To support his case, he called upon the 
"higher moral duty of the Federal government", saying that 
he was confident that if more encouragement was given and 
more incentives given to the black students in the South, 
then there would be many more of them in the agricultural 
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colleges than there were. 45
Such use of "higher moral duty" rhetoric was common 
among Northern and Western senators. It may be said to be 
their equivalent of the Southerners' states rights dogma.
Yet there is an important difference, despite their common 
borrowing of emotional language. The calling upon the 
higher moral authority of the federal authority to justify 
legislation was invariably used to hide constitutional 
problems, the perfect example of this being Senator Albert 
Beveridge's defence of the Federal Child Labor Bill of 1907. 
As he was well aware, this measure was unconstitutional, 
but highly popular throughout the union; his argument 
accordingly was based on the alleged right of Congress to 
act upon matters across state boundaries where the greater 
aims of American development were threatened. William 
Borah argued in a similar vein in favour of the 1916 
Federal Child Labor Bill. Other Midwestern senators, not­
ably Robert Lafbllette were so incensed at what they per­
ceived as the intransigence of the Supreme Court in delay­
ing social reforms that were necessary, but unconstitutional, 
that they seriously suggested that Congress should become 
the ultimate arbiter in constitutional matters. While such 
frustrated rage was understandable, it accomplished little. 
Southern states rights dogma, by contrast, was solidly based 
upon legal precedent and the sayings of great men. Con­
sequently it provided the South with a more concrete and 
relevant defence, that was far harder to defeat than evan­
gelical moralising. 46
The one inevitable result of such an argument was to 
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raise the of debate, despite Jones's care to appease
Southern race attitudes. Smith attempted to prove Jones's 
allegations regarding Southern legislatures wrong by quot­
ing figures showing that Georgian blacks did receive state 
aid in education. Although they only paid #173,497 in 
state taxes, Smith said, the blacks received #650,000 to 
aid their education from the state. While admitting that 
there was a large differential between the funds given to 
white and black students. Smith said this was due to the 
white colleges teaching botany, chemistry and mechanical 
engineering while the black colleges only taught bricklay­
ing and ploughing; this required less money. This was in­
evitable according to the Georgian for the majority of 
blacks were neither ready nor prepared for advanced higher 
education. Jones was correct in revealing that the black 
colleges in Georgia received only #24,000 to teach 500 
students while the 400 white students were supported by 
#240,000, but there were sound reasons for this, which 
Smith hoped Jones would appreciate. 47
Smith retained his temper throughout, although in a 
burst of anger towards the end of the day he revealed his 
frustations by shouting that Georgians did not want the fund 
if it went to any but the white colleges. In the main how­
ever his argument was precise, reasoned, informed and based 
upon practicalities. With the one exception mentioned above 
he had refrained from the worst forms of racist abuse. Yet 
Smith was wrong in many areas of his argument. Many more 
blacks did want to attend vocational colleges, it being the 
only level of higher education that was open to them; and 
many/
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many made considerable sacrifices to ensure that they could 
attend. Similarly, black teachers were very successful in 
getting their message across to black tenant farmers, indeed 
Eugene C. Branson was jealous of the success of Booker T. 
Washington, wishing that he had a similar record among white 
tenants. Furthermore, Smith's contention that blacks learnt 
best from whites would have been hard to substantiate in 
Florida and Louisiana where whites were forbidden by state 
law from teaching blacks,or in South Carolina where whites 
were allowed to teach only the Bible to blacks. This point 
was made during the debate by John Works of California, one 
of the few remaining Union veterans in Congress. Nor was it 
true that blacks inevitably made poor farmers. Much to 
Smith's embarrassment Bristow pointed out during the debate 
that blacks in Kansas were among the most successful farmers, 
and that they were creditable citizens. Smith's arguments 
therefore, reasoned and parliamentary though they were, had 
not completely stilled criticism. 48
More effective, though less condonable, were the methods 
employed by Vardaman, who chose this debate to air his strong 
racist views for the first time in Congress. Vardaman had 
hitherto been very quiet in the chamber, limiting his remarks 
to short unemotional points of information, although his 
threatened revolt over the income tax provision of the tariff 
had raised the administration's proposed rate slightly. His 
conforming to Senate rules had surprised manyf' his reputation 
as the racist, demagogic governor of Mississippi having pre­
ceded him to Washington. It appeared as if the gentlemanly 
Senate had reformed him. His reasons for choosing this 
moment to make his mark remain cloudy, for there were 
previous/
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previous ocasions when he could have spoken on the race 
question. Many of his wilder actions are inexplicable, 
partly according to his biographer to the lack of available 
sources, and partly one suspects to the irrationality of 
Vardaman*s character. 49
Vardaman based his attack upon personal grounds. Jones, 
he sneered, was happy enough to turn over the money to the 
blacks, but Vardaman wondered, would the Washington senator 
be willing to give the appropriation to the Japanese of the 
West Coast? Jones, flustered, attempted to evade the ques­
tion by correctly saying that this carried the argument 
into realms that it should not go. Vardaman however con­
tinued to press home his point, wringing out of Jones the 
admission that he would not be prepared to give the Japanese 
money; he would if they were United States citizens, but he 
fervently hoped that this would never be the case. 50
The ferocity and tone of Vardaman*s attack clearly took 
Jones by surprise. Although Jones's point that blacks 
should receive equal treatment because they were American 
citizens, whereas the Japanese were not, was consistent with 
Republican thought and legally valid, it was lost, due to 
his confusion. Once his moral hypocrisy over race had been 
revealed, there was little he could do. Vardaman further 
denied him the chance of justifying his position by widening 
the focus of his argument. Saying that he wished the black 
well, and that he was willing to make even greater personal 
sacrifices so that the black could enjoy life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness, the Mississippi senator held in 
contempt those gentlemen, "who live at a distance from him, 
who/
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who love him as a race, but who despise him as an individ­
ual" . He further believed that it would be a very unfort­
unate condition of affairs if the black was allowed to 
manage his public educational institutions. Jones's only 
response to this was to once again meekly declare his 
amazement at the progress made by the blacks in the South, 
and to repeat that the federal government had the duty to 
appropriate its monies to benefit those in the most need. 51 
While nominally disapproving of Vardaman's tactics, 
which were intended more for personal rather than party 
aggrandisement, most Southern senators welcomed his intru­
sions. They silently endorsed his arguments; and it 
placed them in a more reasonable light. Vardaman made a 
very effective battering ram when the South wished to 
assault a persistent threat to their society. Thus, after 
Vardaman had trampled upon Jones, Furnifold Simmons was 
able to say it would be wise to place all the appropriation 
in the white colleges, for not only would good economy 
result, but the results would be better, and appear to be a 
conciliatory voice. In the event the Jones amendment was 
defeated by 32 votes to 23, a comfortable margin. Support 
for it came from Midwestern and Northeastern Republicans; 
Southern Democrats voted against as did their counterparts 
from the North. 52
The vote on the amendment came on 7th February 1914, 
the day after the Jones Vardaman exchange, but Republican 
attacks on the bill continued. Cummins declared that he 
would vote against the bill, thus changing his mind from 
31st January, not because the race question had been raised 
but because the whole issue had been raised as to whether 
the/
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the power should be withdrawn from the central government 
how the money contributed from all people should be spent; 
the whole matter should be left entirely to the state or to 
the secretary of agriculture. Further opposition to the 
bill as it stood came from a surprising source, Western 
Democrats. Thomas Shafroth of Colorado, an administration 
Democrat, offered an amendment stating that in a state with 
two or more colleges the appropriation should be adminis­
tered by the governor of that state and the secretary of 
agriculture. This he saw as allowing greater efficiency: 
the secretary of agriculture would be able to assess the 
demand for the allocation over many years thus meeting the 
needs of the colleges in a more accurate manner; and a 
legislature could hardly negotiate with anyone, it being 
too cumbersome. Jones spoke in favour of this amendment, 
saying that it would greatly improve the bill, although it 
would not solve the racial problem. Another amendment was 
proposed by Gilbert Hitchcock, a Nebraskan Democrat, which 
proposed to include the phrase "without discrimination 
towards race". Playing cleverly upon the Southern argument, 
Hitchcock presumed that as those in charge of the bill in­
tended that the work be carried out without discrimination, 
then they would not oppose the amendment. 5 3
Smith did not. Conscious that the permissible time on 
debate was running out, he accepted both amendments to the 
bill, hoping that they would be erased when the bill went 
into joint committee. Shafroth's amendment was probably a 
genuine attempt to improve efficiency of the bill. Hitch­
cock’s was more malicious, designed to embarrass Smith and 
the/
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the South. He was the leader of the anti Bryan faction in 
Nebraska, and at dudgeons with the administration over its 
handing over of the state's patronage to the Bryanites. 
Furthermore, he had resented Wilson's bullying tactics in 
forcing him as a member of the Senate banking and currency 
committee to accept the Federal Reserve Bill. As with 
O'Gorman's opposition it is likely that Hitchcock's amend­
ment was born of spite. Both Westerners had voted against 
the Jones amendment. 54
The Jones amendment had been the main challenge to the 
bill; once this was defeated the debate ended and the amend­
ed bill passed the Senate without a yea or nay vote. To 
Southern leaders the Jones amendment represented a Northern 
attempt to reintroduce the federal authorities into Southern 
society. Its proponents certainly saw it as a possible 
entering wedge; by this the federal authorities could ensure 
that although Southern life was separate, there was some 
degree of equality. Jones's argument was not one for de­
segregation; it was meant to guarantee that the black 
colleges gained something from the measure. In one sense 
the argument was merely symbolic, for no matter how mean the 
Southern state legislatures were, the black colleges would 
continue to receive direct aid from the Morrill land grant 
fund, and it was likely that they would receive some in­
direct benefit from the Smith Lever fund. Jones merely 
attempted to institutionalise the inevitable. Furthermore, 
even if such a clause was inserted, enforcing the state 
legislatures to apportion the fund equally between the black 
and white colleges, its enforcement in the South would have 
been/
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been very lax indeed, 55
Knowing all this, Southern congressmen nonetheless 
vigorously attacked the amendment; due to this, they won. 
The legislation had been passed in essentially the same 
form as it left the committee; Shafroth*s amendment had 
replaced the state legislature'^ role with the governor, but 
this would be changed in the joint committee; but more 
importantly, the federal government in the form of the 
secretary of agriculture was to play the minimum function 
necessary to justify the appellation of "cooperative" 
legislation. This victory had been due in the first in­
stance to superior numbers, but in the moral argument 
Southern aggression and precision had carried the day. This 
had been no overblown, defensive use of the states rights 
argument, lasting for hours with frequent references to the 
wisdom of Jefferson and Calhoun, but a confident, fighting 
use of the rhetoric which, when used by Vardaman,exposed 
Northern race hypocrisy, and when used by Smith so effect­
ively mapped the constitutionality of the bill that Jones 
had to resort to vague ideals of the higher moral authority 
of the union. The result was a victory for the Southern 
interpretation of federal state relations.
Smith's personal triumph was completed by his success­
ful defence of the appropriation plan; this was a secondary 
argument compared to the Jones amendment, but it was 
important to politicians. When he spoke upon appropriation 
allocation, a politician was speaking directly for his 
constituents; while impressive flights of rhetoric won 
respect in the Senate or House, constituents tended to 
judge/
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judge a politician's success by how large a slice of the 
federal cake he could grab. Few men admitted publicly to 
this pork barrel style of politics, but it was uppermost 
in their minds, especially as 1914 was the first electoral 
test for the New Freedom.
The House committee proposed that the fund be alloca­
ted among the states according to the proportion of the 
rural population of each state to the total population of 
the union; this used the census definition of rural: those 
living in communities of less than 2,500 people. According 
to Smith, this was neither his nor Asbury Lever's idea, 
but that of the presidents of the agricultural colleges and 
the officers of the department of agriculture. Their 
motives, he continued, were neither partisan nor sectional, 
but purely those of national service, Midwesterners however 
did not accept this explanation, choosing rather to see a 
Southern plot to seize more than the South's fair share. 
Certainly the proposed system meant that the money went to 
those areas with the most labour intensive methods, and this 
favoured the least efficient and innovative regions, parti­
cularly the South. Southerners defended this windfall 
although it was not their idea, 56
The main criticism came from Albert Cummins. Pointing 
out that the twelve Southern states would receive 40 per 
cent of the appropriation while producing #3,236,398,813 in 
agricultural produce each year, he claimed that twelve 
representative Northern states, of his own choosing, pro­
duced #6,184,292,673, yet they were to receive only 36 per 
cent of the appropriation. That, Cummins said, hardly did 
justice to all the people of the country. Narrowing the 
focus/
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focus of his argument, Cummins showed that Iowa and Georgia 
were similar in size, population and area, yet Georgia was 
to receive 4.19 per cent of the appropriation, and Iowa 
only 3,13 per cent. To rectify this anomaly, Cummins tabled 
an amendment allocating the fund on the basis of a state's 
value of agricultural production and the proportion of its 
population involved in agriculture. The effect of this was 
to aid the Western states at the expense of the South and 
the East; this was sectional politics at its most blatant. 
Cummins duly admitted this; when challenged by Smith
acting upon narrow grounds, he replied that he was guilty
of the charge of having a very deep interest in his own 
state; but he justified this by saying that the effect of 
the Underwood tariff had been to aid the East at the expense 
of the West, He was merely readjusting the balance; table
II shows how he intended to do this, 5 7
This amendment was heavily defeated by 41 votes to 16, 
with only the Midwesterners voting for it. The Southern 
defence of the allocation had been based upon the drafting 
of the plan by professionals and not politicians; both Smith 
and Williams asserted that in no way did they wish this work 
to be dominated by politics. This argument however was 
carried further. It was proper that federal aid should go 
to the most deserving or needy areas Smith argued. Simmons 
concurred in this, adding that while the South did receive 
the lion's share, this was only proper as less had been 
spent on the South prior to 1913, 58
This was a relatively new concept in federal legisla­
tion; it was one of the first examples of true regional aid. 
Congress, by accepting that the need was greatest in the 
South/
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Table II: Allocation of the appropriation under the Smith
Lever bill: and as proposed by the Cummins amendment.
The Twelve Southern States
per cent under per cent under
the bill the amendment
Alabama 3.58 2.03
Arkansas 2.78 1.69
Florida 1.08 0.38
Georgia 4.19 2.57
Kentucky 3.51 3.00
Louisiana 3.22 1.10
Mississippi 3.22 1.88
North Carolina 3.83 1,84
South Carolina 2.62 1.27
Tennessee 3.53 2.28
Texas 5.99 5.72
Virginia 3.21 2.06
Total 40,76 25.82
The Twelve Northern States
per cent under per cent under
the bill the amendment
Illinois 4.38 5.86
Indiana 3.16 3.54
Iowa 3.13 6.16
Kansas 2.43 6.25
Michigan 3.01 2.68
Minnesota 2.48 4.11
Missouri 3.84 5.14
Nebraska 1.79 5.10
New York 3.91 3.10
North Dakota 1.03 4.28
Ohio 4.26 4,20
Wisconsin 2.69 2.49
Total 36.11 52.91
Source: Congressional Record, 63rd Congress, 2nd session,
(1914), 2656.
199
South, and by proposing to act upon this, had decided to 
aid one region at the expense of another. The federal 
government had appropriated money to aid deprived or 
threatened regions, but this had rarely been enacted as 
nationwide legislation, and was invariably related to a 
natural phenomenon. Thus, appropriations had been made to 
help combat the boll weevil in the South west, or to con­
serve forestry in the North west; but this did not involve 
one region benefiting at the specific expense of another; 
and the legislation was intended to be temporary, or until 
the specific problem was eradicated. Similarly, regular 
appropriation bills which were passed by every Congress, and 
were very open to behind the stage manipulations, had to 
have some natural justification; Florida did not receive a 
greater share of the rivers and harbours appropriation than 
South Carolina on the grounds that her economic or social 
needs were greater: she received this because her coastline 
was. longer. Furthermore, many states did not benefit from 
this by definition of the legislation.
The Smith Lever bill however was designed to be per­
manent, and it affected every state in the union. Only 
Rhode Island could claim to be predominantly industrial in 
1914, and even it had a sizeable agricultural population. 
Precedents existed for nationwide federal regulation that 
was deliberately weighted to aid one region at the expense 
of another, the abolition of slavery being the best example. 
Rarer however was the deliberate skewing of federal expendi­
ture to benefit a backward or deprived region. Southerners 
correctly saw a difference between this and federal regula­
tion; for although Southern elites were unwilling to approve 
federal/
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federal regulation that would benefit children, women, 
labour or blacks, they were in this instance in the fore­
front of advocating regional aid. It can be argued that 
this was mere Southern spoilsmanship; such legislation in 
almost every conceivable area would benefit the South.
While there is truth in this, it is also correct to note 
that such thinking was advanced in the 1910s, although it 
would be increasingly perceived as a proper function of 
central government, throughout the Western world. In terms 
of the United States Congress and constitution during the 
1910s, it required considerable sophistication of thought 
to justify such legislation. 5 9
It was largely this regional imbalance that induced 
Midwestern senators to continue their opposition to the bill 
after it had passed both chambers. As several amendments 
had been made to the bill in the Senate, it had been re­
ferred to a joint committee. This was usually a formality, 
but in this case the conferees were in committee for six 
weeks, and Smith reported to the Senate that they were un­
sure if they could come to agreement. It was the end of 
April 1914 by now. If the bill was to become law it had to 
go into operation by July 1st, this being a condition of the 
measure. This left only sixty days for the states to ratify 
the act, and utilise the fund. The major stumbling block 
was the Shafroth amendment; the Hitchcock amendment had been 
purely symbolic and the Senate conferees had agreed to drop 
it without argument. 60
Smith wanted to keep the bill in conference; there was 
no hope of it passing the House in its present condition he 
said. On 29th April however, Smoot of Utah tabled a motion 
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to recall the bill from the House, and this was carried by 
32 votes to 30; all the Southerners present voted against 
it but they were defeated by Midwestern and Northeastern 
Republicans. As Smoot’s move had been a complete surprise, 
Smith had not ensured that his votes were present. 61
Smith reacted ruthlessly the next day. He secured by 
32 votes to 25 a motion to lay the Smoot motion on the table, 
thus bypassing it. Prior to this he had persuaded the Senate 
conferees to recede from the Shafroth amendment, and the 
Senate accepted the conference report. Better management on 
Smith's part ensured that enough Democrats were present in 
the chamber to guarantee the bill's acceptance. Thus the 
bill became law in exactly the same form as it was introduced 
to the Senate from the House. Controversy continued to 
surround it however. Smith had voted for the bill without 
noticing that his regular pair, Henry Cabot Lodge, was out of 
the chamber, a serious breach of senatorial etiquette, for 
which Smith apologised. Given his excitement and haste it is 
possible that his error was accidental. Less pardonable were 
the accusations made the next day by Townsend of Michigan 
that Smith by acting so suddenly had cut out senators who had 
declared their intention to speak on the matter. This accord­
ing to Townsend went totally against the Senate's customs, 
and he doubted if the Senate would have approved the action 
that it took, if everyone had known exactly what the situa­
tion was. 62
Hoke Smith was unhappy with these allegations, and he 
apologised; but his excuses were unconvincing. Doubtless he 
considered that he had fought fire with fire, and that if he 
had/
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had allowed Midwestern congressmen to speak, then the bill 
would have been lost. It is unfortunate however that such 
an important statute should have been associated with 
personal unpleasantness.
The second educational statute, the Smith Hughes 
Vocational Education Act, was not passed until 1917. Closely 
following the Smith Lever Act in its use of federal funds, 
it differed in its aim and the basis of its appropriation 
allocation. As with the Smith Lever Act, its eventual pass­
age was rarely in doubt, although it was debated in a 
friendly and parliamentary fashion. There were no attacks 
on the South or' Hoke Smith comparable to that of Senator 
Jones. The topic provided a welcome break from the more 
divisive issues of Preparedness which were before both 
chambers at that time.
The Smith Lever Act had limited its aid to agricultural 
colleges, and to the work carried out by the colleges off 
their campuses. The Smith Hughes bill intended to fund 
vocational education at institutions below the grade of 
college, and within the precincts of these institutions. 
Smith considered that three broad divisions of schools should 
be aided: schools in which practically half the time was 
devoted to vocational education; part-time schools for work­
ers over the age of fourteen, with a view to extending the 
student's "vocational intelligence"; and evening schools 
teaching vocational subjects to those over the age of six­
teen. The terms of definition however were unduly vague; 
and/
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and many institutions deserving assistance fell outside the 
bill's rubric. 63
Demands for such aid had been discussed in Congress 
for many years but nothing had come of them. The Page bill, 
which the House had rejected in 1912, had contained pro­
visions for funding vocational education at the high school 
level. Hoke Smith had attacked these plans, saying that 
they were unworkable and would give the federal authorities 
control over the entire national education system. None­
theless, the Georgian senator meant to sponsor such legisla­
tion himself, and in July 1913 he proposed a joint resolu­
tion empowering the President to appoint a commission to 
consider the federal funding of vocational education, and to 
report a bill to Congress. 64
Wilson favoured vocational education, despite being 
completely lukewarm to agricultural extension work. On one 
occasion he remarked that an imperative need existed for 
vocational education, and that there were not "half enough 
vocational schools". Accordingly, the President speedily 
approved the commission, and it began work in early 1914. 
Smith had intended that the South should be strongly repre­
sented on the commission, but in this he was thwarted: there 
were no Southern representatives on the commission, apart 
from politicians. The commission had a sectional and occu­
pational balance, and this was to be mirrored in its pro­
posals, Smith, as chairman of the Senate committee on 
education, chaired the commission. Three other congressmen 
were appointed: Senator Page, Representative Dudley Hughes 
of Georgia, and Representative Simeon Fess of Ohio. The 
various/
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various groups interested in the subject were represented 
by: John Lapp, director of the Indiana Board of Legislative 
Information; Florence Marshall, director of the Manhattan 
Trade School; Agnes Nestor, a member of the American 
Federation of Labor's committee on industrial education; 
and Charles Prosser, the secretary of the National Society 
for the Promotion of Industrial Education. Representing 
the bureaucracy was Charles Winslow, a special agent of the 
bureau of labor statistics. There was no official represen­
tative from the department of agriculture. A more complex 
bill than the Smith Lever bill was the result of the 
commission's deliberations. 65
The proposal proceeded along three lines. It intended 
to appropriate money in cooperation with the states to pay 
vocational teachers of agriculture; a similar appropriation 
was to be made to pay vocational teachers in the mechanical 
arts; finally, funds were to be appropriated for the train-
S)
ing of vocational teachers. The bill required an equal 
contribution from each state before the grant was made; no 
guidelines were laid down as to how this could be raised, a 
concession to the South. Each state, through its legisla­
ture, had to formally accept the conditions of the legisla­
tion, and establish state boards of vocational education 
before they could make use of the fund. As with the Smith 
Lever Act, the state board was to devise a proposal for 
using the fund, receive half the necessary capital from the 
state legislature, and then submit the plan for approval to 
a federal vocational education board. The power of initia­
tive lay with the state authorities. Hoke Smith remarked: 
"It in no sense is contemplated that the final responsibility 
for/
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for the work shall be removed from State authorities". 66 
The bill called for an annual appropriation which 
would amount to #7,200,000 by 1924, when the system would 
be fully implemented. For the training of teachers, the 
appropriation fpr the first year would be #5 00,000, increas­
ing by #200,000 annually until it reached #1,000,000; there­
after it would be #1,000,000 annually. The appropriation 
for paying the salaries of teachers, supervisors and 
directors of agriculture was to be #500,000 initially 
increasing by #200,000 each year until the total reached 
#2,000,000; thereafter the annual increase would be #500,000 
until #3,000,000 was reached; this was to be the final 
annual appropriation. Similar provisions, both in method 
and the amount of money involved, were made to pay the 
salaries of those in mechanical arts. The gradual intro­
duction of the act aimed at decreasing the chances of mis­
use of funds during the early years of operation. A further 
#200,000 was appropriated for the administering of the 
federal vocational education board. 67
The commission proposed different indices for each of 
the three appropriations. The appropriation to pay the 
salaries of the teachers, directors and supervisors of agri­
culture was to be divided among the states according to the 
proportion of rural dwellers in each state to the total pop­
ulation of the union. For mechanical arts, the appropria­
tion was to be prorated by each state’s urban population.
The total population of the state was to be the basis of 
division for the teachers’ training fund.
While complicated, the bases of division were appro­
priate. They were less of an exercise in regional aid than 
the/
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the Smith Lever Act had been, but the principle of alloca­
ting resources to the areas in the most need remained; 
albeit related to population rather than economic or social 
need. Table III reveals how the twelve Southern states 
fared by comparison with the twelve Northern states used by 
Cummins in the earlier debate. While the Southern states 
continued to receive the lion's share of the agricultural 
education appropriation, the region benefited less in the 
field of mechanical arts. The twelve Northern states did 
better under this, cornering almost half the total appropri­
ation; although this is slightly misleading for once 
Illinois and New York are discounted, the Northern states 
received only 25 per cent of the appropriation. The 
difference between the average Midwestern and Southern state 
was measured in thousands rather than tens of thousands of 
dollars. Nonetheless, the division appeared reasonable on 
paper. Most congressmen accepted it, there being no argu­
ments over the appropriation. 68
Despite being reported out of the commission in 1914, 
the measure had to wait until July 1916 before the Senate 
considered it. Congress chose not to act upon it in 1914, 
and the short third session of the Sixty Third Congress 
blocked action during 1915. Smith ensured however that it 
was favourably reported out of the education and labor 
committee in March 1916, and placed on the Senate calendar. 
The committee had made only minor amendments: the date on 
the bill had to be changed for example, a year having 
elapsed since the bill was drawn up. Smith wanted to pro­
vide a #7,500 salary for a general director of vocational 
education,/
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Table III: Division of the appropriations as proposed by
the Smith Hughes bill.
The Twelve Southern States
per cent of the per cent of the per cent of
agricultural mechanical arts the training
fund fund fund
Alabama 3.58 per cent 0.8 7 per cent 2.32 per cent
Arkansas 2.78 0.48 1.71
Florida 1.08 0,51 0.82
Georgia 4.20 1.26 2.84
Kentucky 3.51 1.30 2.49
Louisiana 2.35 1.16 1.80
Mississippi 3.22 0.49 1.95
North Carolina 3.83 0.75 2.40
South Carolina 2.62 0.53 1.65
Tennessee 3.53 1.03 2.37
Texas 5.99 2.20 4.24
Virginia 3.21 1.12 2.24
39.90 per cent 11.70 per cent 26.83 per cent
The Twelve Northern States
Illinois 4.38 per cent 8.16 per cent 6.13 per cent
Indiana 3.16 2.68 2.94
Iowa 3.13 1.60 2.42
Kansas 2.43 1.16 1.84
Michigan 3.01 3.11 3.05
Minnesota 2.48 1.99 2.26
Missouri 3.84 3.28 3.58
Nebraska 1.79 0,73 1.30
New York 3.91 16.86 9.91
North Dakota 1.04 0.15 0.63
Ohio 4.25 6.25 5.18
Wisconsin 2.69 2.36 2.54
36.11 per cent 48.33 per cent 41.78 per cent
Source: Congressional Record. 64th Congress, 1st session,
(1916), 11874 - 11875
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education, but he chose to accomplish this on the Senate 
floor, presumably to save time. The commission's thorough­
ness and professionalism defied any meaningful alterations. 69 
Introduced to the Senate on 20th April 1916, the con­
sideration of other matters meant that debate did not comm­
ence until 31st July. Foreign policy deliberations created 
most of the delay, but a minor cause was Smith's insistence 
that Carroll Page be present in the chamber when the bill 
was debated, allowing a joint presentation. (As chairman 
of the relevant committee Smith had the right to present 
the measure on his own). Going out of his way to pay tri­
bute to the "splendid work" carried out by Page on behalf 
of vocational education, Smith revealed a more generous 
side to his character. It certainly represented a change 
from the vain glory seeker who squabbled to havebhis name 
placed first in the Smith Lever Act. 70.
The Senate debate was largely uneventful. At its 
beginning, Jacob Gallinger asked Smith if he knew of any 
senator opposed to the bill. Smith replied, truthfully, 
that he did not ; and proceeded to read through the bill pro­
posing a few minor amendments. The only controversy arose 
when Thomas, Democratic senator from Colorado, tabled an 
unexpected amendment. This intended to include the teach­
ing "of foreign born persons for intelligent citizenship 
and industrial efficiency" within the terms of the bill.
Saying that he was acting on behalf of a woman in Denver, 
active in the teaching of civic duties and obligations to 
aliens, Thomas also disclosed that the woman had met Smith, 
and had been informally informed that the amendment would 
be accepted, 71 
Smith,/
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Smith, clearly embarrassed, openly admitted that he 
did not know what to do. Saying that the subject appealed 
to him, he nonetheless could not see how it could agree 
with the bill's general scheme; the amendment would relate 
the bill to one specific class. Furthermore, he said, as 
the immigrant population varied so enormously, it would be 
better to solve the problem at local level. Page attempt­
ed to rescue Smith by emphasising the role of the state in 
providing cultural education; only when the immigrant had 
a broad, general education could he take advantage of 
vocational education. 72
Smith had remembered his meeting with the woman by 
now. He thought that she must have misunderstood him; he 
recollected telling her that the bill would accomplish her 
aims without further amendment. He was certain that he 
had not promised any special designation in the bill for 
such a proposal. Thomas accepted Smith's word, and as the 
matter was of little importance to him, he did not attempt 
to force the issue. Smith however, after consulting with 
Page, agreed to accept the amendment, partly to save face, 
and partly to reduce the chances of any argument• The bill 
passed the Senate without a yea or nay vote on the same 
day it was introduced. 73
The bill was referred to the House committee on educa­
tion, whose chairman, Dudley M. Hughes, recommended that 
the Thomas amendment be struck out. Hughes had a personal 
interest in the measure, A cotton planter by profession, 
he had been president of the Georgia State Agricultural 
Society, 1904-1906, and was a trustee of the University of 
Georgia/
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Georgia and the Georgia State Agricultural College, He was 
also the president of the Georgia Fruit Growers Association, 
a highly influential body within Georgian agriculture. The 
House did not have enough time to consider the measure in 
1916 but the bill passed the lower chamber with little 
difficulty in 1917. Slight difference existed between the 
House and the Senate bills: the House had struck out the 
Thomas amendment ; and it recommended that the federal board 
be composed of representatives from vocational education, 
whereas the Senate bill recommended cabinet members. The 
conference soon straightened out the difficulties, the 
Senate receding on the Thomas amendment, and a compromise 
board was decided upon. 74
Despite appropriating more federal money and covering a 
wider educational area, the Smith Hughes Act was less con­
troversial than the Smith Lever Act. Many of the controver­
sial matters had already been settled both by the Smith 
Lever Act and the Federal Highways Act; the debate had grown 
stale. Neither was Congress's attention fixed upon domestic 
policy any longer. Threats to the United States from Mexico 
and Europe commanded attention; vocational education was 
small beer compared to these. The mellowing of Hoke Smith 
also contributed to the passivity of the bill's passage. He 
no longer antagonised the opposition unnecessarily, removing 
an element of vindictiveness from the Senate floor. The 
uncontroversial passage of the Smith Hughes Act should not 
deceive however. It was a vital cornerstone in the federal 
government's increasing commitment to education, and a well 
constructed/
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constructed and thoroughly professional measure. Indeed 
in its scope it implied a more radical and complete role 
for the federal government than the Smith Lever Act.
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CHAPTER IV 
FINANCIAL LEGISLATION
Economic and social reformers used rural credits as a 
vague but emotive rallying call. According to its most 
enthusiastic proponents, rural credits reform would trans­
form Southern agriculture in a manner that improved hi^ways, 
a regulated cotton exchange, increased warehouse provisions 
and an expanded educational system could only hint at. Once 
shorn of millennial rhetoric, the nature of rural credits 
was more prosaic. Essentially, rural credits reform meant 
the rationalisation of the haphazard,though not completely 
inefficient, banking system which had supported the American 
farmer. Commercial bankers, who never really interested 
themselves in agricultural finance, contemptuously dismissed 
the already existing system as "dealings in squash and 
pumpkin" currency. 1
Such comments were hardly fair. Rural credits tfv&ye. 
important ; any legislation on the subject would have far 
reaching effects, for both the farmer and American banking. 
Furthermore, it would establish a more permanent structure 
than any other component of the agricultural reform programme. 
The problem was simple; how could the farmer obtain depend­
able, guaranteed credit at a reasonable interest rate? The 
proposed solutions fell into three broad categories. The 
commercial banks and their political allies preferred to keep 
rural credits in the private sector, or limit government 
intervention to the state level. Initially Woodrow Wilson 
concurred in this opinion. Occupying the middle ground were 
those/
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those who desired a rural equivalent of the federal reserve 
system, with a limited federal responsibility and an 
emphasis on local autonomy. This formed the majority 
opinion, particularly amongst politicians. Direct federal 
grants to the farmer was the most radical solution; this 
idea was without constitutional precedent, banks resisting 
it bitterly. The strongest support for this came from 
farmers' organisations in the Mid west. Despite the appar­
ently deep divisions however, all agreed upon the necessity 
of some form of legislation.
Southerners in Congress agreed wholeheartedly with the 
need for reform. Some politicians such as Duncan Fletcher 
of Florida and Morris Sheppard of Texas preferred to limit 
rural credits to private business, but the majority worked 
to bring about some degree of federal intervention; ho South­
ern politician supported the idea of direct, unqualified 
federal grants. The eventually successful bill was sponsored 
by Henry Hollis of New Hampshire in the Senate, and by Robert 
Bulkeley of Ohio in the House, but Southern support was 
essential to the bill's passage in both debate and voting.
In certain respects, most notably the boundaries of the land 
bank districts, the bill had been intended specifically to 
help the South.
The rural credits problem was more pressing in the South 
than elsewhere. The problem was not a lack of rural credit 
facilities, but rather their unregulated nature. A large 
body of opinion contended that the Southern agricultural 
problem stemmed from an excess of credit. Clarence Poe 
believed that encouraging rural thrift would result in better 
conditions/
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conditions than even the best regulated credit system. John 
Sharp Williams, no stranger to the workings of agricultural 
finance, agreed considering that in the past too much 
credit, too easily available, had been the ruin of the 
Mississippi farmer. Advising extreme caution on all 
matters of rural credits, Williams believed that the clos­
est attention should be paid to the workings of the federal 
reserve system before any proposals for rural finance be 
drawn up. The nature of Southern rural finance posed the 
problem; not the ease of obtaining it. One of the many 
paradoxes of cotton production concerned its financing, for 
while highly sophisticated on one level, involving complex 
international transactions, at the local level it was almost 
primitive. Verbal or poorly drawn up contracts between 
planter and merchants were common; in many cases the barter 
means was merchandise rather than specie or paper; and the 
interest rates were both high and variable. The system had 
its advantages; it was well adapted to local conditions, and 
flexible enough to deal with minor fluctuations. It was 
however open to abuse, the whole system being considered by 
many to be corrupt and inefficient. Expressions of confid­
ence in the Southern banking system were few and far between. 2 
The nature of cotton cultivation placed additional 
strains upon an already inefficient system. Requiring nine 
months growth and careful attention, generally between 
January and September, cotton growing meant that producers, 
both landowners and tenants, wished some form of credit to 
tide them over until the next crop. The debt was paid if 
the/
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the crop succeeded. Banks disliked this. As only one crop 
grew during the year, this placed considerable strain upon 
the banks' resources at harvest time, when planters requested 
one month's credit "to move the crop". It was uneconomic as 
well as inconvenient, the optimum lending period being more 
than three months and less than six. Industry was a better 
alternative for a long term investment, the returns being 
less speculative, but more reliable. Yet the banks had to 
underwrite the cotton crop; often it provided a country 
bank's only business. 3
While credit could be easily obtained, formal banking 
provisions in the South were poor compared with other regions, 
The position had improved considerably since the 1880s when 
there were less than 200 national banks in the region, but in 
1910 despite having a quarter of the banks in the union, 1400 
banks, the South possessed less than a fifth of the banking 
capital. The average Southern national bank had capital 
resources of #119,854, the union's average being #139,407. 
Financial control continued to lie with Wall Street, the 
traditional villains of Democratic rhetoric. 4
Southern banking had changed in one important respect, 
in that bankers were now more accepted members of society. 
According to Richard Edmonds the "deeply seated prejudices" 
of the region against banks had been overcome. An analysis 
of opinions expressed in agricultural journals conducted by 
Louis Galambos bears this out. While all the opinions 
expressed on big business and banking in the South were un­
favourable in the 1890s, by 1910 almost half the opinions 
were favourable, and the remainder neutral. This sample is 
unrepresentative/
224
unrepresentative of Southern farmers as a whole, being 
accurate for the readers of only one journal, the Southern 
Cultivator, but it may be taken as being representative of 
those who had some say in the political debate. It reveals 
that anti banking sentiment amongst the better off farmers 
had almost entirely died away. A sense of common purpose 
existed between lender and borrower in the 1910s that was 
not there in the 1890s. Both wanted reform, but neither 
desired it at the expense of the other. 5
Southern banks had to protect themselves against loss, 
large fluctuations being especially common and unpredictable 
at the local level. To accomplish this they charged high 
interest rates, partly to discourage less well off borrowers 
and partly to create reserves. Compared with the rest of 
the industrialised world very few American banks failed, but 
the unreliable nature of the cotton crop meant that many 
Southern banks ran very close to their margins. Small 
country banks often found themselves having to flaunt the 
state banking laws in order to ensure survival, rather^from 
a particularly corrupt intention. Most offences related to 
charging illegally high interest rates. Although less 
rigidly enforced in the South than the North, 546 Southern 
banks fell foul of the various usu^y laws in 1915 compared 
with only 57 Northern banks. This represented almost half 
of all Southern banks. A North Carolinian economist report­
ed that his state’s general usu^y law had only a shadow of 
a real existence. Despite the many convictions it did not 
act as a deterrent as banks accepted conviction as a 
necessary business risk. Furthermore, he believed that the 
total/
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total number of convictions did not accurately represent the 
true number of offences as violations could be brought to 
trial only by the slow and uncertain process of indictment 
by grand jury. 6
Planters complained bitterly about high interest rates, 
but as they could pass these on to their tenants they were 
cushioned against the full impact. Figures collated by the 
United States department of agriculture reveal that although 
Southern interest rates on mortgages were among the highest, 
they were not noticeably so. This is shown in Table I. The 
average rate in New Hampshire was 5.3 per cent, and although 
rates in the South could rise as high as 9 per cent, the 
regional average was 8.4 per cent; the average rate for the 
United States was 6.9 per cent. Southern planters clearly 
were not as hard done by as they often claimed to be, espec­
ially when it is considered that interest rates in Montana 
and Wyoming were 10 per cent. While this places Southern 
interest rates in a national context, it should be remember­
ed that local variation was considerable. At least 343 
Southern banks charged more than 12 per cent in 1914, 
whereas only 30 did in the North. Five Alabaman banks 
charged 26 per cent, one charged 34 per cent and another 
60 per cent ; in Georgia an average of 30 per cent was levied 
by eleven banks; and in Arkansas one bank asked for, and 
presumably received, 120 per cent. Such enormous variations 
doubtless reflected very differing local conditions. None­
theless they illustrate the great defect in Americal agri­
cultural credit: the complete lack of central control. Banks 
were too sensitive to local conditions, and not responsive 
enough/
225A
Table I; Farm mortgage loans - average rates for interest 
and commission.
Average 
Interest Rate
Average Annual 
Commission
Interest Plus 
Commission
Alabama 8.7 per cent 0.7 per cent 9,4 per cent
Arkansas 9.0 0.6 9.6
Florida 9.0 0.6 9.6
Georgia 7.6 1.1 8.7
Kentucky 6.7 0.4 7.1
Louisiana 8.2 0.4 8.6
Mississippi 8.0 0.5 8.5
North Carolina 6.3 1.4 7.7
South Carolina 7.8 0.6 8.4
Tennessee 7.3 0.6 7.9
Texas 8.4 0.6 9.0
Virginia 6.1 0.7 6.8
New Hampshire 5.3 — 5.3
Indiana 5.8 0.4 6.2
Iowa 5.6 0.3 5.9
Montana 8.4 1.6 10.0
Wyoming 9.2 0.8 10.0
Washington 7.9 0.8 8.7
Southern
average 7,7 0.7 8.4
United States
average 6.9 0.5 7.4
Source: United States Congress, Senate, Rural Credits, 64th
Congress, 1st session. Report No. 144, (15th 
February, 1916), p. 8.
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enough to national trends; while they could deal with local 
emergencies, in times of national panic they went under. 7 
Banks, especially country banks, were Southern land­
owners' main source of credit: only 4 per cent of Texan 
landowners borrowed from elsewhere. Insurance companies 
provided the cheapest credit, and the best regulated; they 
generally charged their legal maximum rate of 6 per cent, 
with an added 3-4 per cent for the agent's and lawyer's 
commissions, but such sources were available only to policy 
holders. Being small, many country banks were unable to 
provide the large, long term loans necessary for permanent 
improvement to farm buildings and equipment, Texas farmers 
borrowed only #5 00 per annum, and this dropped to #300 when 
a few unusually large loans for land buying were discounted. 
Over 45 per cent of the loans were for less than #100. While 
perfectly adequate for the year to year running of a farm or 
plantation, it hardly allowed for long term change or 
improvement. Banks reported that few borrowers asked for 
long term loans, 75-90 per cent of their borrowers asking 
for accommodation from year to year. The high interest 
rates meant that long term loans were perceived as unecono­
mical, even when they offered the chance of long term 
improvement. 8
Such short sightedness to future development cannot be 
blamed entirely on the banks. They were small, engaged in 
a profitable but hazardous business, and had few ways of 
raising capital in an emergency from outside sources. 
Planters could offer little in the way of collateral: all 
they had was their land and buildings. While this could be 
quite/
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quite substantial, the national banks before the passage of 
the Federal Reserve Act in 1914 were not permitted by federal 
law to give loans on the security of real estate. Several 
did in practice, in Texas for example such loans comprised 
10 per cent of all national bank loans. Borrowers would put 
up their real estate notes in the national banks, and while 
they were not pledged as security, it was understood that 
they were in the bank for that purpose. Additionally, 
national banks made loans on real estate when the landowners 
had no other collateral, but the land did not have to be 
depended upon for the liquidation of the debt. Highly 
illegal, and damaging to the bank if discovered, such 
practices nonetheless went on with the tacit sanction of bank 
examiners. More usually banks demanded either chattel, 
buildings, implements, or, less often, the next year's crop 
as collateral. Personal security could be offered, particu­
larly when the landowner was a major depositor, borrower, or 
shareholder in a country bank, but this was rare. Banks 
demanded high amounts of security, two to three times the 
size of the loan being expected. This effectively excluded 
tenant farmers from access to bank credit. Small landowners 
tended to be low users of bank credit as well. One economist
believed that this was so because of a lack of business know­
ledge, and a disposition to keep aloof from banks, or even 
neighbours, in times of financial crisis. Few knew the real 
difference between credit and cash prices at a store, often 
obtaining store credit at 12-20 per cent when a bank would
lend willingly at 6-8 per cent. 9
Before the passage of the Federal Farm Loans Act, banks 
acted/
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acted as commercial as well as agricultural agencies, larger 
banks in particular preferring to invest in industry rather 
than agriculture. Few banks welcomed the farmer when they 
could invest elsewhere. Southern agriculture was correctly 
perceived as being too prone to human error and natural 
disaster to represent a sound commercial proposition. Land­
owners had some say in local banking affairs, but studies in 
North Carolina reveal that they rarely possessed absolute 
control. Landowners in the larger towns owned very little 
in the way of bank stocks, but in smaller centres they could 
control up to 50 per cent of a bank’s shareholding. In such 
areas their importance as borrowers and depositors could 
increase their influence on banking policy, as doubtless did 
the friendships and alliances created within small town 
society, but landowners did not have a recognised, guaranteed 
say in the running of agricultural credit. 10
The formal credit structure was the most important from 
the landowner's immediate financial position, but it formed 
only half the picture. Furthermore, its most obvious defects 
of variable interest rates, low capitalisation resulting in 
undue caution, and an inflexible response to the seasonal 
needs of agriculture could be corrected by legislation. Below 
the relatively ordered levels of banks, trust companies, and 
insurance agencies existed the completely unregulated world 
of the credit merchant and the furnishing store, whose many 
faults could only be corrected by economic and social change.
Few commentators would contend that store credit helped 
to advance Southern agriculture. It is interesting to note 
however that the greater the time distance from the credit 
merchant's/
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merchant's world, the greater has been the condemnation of 
it by historians. Frank Tannenbaum, writing in 1924, saw 
little wrong with the credit system. The accusations of the 
credit merchant being rapacious were undeserved, he wrote; 
the merchant had to protect himself in a businesslike manner 
from a hazardous undertaking. Vann Woodward conceded that 
the credit merchant was an evil, but a necessary and under­
standable evilo Tenants and merchants were both trapped in 
that they had to pay outrageous interest rates to their 
immediate superiors on the financial ladder; the credit 
merchant being "a bucket on an endless chain by which the 
agricultural well of a tributary region was drained of its 
flow"o Lawrence Goodwyn considered the system to be an 
absolute evil, run by grasping merchants who deliberately 
forced many into either permanent debt or migration in their 
efforts to squeeze the last drop out of their creditors. 11 
Whatever the nature and intent of the credit merchants, 
and it would be reasonable to suppose that honourable as well 
as dishonourable members of the fraternity existed, the 
effect upon the tenant was undesirable and undeniable. 
Complete political, economic, and social control in the small 
isolated rural communities of the South lay with the credit 
merchant. Even Tannenbaum acknowledged this. The merchants, 
he wrote, owned the fertiliser plants, the oil mills, the 
banks, and the warehouses, dictating what should be grown and 
by whom: "They are the politicians and control the political 
destinies of the community". Consequently, those in Southern 
society who could benefit most from an effective standardisa­
tion of credit were, in reality, outwith the law. Attempts 
had/
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had been made in the 1870s and 1880s to repeal crop lien 
laws, but they had come to nought. No proposed solution to 
the rural credits problem in the 1910s could reasonably have 
been expected to deal with the credit merchant, a fact that 
affected the workings of the Federal Farm Loans Act. A 
Georgian farmer recognised the inevitability of this; 
writing to his representative he judged that any rural 
credits system would work only for the benefit of those who 
farmed the farmers: tenant farmers and those of small means 
could not hope to benefit. 12
Outside the academic community few concerned themselves 
with the tenant's problems; the agricultural journals while 
deploring the existence of the crop lien system proposed 
little in the way of alternatives. Southern academic econo­
mists preferred to work at state level. Eugene Branson, 
writing in 1915, despaired of ever seeing federal législa­
tion, and recommended to a farmers' leader that they work 
"hammer and tongs" to persuade the North Carolina legisla­
ture to authorise cooperative land associations, credit 
unions, and land-mortgage associations. Similarly, Lewis 
Haney of the University of Texas proposed that state and 
county facilities be expanded, there being no mention in his 
study of the desirability of federal aid or regulation. 13 
By the 1910s state legislatures had become active in 
the field of rural credits legislation. By 1915, seven 
states had enacted laws governing the formation of credit 
unions. Massachusetts, Utah, and Wisconsin allowed for 
competitive farm land banks under state supervision. New 
York had chartered a land bank controlled entirely by local 
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savings and loan associations, the state legislature having 
almost no say in the running of the system. The most radi­
cal solution had been adopted in Missouri, Montana and 
Oklahoma, as private initiative was entirely abandoned and 
direct state loans introduced. In North Carolina and Kansas 
the existing laws on building and loan associations were 
amended in 1915, enabling them to make loans on agricultural 
land. 14
Yet, as bankers' journals repeatedly pointed out, even 
the best of the state plans were little more than a step 
towards the desired end: "As a rule, the states seem to have 
acted on the belief that something additional in the way of 
financial machinery should be created". The feeling grew 
that the federal government should step into the breach.
Many expected this. Several farmers were reported to have 
acquired new land at a high mortgage rate in the belief that 
direct government aid would bring down their interest rates, 
thus enabling them to realise a speculative profit. Carter 
Glass, the conservative representative from Virginia, sadly 
recognised the inevitability of federal legislation. He 
agreed with a correspondent that this was not a suitable area 
of interest for the government, "but I have long since found 
that I cannot altogether have my own way in matters of legis­
lation". 15
National rural credits legislation was not new. The 
banking systems of the early republic had been concerned 
primarily with the needs of a rural community. By the 1863 
National Banking Act however the balance had been heavily 
weighted in favour of the commercial and industrial sectors, 
presenting/
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of
presenting Southern politicians with plenty^opportunities to 
make political hay out of grumblings against Wall Street. An 
expanding agricultural economy throughout the 1870s and 
early 1880s, combined with the continued availability of 
cheap land, had pressed comparatively little stress upon the 
banking structure. Cracks had begun to appear in the late 
1880s, with nationwide agricultural depression. Alternative 
proposals appeared; the most relevant to Southern conditions 
being the sub-treasury plan of Charles W, Macune.
This called for a credit system that would aid "a whole 
class"; it was pragmatic, well adapted to local conditions, 
and it represented the most radical and innovative alterna­
tive to Gilded Age economic thought. Macune*s plan envisaged 
the nationwide establishment of federal warehouses. In these 
"sub-treasuries", farmers could store their crops until 
higher prices materialised; they were to be allowed to borrow 
up to 80 per cent of the local market price upon storage, and 
could sell their receipts at any time. An interest charge of 
2 per cent was to be levied on depositors. The plan had many 
strengths: it could respond to varying local conditions; it 
could call upon national resources in times of crisis; it 
provided tenant farmers for the first time with access to 
regulated credit; and it bypassed the credit merchant. Great 
claims were made for it. Subsequent commentators have seized 
upon it as the one viable alternative to the growing national 
corporations. Goodwyn claims that the Alliance's sub­
treasury plan would have replaced the private national bank­
ing system, and established the United States treasury 
department as the pre-eminent capital institution in the 
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country, thus making large scale agricultural cooperation 
politically and socially possible by providing a sound econo­
mic base. As an idea, the sub-treasury plan had one great 
virtue: it was never put into practice. Important flaws are 
apparent however: it would have sparked off great inflation; 
without a supporting bureaucracy, which did not exist in the 
1890s, it would be open to abuse and inefficient administra­
tion; it could easily be opposed in the courts as "class 
legislation", and therefore unconstitutional; and it is hard 
to envisage its aims of helping the tenant farmer being 
realised against the immense entrenched powers of the credit 
merchants. Nonetheless, its strength and vision were admir­
able. It is hard to disagree with William P. Yohe's conten­
tion that Populist economists properly belong to Lord 
Keynes’s "brave army of heretics ... who, following their 
instructions, have preferred to see the truth obscurely and 
imperfectly rather than to maintain error, reached indeed 
with clearness and consistency and by easy logic, but on 
hypothesis, inappropriate to the facts". 16
Macune’s cooperative ideals were far removed from the 
cooperative ideas of the framers of the Federal Farm Loans 
Act; nonetheless, similarities existed. Both plans were 
conceived within the geographical framework of the union, and 
on the level of federal politics. By the late 1890s, the 
Populist challenge had been successfully resisted and defeat­
ed, but the questions they posed remained vital and unanswer­
ed. Roosevelt’s Country Life Commission observed that the 
lack of an adequate system of agricultural credit contributed 
to the deficiency of country life. Whereas Populist ideas 
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had tended to get lost in the mire of Southern politics, the 
commission's findings aroused public and official interest.
It convinced President Taft of the necessity and feasibility 
of rural credits legislation, and largely on his own initia­
tive, although partly in response to pressure from the South­
ern Commercial Congress and some of the American Bankers 
Association, he instructed American diplomats in Europe to 
report on how their host countries dealt with the problem. 17 
Wilson encouraged this initiative by appointing a 
commission headed by Senator Duncan Fletcher of Florida to 
visit Europe and report on the existing cooperative banks 
and credit unions. European and Australasian state loan 
practices were not to be studied: Wilson preferred there to 
be no federal involvement in rural credits. Fletcher had 
been a successful corporation lawyer in Jacksonville, Florida, 
with particularly close connections with railroad companies. 
Unusually for a Southern politician, he had built up his 
political strength from an urban base, the highly fractured 
nature of Florida politics allowing him to defeat Napoleon 
Bonapart Broward, the corrupt reform governor, in the 1907 
senate election. His senate voting record was basically 
conservative, although he did resist pressure from the citrus 
growers to vote against the Underwood tariff. Strongly 
opposed to central authority, he contented himself with ensur­
ing that Florida received her fair share of the annual rivers 
and harbours appropriation. His interest in rural credits 
provided him with his only national platform. The findings 
of the commission were reported to Congress, and legislation 
duly drafted. Known as the Moss Fletcher bill, this formed 
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the first legislative attempt to enact a federal rural 
credits system, but before Congress came around to consider­
ing it, important changes occurred in the national banking 
system that would affect agricultural credits. 18
Woodrow Wilson had made several supporting statements 
on rural credits. In a prepared statement issued on 3rd 
August 1913, he claimed that no subject was more important 
to the United States than rural credits legislation, and that 
"there is no reform in which I would myself feel it a greater 
honor or privilege to take part". This was largely window 
dressing however; Wilson's main concern was commercial bank­
ing. At one stage it was suggested that the same legislation 
should accommodate commercial and agricultural credit, but as 
the commercial banks would have none of this, the idea was 
dropped. The Federal Reserve Act was a major commercial and 
legislative achievement, and its drafting and passage has 
been well documented by historians. 19
The South welcomed the measure. The Reserve Act had 
been largely drafted by New York and Chicago bankers, but 
Carter Glass and the Washington and Lee economist Parker 
Willis had influenced the final bill. Southern congressmen 
approved the decentralised nature of the proposed banking 
system, and their unqualified support greatly aided the pass­
age of the bill. The President had to apply considerable 
pressure on certain Democrats, particularly in the Senate 
banking and currency committee, to bring them to order, but 
not on Southerners. All sections of the South agreed with 
their politicians' approval of the act. Daniel Tompkins, 
the by now elderly luminary of the New South, believed that 
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the new asset currency system would provide all that was 
needed for secure loans and equalised interest rates. A 
Georgian cotton merchant wrote that the Reserve Act would 
meet all his present and future needs. The Progressive 
Farmer welcomed the clause in the act that allowed the South 
to draw upon the financial resources of other regions; per­
mitting easier loans to help move the cotton crop. The 
authors of the act had been aware of this need. Paul Warburg, 
the New York banker, had stressed the necessity of other 
regions aiding the South: local banks in areas where money 
was not in strong demand during the autumn, which essentially 
meant urban areas, he wrote, should be ready to buÿ Southern 
bills. 20
Southern agriculture benefited not only from an improved 
cash flow in the autumn, but the act also permitted national 
bank associations outwith the central reserve cities to lend 
on the security of improved land. Such loans could be made 
for five years, although they were not to exceed 50 per cent 
of the actual value of the property. Furthermore, for the 
first time the paper arising from agricultural transactions 
was eligible for discount by national banks. Allowed a six 
months maturing period for discount compared with a ninety 
day period for commercial paper, to make allowance for the 
agricultural year, it is little wonder that many bankers saw 
no need for subsequent agricultural credit legislation. 
Bankers considered that the rural credit problem would be 
solved if existing banking facilities were made more access­
ible to the farmer. 21
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Yet the act had not provided for long term credit; 
while this caused little worry in New England or the Midwest, 
where farmers opposed long term mortgages on principle, the 
omission was serious for the South. One of Carter Glass's 
constituents disagreed with Glass's belief that the Reserve 
Act left no stone unturned; while the act was well suited to 
commercial purposes, he wrote, it could never fully adapt to 
rural conditions and place the American farmer on an equal 
footing with his competitors. 22
Southern bankers were delighted with the new act. Their 
delight increased when William G, McAdoo directed that 
350,000,000 be placed in Southern and Western banks to help 
with the harvest; this went ahead much to the annoyance of 
New York banks. Their optimism soon turned to bewilderment 
however ; this was particularly true for the country banks. 
Peeling that the act had been passed for their benefit, this 
being consistent with Democratic banking rhetoric, the 
country banks now found themselves in direct competition 
with the new reserve banks; and they could not hold their 
ground. The assets of a country bank generally comprised 
real estate mortgages and crop lien loans, and such banks 
could not act as members of the reserve system. Furthermore, 
investment by predominantly rural banks in federal reserve 
bank stock brought only a five per cent return, whereas 
money loaned to farmers could legally recoup ten per cent. 23
The Reserve Act further damaged the country banks as 
the smaller banks had lost the important commissions for 
handling cheques they had previously received. All cheques 
after 1914 had to foe sent through the reserve banks without 
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compensation, whether they came from banks in the reserve 
system or not. Cheque handling had been a lucrative side­
line for country banks, and this bite into their profits 
grieved them. The loss of independence further rankled them; 
their complaints were numerous and vociferous. Eventually 
Claude Kitchin, a North Carolinian representative, intro­
duced a measure restoring conditions to what they were before 
1914. 24
Despite such hiccups, the Reserve Act successfully 
helped farmers to obtain short term credit, but the provision 
of long term credit took longer. The crucial difference was 
the attitude of Woodrow Wilson. Although knowing little 
about finance, the President had thrown himself wholeheartedly 
behind the Reserve Act, recognising the necessity of a speedy 
reform of commercial banking; his commitment to rural credits 
was less. One suspects that the subject bored him: writing 
to Mrs. Galt in June 1915, he expressed his relief when 
McAdoo and Glass came to discuss rural credits with him and 
left before their allotted half hour was up. He had 
commissioned the Fletcher report, but if anything his opposi­
tion to government intervention in rural credits was more 
extreme than the Floridian's; writing to the similarly 
minded Glass, he confided; "I have a deep conviction that it 
is unwise and unjustifiable to extend the credit of the 
Government to a single class of the community". His consti­
tutional doubts were sincere; he had expressed similar feel­
ings on the wisdom of federal workmen's compensation legis­
lation. The farmers however constituted a more powerful 
voting lobby than labour, and the 1912 platform had committed 
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Wilson to a rural credits system of some sort. One Southern 
letter writer considered that the Democratic orations of 
1912 rang "emptily", despite the political achievements of 
the low tariff and banking reform, because rural credits had 
not been enacted. 25
The banking community shared Wilson's opposition; 
opinions on the wisdom of rural credits varied from negative 
disinterest to the hostile, particularly regarding the 
question of federal aid. One banking journalist believed 
the states to be perfectly capable of handling the situation. 
Another wondered why farmers needed any help at all; the 
American farmer was the most prosperous in the world. Many 
bankers completely ignored the subject. The editor of one 
banking journal warned his readers that they should find 
means of perfecting existing legislation, otherwise they 
would be confronted by a law drawn up by borrowers. Another 
journalist claimed that banking suspicion of rural credits 
sprang from a belief that such a system would be linked to 
the federal reserve system, thus complicating and weakening 
it. 26
Banking opposition continued even when it looked certain 
that some credit system would be enacted. It is true that 
certain of the journals pronounced such legislation to be 
desirable, and that an ex president of the American Bankers' 
Association, Myron T. Herrick was amongst its strongest pro­
ponents, but compared to its involvement in the formation of 
the Reserve Act, the banking community's role in the Federal 
Farm Loans Act was minimal. Indeed, the Farm Mortgage 
Bankers' Association, representing the banks and bankers 
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involved in the farm mortgage business, severely hindered 
the workings of the Farm Loans Act in 1919 by instigating a 
suit to test the constitutionality of the act. Much of the 
initiative and technical knowledge involved in the Reserve 
Act had come from the bankers, it being presented to 
Congress as a fait accompli. This was not so with the Farm 
Loans Act. Much had been learned from the Reserve Act, but 
the main initiatives came from the politicians, not the 
bankers.
The Fletcher commission reported voluminously and 
favourably upon European credit systems, particularly the 
state chartered but privately controlled German landschraft 
plan. The commission nonetheless concluded that an American 
solution should be found for the American problem. Its 
findings were expressed in the Moss Fletcher bill, intro­
duced to Congress in 1914 but not considered due to lack of 
time. Providing for highly decentralised land banks operat­
ing under a federal charter solely within state boundaries, 
but privately controlled, it was regarded with great suspi­
cion by Western farmers who charged it with placing too much 
control in private hands. The bill was unrealistic; it took 
little account of public opinion^ its conception had been 
hasty, and the Reserve Act’s choice of districts comprising 
several states had rendered its stress upon action within 
state boundaries anachronistic. Divisions over the necessary 
degree of federal control between Fletcher and Moss became 
apparent during the extensive committee hearings, and its 
credibility thus impaired, the bill failed. 27
Public and congressional interest continued to mount. 
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Elsworth Bathrick, an Ohio representative, introduced a bill 
in January 1914 providing for direct government loans at low 
interest rates. Bathrick represented a highly marginal con­
stituency, which although normally Republican, had been cap­
tured in the 1910 Democratic swing. Retaining his seat in 
the 1912 election, Bathrick nonetheless felt his position 
slipping away, and this doubtless influenced his initiative. 
Midwestern and Western farmers' organisations supported his 
bill, but no endorsements came from Southern organisations. 
When Wilson let it be publically known that he would veto 
any such bill, the bill was dropped. 28
The necessity for congressional action had become 
obvious; the problem existed, farmers demanded a remedy, and 
the important mid term elections were approaching, A com­
promise bill was introduced in May 1914 by Henry Hollis and 
Robert Bulkeley, the respective chairmen of the Senate and 
House subcommittees on rural credits, this being essentially 
the bill that eventually succeeded. While reducing the 
influence of the private banks, as proposed by the Fletcher 
Moss bill, the Hollis Bulkeley bill proposed less federal 
intervention than the Bathrick bill. It envisaged a federal 
role similar to that of the federal reserve system, that is 
as an overseeing regulator. Both sponsors had considerable 
knowledge and experience of banking, Robert Bulkeley was a 
product of the Harvard Law School; he specialised in banking 
law, and had built up a successful practice in Cleveland. 
Elected as a Democrat from Ohio in 1911, he was elected to 
the Senate in 1915, although he remained in the House until 
after the 1916 election. Another product of Harvard Law 
School,/
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School, Henry Hollis had also specialised in banking law. 
Elected as a senator from New Hampshire in 1912,without any 
prior political appointment, he was described by William 
McAdoo as being: "able, energetic, and enthusiastic, and a 
true friend of the farmer. He was considered a radical by 
the reactionaries of the Senate, but that means nothing. 
Hollis was an advanced liberal, and not a visionary". 29 
Despite its compromise nature, and its wide support 
from the public and Congress, this bill also failed. The 
legislative session was too crowded to allow a proper con­
sideration, but Wilson*s opposition remained the main 
obstacle. Carter Glass considered that the main reason why 
the rural credits bill had only low priority, was due to 
its containing provisions for government support that Wilson 
regarded as "obnoxious to sound Democratic doctrine", and 
which Hollis declined to eliminate. This vexed many con­
gressmen. In a final effort, Bulkeley managed to have the 
bill accepted as an amendment to the agricultural appropria­
tions bill, thus overcoming the timetable problem and forc­
ing debate of rural credits. In the meantime, Albert 
Cummins had successfully tacked a direct loans amendment on­
to the Senate agricultural amendment bill, creating deadlock 
on an important measure. This was only broken when both 
sides agreed to drop their amendments in return for the 
establishment of a joint committee which had to recommend a 
bill by January 1916. 30
Wilson still opposed any suggestion of extending the 
credit or the support of the United States to aid a single 
class. All through the early months of 1915 while the 
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Hollis Bulkeley bill occupied Congress, Wilson maintained 
that he would only support a bill without federal aid.
Other priorities held his attention; he wanted Congress to 
pass a shipping bill, thus encouraging the growth of the 
American merchant marine; the seaman's bill and the immigra­
tion bill, neither of which Wilson supported, were in Con­
gress; the Germans had increased their use of submarine war­
fare; the British threatened to extend their naval blockade; 
beside these, the rural credits bill seemed an irritant. 
Furthermore, Wilson believed that all that should be done to 
aid the farmer had been done by the Reserve Act. Houston 
strengthened his doubts by impressing upon him the dangers 
of federal intervention. 31
In the meantime, the joint committee had carried out its 
duties, and recommended a bill committing the federal govern­
ment to underwrite the system with 36,000,000. Link relates 
how Hollis and Asbury Lever went to the White House to report 
the committee findings to Wilson, prepared to compromise, but 
determined to retain a considerable federal responsibility. 
After forcibly putting their case, Lever suggested to the 
President that if 36,000,000 seemed too high, then 33,000,000 
could be agreed upon as a suitable compromise. Wilson pro­
ceeded to stun both men by saying that Lever's proposition 
was too modest, and that the original figure should be re­
tained. From that moment the bill was an administration 
measure, and its enactment in some form never in doubt. 32 
Wilson's turnabout was dramatic. He could intellectua­
lise away his change of heart by pointing out that as the 
government subscription to the capital land stock of the 
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land bank would be repaid eventually, then there was no real 
federal commitment, but hard political reality explains his 
position better. His re-election was uncertain; while 
representatives like Bathrick were expendable, Wilson needed 
Ohio's electoral college votes badly if he was to survive 
the regenerated Republican challenge. Much has been made of 
Wilson's idealistic dream to place the Presidency truly 
above politics; it is as well to remember that Wilson could 
also be a cool, calculating politician of the first order. 
When convictions stood in the way of ambitions, they went.
In his understandable wish to be re-elected Wilson endorsed 
many measures he had previously opposed on constitutional 
and moral grounds; a federal child labour regulation law, 
workmen's compensation, the seamen's bill and women's suff­
rage. His adoption of a rural credits bill including federal 
involvement became part of this radical swing.
Hollis's bill was long and complex, as could be expected 
of a statute that intended to establish a completely new 
banking system. Although modelled on the Federal Reserve Act, 
the principle behind the Farm Loan Act was that of coopera­
tion, the same as the other agricultural reforms; the coopera­
tion involved was not only to be between the government and 
the farmer, but between the prosperous and less prosperous
WAS
regions of the union. As Hollis admitted, it^intended to aid 
the South at the expense of New England. The bill envisaged 
three administrative levels; a federal farm loans board whose 
members were appointed by the President, and comprised of 
four members not more than two of whom could be members of 
the same political party; twelve or more land banks were to 
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appraise and provide the loans, and although these could 
correspond to the already existing reserve districts, Hollis 
hoped that there would be more in the South than the North 
East, as it was there that the need was greatest; and farmers 
were to deal with the land bank through farm loan associa­
tions, the membership of which was necessary before a loan 
could be obtained. 33
The whole system interlocked. Each land bank had to 
have an initial capital of not less than 3500,000; hopefully 
this could be raised by the sale of bonds to the public or 
trust funds, but the federal government undertook to sub­
scribe for as much as would be necessary to make up the re­
quired amount. Once the land banks were fully operable, the 
government subscriptions were to be returned. It was this 
federal underwriting of the land banks that Wilson had found 
so objectionable, although it was essential if the public 
were to have any confidence in the value of the land banks, 
and subscribe to the bonds. The committee recommended that 
these bonds be exempted from all federal, state, local, and 
municipal taxation, and that the interest rate be 4 per cent, 
in the hope that they would be a more attractive long term 
investment than savings bonds. Each bond was secured by the 
capital, reserves, and earnings of the issuing land bank, and 
by the resources of all the other land banks.
Farm mortgages were similarly secured. Each mortgage 
was to be secured by the personal undertaking of the borrower, 
the security of the mortgaged land, by the capital of the 
endorsing local farm loan association, and by the other 
members of the loan association. As with the bonds, the 
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loans were to be long term arrangements. The bill proposed 
that they should extend for no less than five and no more 
than 36 years; the rationale for this being that if the 
farmer repaid 5 per cent of his loan semi annually, and with 
each interest payment paid 1 per cent on the principal of 
his loan, the debt would be redeemed in 36 years. Money had 
to be borrowed for productive purposes such as the purchase 
of a farm, or to liquidate existing indebtedness; no loan 
was to exceed either 310,000 or 50 per cent of the appraised 
value of the mortgaged land; and the borrower had to engage 
in the cultivation of the mortgaged farm. The proposed 
interest rate was 3 per cent.
As with the previous reforms, it seemed as if all had 
an equal say in the workings of the system: farmers could 
present their cases through the loan associations; profess­
ional bankers offered their opinions through the land banks; 
and the farm loan board represented the public, and had the 
ultimate say. The similarities with the reserve system were 
obvious and intentional, but the inclusion of the farm loan 
associations in the bill had no equivalent in the earlier 
system. Membership of an association was open to anyone who 
owned or was about to become the owner of farm land; a mini­
mum of ten members was necessary. The duty of each associa­
tion was to report requested loans to the land bank who then 
appointed appraisers to consider the economic viability of 
the loan. Further membership was open to those who the 
members considered to be of suitable and good character; all 
who passed this test had to take out stock in the associa­
tion to the amount of 5 per cent of the requested loan. 34
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Sound practical reasons existed for the existence of 
the associations: they provided a needed institution between 
the farmers and the land banks; they could react speedily to 
local needs and conditions in a way that the land banks 
could not; they were an essential recognition of the highly 
diverse nature of American agriculture; and they encouraged 
farmers to take an active interest in the new credit system* 
Their effect was to ensure that their members had absolute 
control over future developments within their own area: 
possessing the right to examine all improvements, they also 
wielded the vital initiatory power within the banking system. 
This emphasis upon extreme local autonomy made the farm loan 
banks consistent with Democratic dogma: the states rights 
argument once shorn of its emotional ties to the state and 
the Confederacy, was basically an assertion of local autonomy 
against central authority. While certain Southerners such as 
Fletcher preferred that a national rural credits system be 
organised through the states, the vast majority realistically 
accepted that this was impractical: Mississippi, for example, 
could be trusted with federal funds to finance her internal 
educational and highway improvements, but a rural credits 
plan operating solely within Mississippi financed by Mississ­
ippi capital would neither inspire confidence nor result in 
lasting benefits. The problem was too large; larger and more 
efficient agencies than the Southern state legislatures were 
required to solve it. Southern Democrats could not accept 
direct federal grants, as shown by the completely negative 
attitude displayed towards the Bathrick bill, but they could 
support a plan that retained local control, the role planned 
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for the loEin associations being analogous to that envisaged 
for the state legislatures in the Federal Highways Act and 
the Agricultural Extension Act. A measure of the Southern 
acceptance of the Hollis bill’s validity can be gauged by 
the South’s constitutional defence of it during the Senate 
debates, while Hollis offered a technical and financial 
defence.
The bill was not of the South's making, although its 
aims and constitutional doctrine appealed to the region. The 
main credit for the complex and theoretically sound clauses 
of the bill must go to Hollis, although McAdoo and Glass 
offered their advice and experience gained from the Reserve 
Act. Curiously, neither McAdoo nor Glass dwell in their 
memoirs upon their roles in the farm loan system. McAdoo 
in particular seems to have regarded his involvement as 
being an unpleasant chore. The secretary of the treasury's 
attitude reflected the banking community's disinterest, 
although Link mentions the involvement of Leonard G. Robin­
son, the director of the Jewish Agricultural Industrial Aid 
Society, in formulating the details of the bill. Southern 
non-involvement was not due to disinterest; it merely re­
flected the lack of Southerners on either the Senate or House 
banking and currency committees. Asbury Lever's presence 
during the White House meeting with Wilson probably indica­
ted his standing as a party manager in the House, rather 
than any detailed knowledge of financial legislation. None­
theless, the South vigorously aided the defence of the bill 
against North eastern Republicans, and contributed to its 
successful passage. 35
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The bill passed through the House and Senate committees 
with little trouble, only a few amendments being allowed: 
the secretary of the treasury was made chairman of the farm 
loans board, instead of just an ex-officio member; the House 
committee wanted the board to make annual reports to the 
House; the mortgagee was provided with additional protection 
in the event of the mortgagor's death; and the clause author­
ising land banks to establish savings departments to receive 
time deposits was struck out. This last amendment, according 
to Hollis, was on the insistence of Knute Nelson of Minnesota. 
Hollis very much favoured the idea, but Nelson did not see it 
providing any useful function in the Midwest or New England, 
where there were already many such banks. (Nelson did not 
believe that the bill would serve any purpose in these 
regions, but indicated that he would vote for it to help the 
South). None of these changes affected the basic structure 
or aims of the bill, being designed to improve the system's 
efficiency. 36
Despite the considerable pressure upon Congress's time, 
debate on the bill occupied two weeks in the Senate; intro­
duced on 4th March 1916 it did not pass the Senate until 4th 
May, and the House until 15th May 1916. This aroused consid­
erable criticism from Republicans. Lenroot of Wisconsin con­
sidered this to be typically poor Democratic management as 
the House had been in session since 7th December 1915, but 
not a single regular appropriation bill, outside of three 
urgent deficiency bills, had been signed and passed by Wilson, 
Only one regular appropriation bill had been agreed to by 
both chambers, and that was the legislative, executive and 
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judicial appropriation bill. Four bills remained in the 
House: the District of Columbia bill, the sundry civil bill, 
the navy bill, and the army bill. Two bills still had to be 
considered: the diplomatic and consular bill, and the forti­
fications bill. The post office department and the Indian 
department were running upon the appropriations made the 
previous year. The Democratic managers deserved such criti­
cism; in their haste to enact the more glamorous measures 
they had neglected the more routine but nonetheless important 
duties of Congress. Exonerating circumstances existed: an 
unprecedented amount of congressional time had been taken up 
by foreign affairs; many of the more important acts were 
novel and involved careful consideration, and to have acted 
too suddenly would have been irresponsible; considering this 
to be their only opportunity to enact major reforms, many 
Démocraties devoted understandable attention to them; and 
the influence of the President and the caucus diverted atten­
tion away from normal congressional duties. Nonetheless, 
such omissions cast shadows over the otherwise impeccable 
performance of the Democrats' managers. 37
The quality of debate was low; nonetheless several 
damaging criticisms were made. While Hollis's technical 
command of rural credits was undisputed, the main feature of 
the debate being his impeccable explanations of how the bill 
proposed to operate, his knowledge of agricultural realities 
seemed hazy. Many Midwesterners wanted to know how the bill 
would help tenants become owners, this being one of the main 
aims of the measure. When questioned by Borah as to how 
this could be accomplished, Hollis admitted that even if the 
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local association approved a second mortgage for the tenant, 
he would have to find initial capital; this Hollis suggested 
would be approximately 35 00. He underestimated considerably: 
William Bizzell, a Texas economist, calculated that a tenant 
required an initial capital of 31,000, and a working capital 
of between 32,000 to 33,000 depending upon local conditions; 
only then could a tenant look to buying a house. Clearly 
the bill could help only a few Southern tenants, although 
the outlook for Western tenants was brighter owing to the 
better developed formal banking system in the West. 38
Considering the complex nature of the bill, remarkably 
few details were attacked, Hollis dealing with technical 
questions in a thoroughly competent fashion. One criticism 
that must have gained some senatorial sympathy was that by 
Borah complaining that the proposed salaries of the officials 
was too high. The bill proposed that they be paid 310,000 
per annum plus all necessary expenses: the salary of a 
congressman was 37,500 per annum, with limited expenses, 
although Borah did not feel he had to mention this. 39
The main opposition came from New England Republicans, 
and concerned the bill's constitutionality. They saw no need 
for the measure; savings banks were numerous and responsible 
in New England and farmers regarded mortgages as evil, and no 
charity existed towards regions like the South. The bill was 
a dangerous waste of valuable time and nothing more. Henry 
Cabot Lodge had read into the Record a statement from the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States that summarised 
business's position. The statement began by criticising the 
bill's/
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bill's technicalities: it was too complicated for farmers to 
understand; the bureaucracy would be both inexperienced and 
expensive; and the powers of the farm loan board were too 
extensive, and could not be questioned by the courts. The 
Chamber of Commerce questioned the very constitutionality of 
the bill. The land banks, according to its argument, were 
federal government institutions because they looked to the 
United States for the security and return of their money; 
yet the establishment of such institutions for private pur­
poses on the credit of the United States by Congress was 
unconstitutional. Conceding that the Hollis bill somewhat 
avoided this by authorising the banks to operate as govern­
ment agents and by declaring the bonds to be instrumental­
ities of the government, the Chamber nonetheless argued that 
this was not enough in law. Furthermore, the constitution 
had vested the power to borrow on the credit of the United 
States solely in Congress, and such powers could not be 
delegated, but the bill proposed to give this power to 
presidential appointees and the secretary of the treasury.
The Chamber of Commerce further argued that not only was the 
bill's organisation unconstitutional, but it would operate 
in an unconstitutional manner. The effect of the bill would 
be to provide unlimited and unqualified national aid to the 
members of a single class because of the tax exemptions, the 
access to government funds at only 3 per cent interest, and 
the permitting of farm loan associations to use reduced 
postal charges. As the power to do this, or indeed to create 
joint stock banks, had never been vested in Congress, it must 
be reserved to the states or the people. 40 
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This was a powerful argument against the bill, making 
pertinent points, but it received little support or develop­
ment. North eastern Republicans contented themselves with 
stating it; and their Western colleagues desired the bill's 
passage. Their position was summarised by Cummins who 
agreed with Hollis that the system should not be left to the 
mercy of the states. His main concern was that the already 
existing banks should not be threatened. In Iowa, 90 per 
cent of bank deposits outside of large cities were from 
farmers; many farms in Iowa were mortgaged, not due to 
poverty, but because that was how lowans secured their capi­
tal and preferred to do business. Cummins hoped that the 
bill would pass, but not that it would threaten already exist­
ing and successful institutions. 41
Hollis demonstrated an unwillingness to defend the 
constitutional implications of his bill, although such a 
defence was both necessary and important. Little danger 
existed of Congress defeating the bill, but if an interested 
body chose to instigate a suit against the measure, then the 
Supreme Court could take note of Congress's constitutional 
argument for the bill. The bill did propose to take over a 
state function: state banks could and did make loans on land. 
Not all had done so, but this did not alter their right to do 
so in the future, nor did it hand Congress an unqualified 
right to intervene. Furthermore, it could be argued that the 
tax exemption clause actively discriminated against the 
states: bonds were to be excluded from taxation to ensure 
that the states could not drive the land banks out of busi­
ness by imposing an excessive tax. Hollis ignored such 
questions,/
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questions, and it was left to John Sharp Williams to offer 
the bill's constitutional defence. 42
According to Williams the whole constitutional question 
had been decided by Marshall: he had declared that a bank 
from its very nature was a convenient fiscal agency for the 
federal government, and that as the federal government need­
ed fiscal agencies to render it more efficient in carrying 
out its granted powers, it had a right to charter a bank. 
Williams said that no difference existed between the federal 
reserve banks and the land banks; if Congress had the right 
to establish a bank for the commercial classes then it sure­
ly had one to establish a bank for the agricultural classes. 
Williams admitted that new ground was being broken regarding 
the federal government's right to pass a credit law, but, 
somewhat contradicting his previous argument, he did not see 
how the land banks could act as fiscal agencies of the 
government if their mortgages and bonds were exempted from 
taxation. 43
Congress, Williams further argued, had the right and 
the duty to protect and ensure the efficiency of its legisla­
tion. John Marshall had decided that if the end of an act 
be constitutional, as the Farm Loan bill must be by the pre­
cedent of the Reserve Act, then every means for its accom­
plishment which is appropriate or convenient, if not necess­
ary, must also be constitutional. Thus, if Congress had the 
right to pass a law, then it also had the right to pass any 
provision safeguarding that law, and making it more efficient 
Williams omitted to mention however that Marshall had includ­
ed a qualification to this in his McCulloch v Maryland 
decision:/
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decision: whereas Congress did have the duty to pass such 
provisions, they had to "consist with the letter and the 
spirit of the Constitution", which it could be argued strong­
ly that the tax exemption clause against the states did not. 
Nonetheless, Williams won the debate; all constitutional 
objections were silenced. 44
The Chamber of Commerce did not oppose rural credits 
completely; they preferred a privately controlled system 
similar to that proposed by the Moss Fletcher bill. Another 
advocate of a privately controlled system was the freshman 
senator from Texas, Morris Sheppard. Sheppard belonged to 
that breed of Southern politicians who carefully cultivated 
their image as unlettered frontiersmen, and who entered 
politics ostensibly to improve the lot of the masses. In 
reality, Sheppard was a wealthy and well educated man. The 
owner of a large farm in Texas, he had graduated from the 
University of Texas at Austin and Yale Law School. While 
never endangering the passage of the bill, Sheppard nonethe­
less used the issue to promote his own position. He had 
delivered a long speech on 27th March 1915 in favour of a 
substitute bill that he had drafted: it was an almost exact 
copy of the German Landschraft system. While not completely 
opposed to the Hollis bill, which he voted for, Sheppard 
nonetheless argued that the creation of an enormous bank 
superstructure was unnecessary; the farmer could manage per­
fectly well with a simple land insurance scheme, provided it 
was based on a very local level. 45
Hollis replied that such a system would require Congress 
to impose certain conditions upon state lands as to liability 
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for assessment that it had no constitutional right to do.
His argument bankrupted, Sheppard continued to press his case, 
proposing that the constitutional obstacle be overcome by­
passing a model law for the District of Columbia; the states 
could then decide if they wanted the system or not. The 
suggestion of passing rural credits legislation for the 
District of Columbia provided considerable amusement, and 
Sheppard allowed the proposal to be dropped. Having failed 
with this, Sheppard switched his attention to the increase of 
tenancy. He proposed that Congress pass a Federal Home Loan 
Act allowing the federal government to purchase land anywhere 
in the union, and hold, subdivide, and sell this land to 
provide for farm ownership; this could be accomplished by the 
federal authorities directly or in cooperation with the 
states. The Preparedness campaign could only benefit from 
the utilisation of credit to anchor the people to the land, 
he further argued. To accomplish this Sheppard tabled a 
constitutional amendment, the object of which was to "pre­
serve the institution of private landownership", and to 
"preserve it for the masses". Again, the Senate treated the 
Texan's suggestion humorously before it was referred to the 
judiciary committee, and duly forgotten. 46
Sheppard's behaviour illustrates well the difference 
between rhetoric and practice. A preliminary reading of his 
amendment can easily give the impression of an attempt by a 
Southerner to force the pace of reform, extending the federal 
authority, and acting in a radical manner. Yet, Sheppard's 
proposals were ridiculous; they were impractical in a 
political, economic and social sense. He must have known 
that/
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that his substitute and amendment were doomed to failure, 
even if the ridicule was unexpected. Morris Sheppard was an 
astute and experienced politician; he had served eleven 
years in the House of Representatives before being elected 
to the Senate in 1913. His legal education had been as 
good as any man in the United States and better than most.
He therefore knew what was politically possible and consti­
tutionally proper. Although not wanting to damage the bill 
or seriously hinder its progress, he nonetheless used the
Wlpüï\
opportunity to impress^his constituents of his concern, and 
possibly to remind the administration and party of his 
presence. Such opportunities came rarely to first term 
senators, especially on such important issues as banking, 
and Sheppard used his chance well. It would be a mistake 
however to interpret his actions as a Southern politician 
acting radically and ahead of his time.
An amendment proposed by James Vardaman was more realis­
tic, although audacious in its spoilmanship. This proposed 
to allow landowners to claim credit for themselves using the 
land farmed by their tenants as collateral. The bill's word­
ing on this was ambiguous, Hollis being uncertain if a plant­
er could apply for any credit if his plantation was worked by 
renters. The amendment aroused considerable resentment 
amongst Midwesterners, Norris of Minnesota claiming that this 
would lead to the planter receiving several loans, and farm­
ing his own land with a loan obtained on another's. Hollis 
attacked the amendment stressing that a man should be pre­
cluded from credit on land he himself did not cultivate; 
otherwise absentee landlords would be encouraged. The 
amendment/
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amendment was defeated. 47
The only other Southerner to voice an opinion was Hoke 
Smith. Less certain than Williams of the bill's constitu­
tionality, he nonetheless felt that the Supreme Court would 
uphold it if the measure was questioned. Smith hoped that 
this would be so, for he believed that no greater contribu­
tion could be made to national prosperity than legislation 
to aid the farmer. Such legislation benefited all. Addi­
tionally, he argued that the loans should be free of taxa­
tion: farmers already paid tax on their land, as well as 
improvements on their land, so it was hardly fair to expect 
them to pay taxes on their loans. Farmers should no longer 
pay for their banking facilities, for this should be the 
responsibility of the "banks of the big cities". Smith 
seemed to speak out of a sense of duty however, offering 
little in the way of original argument, and using only the 
traditional anti-banker rhetoric of the South. 48
Very little concerted opposition existed to the bill; 
most senators realised that their constituents desired some 
form of rural credits legislation, and that very few groups 
completely opposed the Hollis Bulkeley proposals. Only a 
few New England Republicans dissented, and they were too few 
in number to achieve much. Midwestern Republicans, the only 
sizeable group likely to form an opposition did so, but 
their alternatives were proposed half heartedly. McCumber 
introduced a substitute bill that would have allowed exist­
ing banks outside the reserve system, to make loans upon 
land. This would have met Midwestern requirements perfectly, 
although areas like the South which had an inadequate formal 
banking/
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banking structure would have benefited only a little. 
McCumber's bill was lost on a procedural matter however, and 
its proposals were not brought up again. The bill finally 
passed the Senate on 4th May 1916 by 58 votes to 5. The nay 
votes came from Lodge, Page of Vermont, Oliver of Pennsyl- 
vannia, Brandegee of Connecticut, and Wadsworth of New York. 
Weeks, also of Massachusetts, did not vote, but indicated 
his opposition to the bill. 49
Carter Glass introduced the House bill on 6th May 1916 
as chairman of the banking and currency committee. Curiously 
he took the opportunity of disassociate himself from the 
measure by stating that he had little to do with the framing 
of the bill. While true, it nonetheless was an unusual dis­
play of modesty for any politician. The House bill differed 
from that which had just passed the Senate in two important 
respects: it capitalised the land banks at 3750,000 instead 
of 3500,000, and it allowed loans against the improvement and 
purchase of equipment, as well as land. Both were accepted 
by the House without a vote. 50
The most notable feature of the House debates was the 
extraordinarily efficient manner in which they were controlled 
by the Democratic floor managers. The debate on the rules 
was to be limited to 40 minutes: 20 minutes to be controlled 
by the Democrat Garrett of Tennessee, and 20 minutes by the 
Republican Campbell of Kansas. General debate could last no 
longer than six hours, half of which was to be controlled by 
Glass, and half by Hayes of California. No speech could 
last longer than 20 minutes. Such arrangements were common 
in the House, it being the only way to reconcile managers 
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who wanted the minimum fuss, with members who wanted to ex­
pound; but they were rarely planned in such detail. These 
rules were successfully maintained, thirty seven representa­
tives being forced to express their views in the appendix of 
the Record. 51
Most speeches were short and relevant, but did not seek 
to amend the bill; they were purely "for the Record" and 
employed no new arguments for or against the bill. Again, 
opposition came from the Northeastern Republicans who saw no 
need for legislation, and who opposed the creation of a 
highly salaried bureaucracy. Hill, of Connecticut, could not 
understand why Congress could not amend the Reserve Act to 
enable national banks to provide long term loans on real 
estate; the national banks had already accumulated 31,000,000,000 
of savings funds, and part of this should be loaned to farmers 
at 5 per cent interest. As in the Senate however, little 
support came from Midwestern Republicans, although Campbell 
complained about the proposed salaries for the bank officials. 
The bill passed the House on 15th May 1916 by 295 votes to 10,
Of those who voted against the bill, or who did not vote 
because of a pairing arrangement but indicated that they 
opposed the bill, seven came from Pennsylvannia, four from New 
Jersey, three each from New York and Massachusetts , two each 
from Vermont and Illinois, and one each from Rhode Island and 
Connecticut. All were Republicans. 5 2
Although the Senate registered a formal disagreement 
with the House bill, the joint conference soon reached an 
agreement with the Senate conferees accepting the House bill's 
provisions for an increased capitalisation and permitting the 
banks/
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banks to make loans against improvements. The election cam­
paign was well under way by this stage, and Wilson made no 
move to oppose the increased federal commitment to rural 
credits legislation. He signed the bill on 17th July 1916 
at a highly publicised White House ceremony, and the members 
of the federal farm loan board were appointed on 27th July 
1916. Clearly it was intended that the farm credits system 
should be seen to be operating well before the Presidential 
election. 5 3
Despite Wilson's hopes the public did not adopt the new 
system enthusiastically. Farmers did not really begin to 
use the new banks until after the war, and investors shied 
away from the farm loan bonds. Hollis had misjudged his 
market, and the lack of public investment seriously threat­
ened the system's future. To solve this an amendatory act 
was passed in 1918 authorising the secretary of the treasury 
to purchase bonds issued by the federal land banks, providing 
that this temporary arrangement was approved by the land 
banks as long as any farm loan bond was held by the federal 
government; local autonomy was preserved. This was to con­
tinue until the subscription to stock in each bank by the 
farm loan associations equalled the amount of stock held by 
the treasury department. Federal involvement in financial 
legislation was by now completely accepted, and indeed expect­
ed, by farmers and politicians.
McCumber's fears of how the land banks would adversely 
affect the Midwestern banks were realised; just as the South­
ern country banks had suffered from the competition of the 
reserve banks, so the Midwestern banks suffered from the 
competition/
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competition of the land banks. Consequently they instigated 
a suit questioning the act's constitutionality. The Farm 
Mortgage Bankers Association initially pressed their case 
within Kansas, but when the act was upheld by the United 
States District Court of Kansas, they took the case to the 
Supreme Court, This was the only agricultural reform measure 
to be so questioned. It also provided William McAdoo with 
his first court case after he returned to the bar in 1919, 
representing the joint land stock banks as a special assis­
tant attorney general, Charles E. Hughes, the defeated 
Presidential candidate of 1916, also represented the land 
stock banks, 54
The appellants argued the same points as had been made 
by the United States Chamber of Commerce during the Senate 
debates: the bill went beyond the constitutional powers of 
Congress, and that the securities it offered were therefore 
invalid; the power to create land and joint stock banks was 
reserved to the states or the people ; the act could not be 
sustained as an exercise of the power to appropriate public 
money for public purposes ; and that the power to borrow on 
the credit of the United States did not authorise the 
issuance and sale of farm loan bonds nor their exemption 
from state taxation. Hughes argued for the appellees that: 
Congress had the power directly to use the public money for 
the purposes of agricultural development; that having this 
power. Congress could exercise the power by the adoption of 
appropriate means to that end, and the creation of instru­
mentalities for that purpose; Congress had the power to judge 
for itself the fiscal agencies needed by the government, and 
this/
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this was not open to judicial review; and that Congress 
could protect the securities created under its legislation 
from impairment by making them exempt from taxation.
Hughes's argument for the supremacy of the legislature went 
beyond the technical question of the act. 55
The Court upheld the act by six votes to two; Justices 
Holmes and McReynolds dissented, while Brandeis did not 
an opinion. In his decision Justice Day held that the 
creation of these banks and the grant of authority for them 
to act for the government as depositories of public money 
brought them within the creative powers of Congress. Further­
more, he pointed out, the national bank cases had declared 
the power of the states to tax the property and franchises of 
national banks only to the extent authorised by Congress. 
Holmes's dissent was based upon the premise that as the suit 
was brought by the citizen of a state against a corporation 
of that state, the cause of action arose wholly from the law 
of the state and should not be tried under the law of the 
United States. 56
Although the case had been resolved in the act's favour, 
the workings of the land banks had been hindered severely as 
all operations had been suspended while the court reviewed
its validity. Once the case was decided, the new banks found 
of
plenty customers. In many ways the Federal Farm Loan Act was 
more radical than the Federal Reserve Act ; whereas the 
earlier act sought to regulate an already existing banking 
structure, the Farm Loan Act not only regulated but created 
a banking system. It implied a far greater role for the 
federal authorities than the commercial banking legislation, 
and/
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and thus represents a genuine extension of the federal power. 
Balancing this however were the wide ranging controls and 
powers of the local land associations, and upon them would 
depend the success or failure of the whole system. Yet, the 
farm loan system was the most genuinely cooperative measure 
of the agricultural reform programme in the bureaucratic 
sense; local autonomy was preserved, but not at the expense 
of the federal treasury. Given this, it is perhaps more 
than coincidental that this was the least Southern of the 
agricultural reforms, being drafted and sponsored by a New 
England Democrat; but this act had produced some strange 
bedfellows, as exemplified by William McAdoo and Charles 
Hughes in alliance against a private bankers' association.
Southern landowners could feel pleased with themselves: 
they now had access to large amounts of capital at low 
interest rates, and to a certain extent they could control 
this themselves through the land associations. While their 
politicians had had little to do with the initial stages of 
the legislation, their support in debate and in voting had 
been essential. Southern economists also welcomed the new 
legislation. Although the other reforms were important, and 
involved harder battles in Congress, the provision of cheap, 
reliable capital for long term improvement lay at the heart 
of future Southern development. And, as Hoke Smith correctly 
pointed out, legislation that benefited the farmer benefited 
all, especially in the South. Yet the most yearned for wish 
of the economic reformers was that the new credit legislation 
would help to eradicate the problems of tenancy; the promise 
offered for this by the new legislation never materialised, 
and the hopes were to be disappointed.
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CHAPTER V 
MARKETING LEGISLATION
While the educational and financial reforms were vital 
to the long term development of Southern agriculture, their 
benefits could not be immediate. Southern planters wanted 
their immediate problems to be tackled, as well as a guaran­
teed future. Reforms designed to improve Southern agricul­
tural marketing could have an immediate effect, leaving the 
landowner with more money in his pockets, as well as further 
improving the future agricultural prospects. The main cash 
crops of the South, cotton and tobacco, had it in common 
that they were produced neither for immediate personal con­
sumption nor for use within the region. Textile factories 
had become increasingly important in the South, and tobacco 
factories would become so in the 1920s, but most of the crop 
was produced for export, and for cash. Cotton and tobacco 
had to be seen in the context of a world market. C.W. Bur­
kett, a professor at the North Carolina College of Agricul­
tural and Mechanical Arts, realised the international role 
played by cotton. Cotton, he considered, contributed to the 
higher wants of man more than any other plant, and an im­
provement in the fortunes of Southern cotton would not only 
benefit the South and the union, but more importantly, it 
would "civilise and uplift other nations" throughout the 
world. Cotton was"the hand-maiden of civilisation". 1
Before cotton could achieve this millennium however, it 
had to improve its marketing organisation. Rationalisation 
was essential. The marketing of cotton, although regulated 
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through and highly centralised around the New York cotton 
exchange, was haphazard and, consequently, subject to wildly 
fluctuating fortunes. Price stabilisation was the main aim 
of marketing improvement, both to guarantee a predictable 
price for the producer and to eliminate speculators. After 
the Civil War prices had fallen rapidly dipping below the 
symbolic level of 10 cents per pound in 1878. Between 1878 
and 1897 the production of cotton doubled, but prices con­
tinued to fall, until in 1898 they reached an all time low 
of 5.6 cents per pound. Prices gradually and, more import­
antly, regularly rose to around 10-14 cents per pound, until 
the combination of a record crop and the market disorganisa­
tion caused by the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 
drove the price down to 6.8 cents. An increased demand 
during the war pushed prices up to 35 cents per pound by 
1919, but prices returned to the accepted norm of 10 cents 
per pound by 1925. 2
Tobacco prices closely followed the pattern set by 
cotton. The value of the Virginian crop in 1894 was less 
than half the value of any crop since 1880. The 1895 tobacco 
crop in Kentucky was worth less than any crop since the 1870s. 
Prices rose after this, and the establishment of the all 
powerful American Tobacco Company, which had no equivalent in 
the cotton world, ensured that prices did not suffer from 
damaging fluctuations. Even the nominal dismembering of the 
trust in 1911 did not measurably alter the situation, 
although tobacco prices did register a severe decline during 
the post war depression. 3
The large fluctuations in cotton prices however clearly
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did no-one any good, although the popular imagination be­
lieved, not without reason, that New York speculators bene­
fited. The consequences for the producer were that the 
basic necessity of planning the next year's crop became a 
gamble rather than a reasoned judgment. Banks as a result 
became naturally wary of advancing credit at low interest 
rates on such a hazardous venture. For the agricultural pro­
blem to be completely solved, it became obvious that a con­
sideration of marketing reforms was essential.
Many variables existed that adversely affected the 
cotton crop, which could not be adequately solved by legisla­
tion; the boll weevil, the weather, and human error all 
lowered the farmer's income. Other areas existed however 
where federal legislation was not only desirable, but necess­
ary. National legislation provided the only effective means 
of organising and regulating the marketing arrangements of 
the diverse and competitive Cotton Belt. Certain economists 
had recommended that Southern planters adopt cooperative 
marketing. Clarence Poe suggested to his readers that they 
should join with their neighbours in marketing their pro­
ducts; this would result in better information, increased 
profits through better grading, and lower freight rates.
While basically sound, such moves towards cooperative market­
ing had only local significance in the 1910s, and they were 
fiercely resisted in certain quarters. One businessman 
wrote that the arguments in favour of cooperative credit and 
marketing were entirely fallacious: they were only excuses 
for the ne'er do well and the lazy. Congress chose to tackle 
the marketing problem through a series of specialised acts 
rather/
278
rather than a cumbersome, all encompassing bill: the Federal 
Highways Act, the Federal Warehouse Acts of 1914 and 1916, 
and the Federal Cotton Futures Act. A Federal Grain Futures 
Trading Act was also envisaged, but this did not pass until 
1921. 4
The Federal Highways Act was the most important both in 
its implications for marketing and for the future involve­
ment of the federal government in the economy. Often living 
in comparative isolation, the planter depended upon good 
communications to market his products. Transportation costs 
for such bulky crops as cotton and tobacco were considerable, 
Railroads offered the most economical form of transport, but 
long distances had to be travelled between the plantation 
and the nearest railhead by road, organised transport by 
canal or river having almost entirely ceased by the 1880s in
the South. The cost of this stage of the journey varied,
but studies concluded that the cost of hauling cotton or 
tobacco to markets over unimproved roads ran to 30 cents per 
ton mile. This assumes that the road was passable, a doubt­
ful prospect given the heavy rain showers common in the
South during the months of the cotton harvest. 5
The improvement of these roads, either by simply cover­
ing them with gravel or by macadamisation, had three bene­
ficial effects. First: it reduced transport costs. Larger, 
heavier and more efficient wagons could be used. Further­
more, mechanical transport could be introduced although this 
was as yet uncommon in the South. Haulage costs could be 
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reduced to 15 cents per ton mile, and while not a great sav­
ing it was welcome during years of low prices. Second: it 
increased the land values of surrounding properties. Two 
state governments recognising this made the owners of pro­
perty adjoining improved roads pay a share of the mainten­
ance costs. Third: it permitted a more rational movement of 
the cotton crop. Too often cotton marketing meant a pell 
mell race to beat the rains that washed away the roads, to 
beat competitors to the nearest market, and to beat the 
Egyptian and Indian crops to the European exchanges, thus 
securing the highest possible price. A glut on the market 
resulted, which quickly drove down prices; only cotton 
dealers benefited. Burkett argued that this rush during the 
ninety days of the picking and ginning season was the funda­
mental flaw in cotton marketing. An improved highway net­
work connecting the planter with his markets while not solv­
ing the whole problem would remove one of the reasons for 
the annual sprint. Railroads approved of this. One of 
their main complaints against the cotton planter was the 
enormous strain placed upon their facilities for two months 
of the year, which remained dormant for the other ten months.
Apart from the benefits regarding the cotton crop, 
economists argued that improved highways would lead the 
South away from its overdependence upon cotton. Perceiving 
this as a means to promote a more stable and prosperous 
rural economy, academics and some businessmen had long advo­
cated a greater diversification of crops. A good and 
dependable road system was a necessary prerequisite for this, 
Soft fruits, citrus fruits and green vegetables all perished 
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quickly in the humid Southern climate unless moved quickly 
to market, and proponents of the idea hoped to find markets 
in the cities of the Northeast. Writing to Eugene Branson, 
the Georgia Chamber of Commerce said that they wished to 
recommend that farmers should grow other crops than cotton, 
but they could not as local markets were inadequate, and 
transport unreliable. A Texan farmer complained that he had 
heeded the call to grow soft fruits, but that peaches and 
tomatoes rotted in his fields because of the impossibility 
of reaching markets. Even when transport was readily avail­
able, farmers did not invariably realise a profit. One 
Southern railroad company managed to persuade farmers to grow 
soft fruits and green vegetables, but found that as the hand­
ling was managed by middlemen, the farmers did not see any 
possible gain and reverted to cotton growing. 7
The proponents of better highways also stressed the 
moral improvements that would result. Reformers agreed that 
good roads bonded communities together: they allowed children 
to attend churches, schools, and places of amusement regular­
ly, as well as permitting them a wider circle of acquaint­
ances. Hopefully rural life would become more attractive, 
and the drift of rural populations to the cities would 
cease. This had been a major concern of the Country Life 
Commission. 8
Automobile manufacturers had a vested interest in the 
passage of such legislation. The automobiles of 1913 became 
unusable on unimproved roads during the rain due to mud.
David Houston recalled that in 1913 it was impossible to 
travel safely between Richmond and Washington by automobile 
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in wet weather. While sympathetic to the wishes of the 
American Automobile Association, an extremely active lobby, 
Southern politicians regarded the funding of roads to mar­
kets as more important than creating new markets for North­
ern industrialists. John Sharp Williams considered that 
"the very largest measure possible" of good roads funding 
should be spent with the view of getting the farmer's pro- • 
ducts to shipping points, and that if he found any opportun­
ity to influence the application of such funds, he would use 
it in that direction. 9
Although not diametrically opposed, the aims of the 
agriculturalists and the automobile manufacturers differed. 
While the former wanted to improve market roads, the latter 
wanted to commence a federal funded programme that would 
eventually create a national highway system. Southerners 
had little time for this; they perceived highway improvement 
as essentially a local problem. The automobile's problems 
did not really exist in the South, simply because there were 
very few automobiles in the South. The industry continued 
to grow during the 1910s, but car ownership in the South re­
mained low. By 1915 there was an average of one car per 41 
persons in the United States, the greatest concentration 
being in the Northeast and the highest average of automobiles 
per capita in the West. Iowa for example had one car per 15 
persons, and California had one car per 17 persons.
Tennessee by comparison had one car per 298 persons; Arkansas 
had one car per 198 persons; and Florida, the best off South­
ern state, had one car per 80 inhabitants, almost half the 
national average. That car ownership remained so low in a 
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rural area where the provision of public transport was non 
existent indicates the general poverty and backwardness of 
the region. 10
The federal government had maintained an ambivalent 
attitude towards funding road building and maintenance during 
the early republic. Jackson’s Maysville Veto in 1830 did not 
lead to a complete halt of federal aid, but the state and 
county increasingly undertook the responsibility. The result­
ing localisation of authority proved satisfactory for a while, 
but it rapidly became inadequate for an industrialising 
nation. Logan Wallis Page, the director of the office of 
public roads in 1912, considered that leaving road building 
responsibility with the county or township was detrimental to 
progress. It led to an unnecessary duplication of petty 
officials subject to the whims of the electorate, and without 
a central guiding hand, the result was a patchy and poorly 
administered highway system. 11
The state authorities had neglected their duties through­
out much of the nineteenth century. As in Britain, matters 
of internal communications focussed first on the canal, and 
then on the railroad. Neither required the state governments 
to provide any funding being privately financed. By the 1890s 
though, necessity, and federal government promptings, as exem­
plified by the establishment of the bureau of road inquiry in 
1893, began to arouse the state assemblies to action. By 
1914, there were only seven states without a highway depart­
ment, and thirty four states had road sections constructed at 
least partly by state funds; the majority of state highway 
departments employed a commissioner and engineer, neither of 
whom/
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whom were elected. Fifteen states provided the complete 
cost of state aid roads; twenty two states divided the cost 
between the state and county authorities; the division was 
between the state and township in two cases; and, as already 
mentioned, two states apportioned the bill between the state 
and those property owners who stood to benefit from increas­
ed land values. However, only twenty one states appropria­
ted funds to maintain their improved highways. 12
Southern state legislatures were not in the forefront 
of this movement. Six of the seven states without a state 
highway department were Southern: Arkansas, Florida, Mississ­
ippi, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas, the other being 
Illinois. None of these states set aside funds for road 
building, neither did Georgia, which relied entirely upon 
convict labour for its road improvements. The only other 
state in the union to use convict labour to any meaningful 
extent was Virginia. 13
Virginia nonetheless provides the honourable exception 
among Southern states in that her spending record compared 
favourably with other states. Virginia spent #1,663,317 on 
the improvement of her roads between 1900 and 1914, more than
f ossassiKg
Wisconsin, which is usually regarded as^the most active and 
radical state legislature. Virginia remained an exception 
however; no other Southern state spent more than #400,000 on 
their roads between 1900 and 1914, and North Carolina and 
Kentucky spent less than #25,000 on improvements. The North 
Carolinian record is particularly poor given that the state 
highway law had been passed as early as 1901, and that in 
1915 alone the state legislature received #120,000 in revenue 
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from vehicle registrations. No Southern state legislature, 
including Virginia, appropriated funds for road maintenance. 14 
Mitigating circumstances existed. Southern geograph­
ical and geological conditions partly explain this low level 
of financing. Lower expenditures could be justified by 
cheap labour and easily available road building material.
In Louisiana for example the cost of macadam construction was 
#1,800 per mile, whereas in Massachusetts it rose to #8,000 
per mile, and in New York the average was #9,000 per mile.
Gravel roads in Alabama cost #790 per mile to construct, but 
the average cost in eight other non Southern states was 
#1,725 per mile. Northeastern states paid between #200-#300 
annually to maintain a mile of macadamised road, but one 
commentator considered that this could be halved in the South, 
even allowing for increased automobile ownership. 15
Despite these qualifications, the response of the South­
ern state legislatures was pitiful. On average, 10 per cent 
of American roads were improved in 1914, a woeful proportion 
in comparison with Western Europe, but the Southern average 
was less than 5 per cent. Only Kentucky with an average of 
19 per cent of improved roads came close to having an adequate 
highway network. Certain other states had records as poor as 
the South; Montana for example spent only #2,484 on roads and 
consequently only 0.3 per cent of the state's roads were 
improved. Such states were usually in the West however where 
low population densities were common, and little need existed 
for a comprehensive road network. The federal government 
owned large areas of land in these states, and this further 
complicated matters, the states being unwilling to pay for 
what/
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what they regarded as a federal responsibility. This argu­
ment surfaced during the Highways bill debates. 16
The federal government, by passing an act establishing 
a bureau of road inquiry in the department of agriculture 
in March 1893 had reasserted its right to aid internal high­
way improvements. The bureau's brief was to inquire into, 
and make recommendations upon, the subjects of road manage­
ment, methods of road making, and to prepare publications to 
disseminate its findings. These duties gradually extended 
to include the conducting of field experiments. By the 
object lesson road the bureau acquired an educational role. 
This consisted of constructing and maintaining a section of 
road along approved and standardised lines, in the hope that 
otherwise sluggish state and county authorities would rea­
lise the value of such improvements. During 1913 the bureau 
completed 42 object lesson roads, 29 of which were in the 
South. Road and bridge improvements were completed in 18 
states, including all the Southern states. 17
The bureau proved to be a success, and was recognised 
as such when the 1912 Post Office Appropriation Act provided 
#500,000 to allow the bureau to construct rural delivery 
roads and publish reports on the economic value of such roads 
to local communities. The relevant amendment was proposed 
by Furnifold Simmons. This formed the precursor of the 
Federal Highways Act: the initiative for such improvements 
lay with the state or the local communities; the bureau pro­
vided one dollar for every two dollars raised by the local 
communities for highway improvement. Nine Southern states 
took advantage of this in its first year of operation, 
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receiving #265,000 from the federal fund. 18
Such proddings from an ambitious bureaucracy were all 
very well, but they could only accomplish a little. They 
could only provide part of the foundations of an improved 
national highway system. Congressional legislation would 
achieve a great deal more, but important constitutional 
problems had to be solved before the federal government 
could even partly pay for any highway improvements wholly 
within one state. From the politician's perspective, federal 
aid for road construction was a very desirable end. Improved 
roads brought meaningful and immediate economic and social 
benefits for his constituents; it provided employment, and 
created additional patronage positions; federal aid removed 
the burden of payment from the local community; and to be 
associated with an improved road increased the standing of a 
politician among his constituents in a tangible manner that 
rural credits could never match.
It required a considerable jump in theory however to 
justify such federal spending under the general welfare clause 
of the constitution. Another rationalisation had to be found. 
Unfortunately, constitutional thinkers had remained silent on 
the issue; the Senate committee on post offices and post roads 
could find no authority later than Daniel Webster to support 
its case thatthis was a suitable area for federal concern.
Even Webster's logic had been more pragmatic than constitu­
tionally accurate: he held that as the states had no abundant 
and easy source of income, but the United States had, then 
the federal government had the power to accomplish internal 
improvements. A somewhat contrived justification was found 
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in the federal government's unquestioned right to establish 
post offices and post roads. 19
Rural districts had long complained of poor postal 
deliveries. Whereas city dwellers had their mail delivered 
to their door, farmers had to collect their mail at the near­
est post office. Consequently, knowledge of the outside 
world filtered down only slowly to the Southern farmer. As 
well as being irksome and time consuming, the journey along 
unfrequented and isolated country roads could be dangerous. 
One Mississippi banker wrote to his senator^ asking the poli­
tician to use his influence to change the route of a mail 
carrier. This would ease the minds of three families in his 
area who lived a mile from their mail boxes. They had to 
send their daughters to collect the mail, and they worried 
for the safety of the girls. 20
Although the Southern imagination exaggerated such 
fears, the problem existed. A further undesirable effect of 
the inadequate postal service was that it presented private­
ly owned express companies with a monopoly of parcel deliv-
coïtvTpÉvmls w«-va,
eries. ^Usually owned by credit merchants, Southern farmers 
considered these companies to be both arrogant and extortion­
ate. A North Carolinian farmer wrote to his congressman 
that there was no man, woman or child in the nation who had 
not felt their "iron heel". Farmers' organisations pressed 
for an extension of the federal parcels post, arguing that 
as they paid the same federal taxes as those in the city, 
then they should receive the same service. Mail had been 
delivered in rural areas along what were known as star routes 
for a long time, but these did not cover mail delivered to 
homes/
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homes in rural areas. 21
Accordingly, legislation was enacted creating rural 
free delivery routes; subsequently the parcel post system 
was added allowing favourable rates on parcels mailed to 
rural addresses. By 1916, the rural mail delivery service 
had an annual appropriation of #53,000,000. Farmers were 
delighted with the new service, and it provided a real im­
provement in rural conditions. The credit merchant could be 
bypassed by the farmer with cash by means of the mail order 
catalogue; some even suggested that the parcel post could be 
used for direct marketing, but this had more relevance for 
truck farmers in New England than Southern cotton producers. 
Southern merchants opposed the measure, correctly seeing it 
as a threat, although politicians attempted to reassure them
that the bill would not bankrupt them. 22
By the Federal Parcels Post Act many more miles of road
came under the control of the post office. It could be
argued that a post road was just as truly a postal facility 
as a post office, and as such eligible for federal funding. 
Star routes had covered only 147,365 miles of road, but 
rural free delivery routes added another 1,056,897 to the 
network used by the post office. However, only 61,495 miles 
of this were surfaced with crushed gravel or some equivalent, 
thus adding to the expense and time of the federal mail 
carriers. There were 48,5 21 miles of star routes and 
292,650 miles of rural free delivery routes in the South, 
this being proportionately compatible with the area of the 
South in the United States. 23
Individual congressmen had long been concerned with the 
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federal funding of road improvement. It provided a good 
election slogan. John Bankhead, the sponsor of the success­
ful bill had been elected in 1907 with this as his main 
plank. Bankhead was a wealthy Alabama planter who had the 
dubious distinction of being the last Confederate veteran in 
the Senate. He had already represented Alabama for 20 years 
in the House of Representatives when elected to the Senate.
He retained his seat in the upper chamber until his death in 
1920. 24
Many previous attempts had been made to enact legisla­
tion, but all had failed. One measure proposed by Dorsey 
Shackleford of Missouri succeeded in passing the House in 
1912 but the Republican dominated Senate had refused to pass 
the bill. Several of the proposed bills had been quite radi­
cal in their intentions. One introduced in 1914 intended to 
lend the states #1,000,000,000 which would be paid out over 
five years. The money was to be raised by selling bonds at 
3 per cent interest. This amounted to a barefaced robbery 
of the national treasury. As McAdoo pointed out, it would 
have doubled the national debt at a single stroke, as the 
federal government would be required to underwrite the system. 25
The Democratic platform of 1912 had promised that the 
party would give national aid to state and local authorities 
for the construction and maintenance of post roads. Accord­
ingly, a bill to provide federal aid for the construction, 
improvement, and maintenance of rural roads used in the 
transportation of interstate commerce, military supplies or 
postal matters, was introduced in the House by Shackleford 
on 8th January 1916. The bill covered any public road over 
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which rural mail was, or might be, carried outside of incor­
porated cities or towns having a population greater than 
2,000. No more than #25,000,000 was to be appropriated in 
any fiscal year, to be divided in the following manner: each 
state was given #65,000 unconditionally; half of the remaind­
er was allocated to each state according to the ratio of its 
population to that of the union; and the remainder according 
to the ratio that the mileage of star and rural free delivery 
routes in each state bore to the total mileage of such roads. 
The initiative lay with the state highway departments. They 
could apply to the secretary of agriculture for aid to con­
struct or maintain any rural post road, supplying the 
necessary surveys and cost estimates. If the secretary 
approved the proposal, he could subsidise it to no less than 
30 per cent and no more than 5 0 per cent of what he consid­
ered to be a reasonable cost. The state highway departments 
supervised all construction and maintenance. In the case of 
those states without a state highway department, the governor 
was to negotiate with the secretary of agriculture. 26
The bill's key concept of cooperation between the state 
and federal authorities echoed the previous legislation. Yet 
a dissenting voice was heard before the bill was introduced 
to the House; Joseph Walsh of Massachusetts, a member of the 
House committee on roads, disagreed with the report. Unus­
ually, especially for a representative in his first term, 
Walsh expressed his opinions in a minority view, summing up 
the opposition that most New England Republicans felt towards 
the federal funding of highway improvement. Road building 
according to Walsh was not a suitable area of interest for 
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the federal government, especially as the treasury seemed to 
be in no fit condition to appropriate #25,000,000 for a novel 
and untried scheme; the legislation should be deferred until 
the treasury was in better health. He also complained, quite 
legitimately, that the appropriation allocation would act un­
fairly against states such as Massachusetts, New York, and 
New Jersey that had taken it upon themselves to construct 
good roads. These states would pay the largest share of the 
appropriation, but receive the least. A greater danger 
however was that the federal government would be committed on 
"a shallow pretext" to a policy that would lead to enormous 
expenditure in the future. This Walsh could never condone. 27 
Many shortcomings existed in the bill. Houston consid­
ered some to be so serious that he attempted to influence 
Bankhead before the bill left the Senate committee on post 
offices and post roads, which Bankhead chaired. Even before 
the bill had passed the House, Houston wrote to Bankhead 
advising him to show more caution in deciding the amount of 
the appropriation. The secretary felt that the House bill 
appropriated too much, too quickly, and that a smaller amount 
that would gradually increase would be better. This would 
allow for a suitable system to evolve before the complete 
expenditure became available, thus cutting down on the misuse 
of federal funds. In a later letter Houston recommended that 
the population of incorporated towns and cities be included 
in the bill otherwise half the country would be excluded from 
the fund, and this could cause bitter arguments in Congress. 
Furthermore, Houston argued, the construction work should be 
subject to the rules and regulations of the department of 
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agriculture, for if it was carried out by the rules of the 
various state highway departments then one of the main pur­
poses of the bill would be lost and localisation of authority 
would remain. 28
Writing a fortnight later, Houston continued to fight 
for his department. He agreed with the general principles 
of the bill, but forcibly objected to the lack of authority 
given to the secretary of agriculture in deciding what road 
sections should be improved. The bill proposed that the 
secretary be presented with detailed estimates by the state 
highway departments, all doubtless impeccable, but Houston 
judged it essential that the secretary and state legislatures 
together should agree upon the roads to be improved, not only 
the manner by which this should be accomplished, thus safe­
guarding against the wrongful expenditure of federal funds. 
Houston also considered that no allocation should be made to 
any state that did not guarantee to maintain its improved 
roads. 29
Houston’s criticisms were relevant and well founded; 
they were the objections of a good administrator eager to see 
the most efficient implementation of what he believed to be 
important work. They also reveal considerable shrewdness. 
Only too aware of the limitations and backslidings of state 
legislatures, Houston realised that many looked upon such 
legislation as a further opportunity to raid the national 
treasury. This he meant to curb by extending the role of his 
department's professionals. Bankhead heeded Houston's 
recommendations, but not all were included in the bill re­
ported out of the Senate committee.
The/
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The Senate committee agreed with Houston* s basic criti­
cisms. In a rare breach of congressional protocol the 
committee labelled the House bill as being "seriously defect­
ive" in its failings to safeguard the use of federal appro­
priations. Debate in the House had been efficiently managed, 
but completely unworthy of note; the Senate committee's 
opinion o:f Shackleford's competence could not have been 
strengthened when he referred the bill to the Senate committ­
ee on agriculture rather than the committee on post offices. 
This caused unnecessary delay, and rather than proposing 
amendments to the House bill, the Senate committee chose to 
reduce the time spent on debate by drawing up a substitute 
bill. 30
Bankhead's bill steered a middle course between the 
House bill and Houston's proposals. The secretary of agri­
culture was to be given more authority in deciding what roads 
were to be improved; the secretary and the state highway 
departments together were to agree upon what roads should be 
improved, and on the method and character of construction.
The legislation excluded only roads in a community having a 
population greater than 2,500, the census definition of urban 
communities, except such roads where the houses were more than 
200 feet apart. This amendment was sensible. The bill no 
longer discriminated against incorporated towns as such, and 
the spacing provision ensured that roads leading into small 
towns with extended corporate boundaries would be eligible 
for funds. 31
Regarding the appropriation plan, Houston's principle 
was accepted but according to Bankhead the details were those 
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of the National Association of Highway Engineers. The meas­
ure appropriated #5,000,000 for the fiscal year 1917, in­
creasing by #5,000,000 each year thereafter until 1921 when 
the full sum of #25,000,000 would be expended. This the 
committee considered would allow a more efficient introduc­
tion of the statute, and afford greater protection for the 
treasury funds. The method of allocation was also changed. 
No longer was a lump sum to be paid to each state, but the 
fund was to be divided according to three indices. In 
addition to division among the states according to the ratio 
of their population and length of post roads to those of the 
union, as proposed by the House bill, consideration was to 
be given to the area of each state. 32
This benefited Western and Southwestern states at the 
expense of the Northeast. On the whole Southern states im­
proved their position after the change although the grant to 
Tennessee dropped by #102,800, almost 15 per cent. Con­
versely, Texas gained #434,864, an increase of almost 30 per 
cent. The substitute also placed a limit of #10,000 per 
mile on each constructed road, a blow to Northern states 
whose roads were more expensive to build. No longer was 
there to be a stipulation that the federal authorities pay a 
minimum of 30 per cent of improvement costs, although the 
upper limit of 50 per cent remained. As a concession to 
poorer areas, the states were permitted to provide labour 
and materials as a part of their contribution, thus enabling 
the states to use all the means available to them to accom­
plish "this important work". Hard pressed state comptroll­
ers were doubtless relieved to learn of this. 33 
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Bankhead ignored Houston* s pleas for the extension of 
federal rules and regulations however; the bill was clear 
upon the point that the construction work in each state 
should be accomplished under state law and under the direct 
supervision of the state highway departments. The secretary 
of agriculture could only inspect and approve. Bankhead 
asserted that it was essential that federal authorities 
dealt only with the state governments in the working out of 
policy. The balance of powers and duties between federal 
and state governments could be maintained only by leaving 
the initiative to determine if they wanted to avail them­
selves of aid with the states, and by allowing each state to 
directly supervise every step of construction and improve­
ment: "thus is reserved to the States all that could possibly 
be expected by the most earnest advocate of State rights". 34
This had obvious consequences; as a contemporary jour­
nalist noted, it would concentrate the most expensive and 
useful improvements in the areas with the greatest number of 
taxpayers. While not entirely unreasonable, this did go 
against the spirit of the bill's declared aims of promoting 
educational and social improvements in the more deprived 
areasrfwithin a state. Houston had lost this important 
battle, but he successfully ensured that the secretary of 
agriculture could withhold the apportionment of funds to any 
state that, having constructed roads under the provision of 
the act, did not properly maintain them. Although Bankhead's 
changes had headed off many of the objections that could be 
expected in the Senate, the debates still proved to be pro­
longed and occasionally ill-tempered. Introduced on 16th 
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March 1916, the bill 19th April, but
it was not voted through until 8th May despite Bankhead's 
wish, expressed on the first day, that the bill be dealt 
with speedily. Opponents and proponents fell into familiar 
battle lines: Northeastern and Midwestern Republicans opposed 
the details, though not always the principle, of the legis­
lation, and Southern Democrats defended the bill. 35
The first serious amendment to the bill was proposed by 
Thomas Shafroth, a Democrat from Colorado, and would have 
made the federal authorities liable for only a quarter of the 
total bill. Shafroth wanted to involve individuals and pri­
vate enterprise in road construction, this already being 
common in the West, and his amendment made it a condition 
that 25 per cent of the bill be subscribed by individuals and 
50 per cent by the state before any federal subsidy be gran­
ted. The total federal appropriation was to remain 
#25,000,000. His suggestion won little support however; 
while many favoured its principle, few believed that it would 
work in practice. Gallinger said that experience taught him 
that the amount paid by individuals would be negligible. 
Marcus Smith of Arizona believed that few individuals would 
willingly pay for roads through the desert; consequently, 
the Southwest would not benefit from the fund. Reed Smoot of 
Utah believed that such an amendment could only increase 
bureaucratic red-tape, thus dissuading the states from apply­
ing for aid. 36
Bankhead hoped that the amendment would be defeated, for 
while believing that it was well meant and without malice, he 
stated that the amendment was based on an entirely different 
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theory to that of the bill. Claude Swanson of Virginia, a 
member of the committee on post offices, developed Bankhead's 
argument. He stressed that the amendment went against the 
basic principle of the bill: cooperation between the federal 
and state authorities. No individual, nor the department of 
agriculture, Swanson argued, should be allowed any say in 
the origination of any policy or proposition; this must be 
brought by the state authorities. The Senate heeded Bank­
head's wish: when put to the vote the amendment failed by 36 
votes to 11 votes. Support came from Mountain state sena­
tors, but the South voted against it as a bloc. 37
The issue of cooperation between federal and state 
government did not disappear. John Works of California con­
tinued to hammer away at what he described as one of "the 
worst pieces of legislation of its kind". Opposed to the 
whole idea of a partnership between the various authorities, 
Works contended that if the federal government had any 
jurisdiction over a road then the obligation lay entirely 
with the federal authority, this was no business for the 
states. Under the bill, Works continued, the states would 
only make improvements for which they could receive aid; all 
other improvements would be neglected, no matter how import­
ant. Henry Cabot Lodge concurred in this judgment, adding 
that the primary purpose of this bill was not to improve 
roads but to gain easy votes. Some deserving communities 
would benefit, he had no doubt, but the overall results 
would be negligible. 38
Southerners could expect only limited aid from their 
Northern Democratic allies on highway improvements. Most 
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Northern Democrats came from states that had diligently 
provided and maintained improved highways, and their chari­
table feelings towards the South could only go so far. 
William Hughes of New Jersey, a member of Wilson's old New 
Jersey machine, even spoke out against the bill claiming 
that it would accomplish nothing. The main responsibility 
of replying to Works fell on Oscar Underwood, Bankhead's 
colleague from Alabama. He maintained that Congress did 
have the power to enact such legislation; it had rarely been 
used in the past he admitted, but that was because too much 
attention had been paid to railroad problems. As transport­
ation was so vital to commerce Underwood continued, and as 
there existed no interest so crucial to the American people, 
outside of liberty, as a successful commerce, then Congress 
was justified in acting. Although certain states did have 
adequate means to fund their own improvements, others did 
not and thus should receive aid. Such an opinion was truly 
radical in its vision of the future role of the federal 
government. 39
The Ohio senators, while saying that they favoured the 
bill, felt that it did not go far enough in ensuring that 
the roads be maintained. Warren Harding in particular doubt­
ed the diligence of state authorities on such matters. The 
president of the American Automobile Association shared 
Harding's concern, having already written to Bankhead on the 
subject; he considered that a real danger existed of the 
bill's purpose being destroyed by the "rapid depreciation of 
roads". To guard against this, Atlee Pomerene, a Democrat, 
tabled an amendment that tried to ensure that funds could be 
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appropriated for a "permanent road" only. 40
What Pomerene meant by a "permanent road" was unclear, 
and Bankhead believed this vagueness to be deliberate. The 
term could be interpreted in many ways, but Southerners were 
fairly certain that it would act against them. Bankhead 
said that if the amendment passed then it would preclude the 
expenditure of money on post roads, there being no such 
thing as a permanent road. While the point was strained, 
Swanson had a clearer vision of the amendment's implications: 
expenditure under the Pomerene amendment would be limited to 
the few areas around large cities where macadam roads already 
existed. It was not an amendment designed to help those 
states without roads, but rather to help those states with 
improved roads to pay for their maintenance. Hoke Smith 
took the matter even further: it was an amendment aimed 
against the South. If it passed then the only roads that 
would be built would be those of brick or granite; post roads 
in the South, Smith argued, were used only lightly, and they 
could be constructed of clay and phosphate gravel. As con­
ditions varied widely over the union, the bill should take 
account of this he continued. Smith's moral standpoint on 
this can be questioned however, for while the Georgia senator 
welcomed and expected financial help from other regions, he 
was not prepared to aid these areas when a measure went 
against them, Pomerene's amendment, like Smith's bills, was 
meant to help his own region, for he estimated that it cost 
#15,000 per mile to build a road in Ohio, and the bill placed 
an upper limit of #10,000 per mile. While Smith may have 
been correct in discovering an element of vindictiveness 
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against the South in Pomerene's amendment, the Ohio senator 
had a valid argument. 41
Pomerene's amendment failed without a yea or nay vote, 
tout other senators tabled further amendments, ostensibly to 
safeguard its provisions. George Norris of Nebraska, a 
progressive Republican, proposed to strike out the provision 
that forced the secretary of agriculture to give notice that 
he did not consider that roads had been properly maintained 
before he could withhold funds. This Norris said would 
prevent roads being built and then wasted because of poor 
management. Bankhead opposed this sensible amendment, argu­
ing that he did not consider it proper that the secretary of 
agriculture should be allowed to pounce on a state govern­
ment without the permission of the state. Vardaman support­
ed Bankhead on this, saying that he did not share the appre­
hension of other senators that the states were going to be 
careless and negligent in the maintenance of public high­
ways. Norris's amendment also failed without a yea:.or nay 
vote. 42
A further amendment concerning where in Washington the 
department buildings should be located was also rejected.
Yet another, tabled by Gordon Lee of Maryland, meant to 
appropriate an additional #96,000 to allow the secretary of 
war to prepare maps and construct military roads, was simi­
larly rejected. The need to have good roads as part of the 
national Preparedness programme had entered the debate pre­
viously, but only on the fringes and for rhetorical effect; 
Vardaman for example felt public highway construction 
should be supported because of the enormous outlay that 
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Congress proposed to appropriate for the "unnecessary imple­
ments of war." Yet, it is surprising how little mention was 
made of the military usefulness of improved highways as a 
justification for federal funding. Presumably, debates on 
Preparedness could be so divisive and time consuming that 
senators gladly avoided them whenever the opportunity arose. 
Bankhead strongly disapproved of the amendment, claiming 
that it had nothing to do with the bill, but was an attempt, 
as were all the other amendments, to so load the bill down 
that it would not pass the House. Certainly the discussion 
of the amendments wasted valuable time, but Bankhead was un­
fair in labelling them all political stratagems; many were 
relevant and designed to legitimately protect the interests 
of a particular region or improve the workings of the act. 43
One such amendment proposed by Thomas Walsh of Montana 
concerned the position of those Western states that had 
large reserves of national forests. Borah, arguing for 
this amendment, contended that as these forests took up 
such a large area of his state, Idaho, and were not sub­
ject to state taxation, this placed a grossly unfair burden 
upon such states having to pay for highway improvement.
Roads were necessary both for access and as fire breaks 
through these forests, which, Borah pointed out, had been 
landed on the West by the East. Although warned by Bank­
head that the House would not agree to it, Walsh proposed 
that the federal government should advance 10 per cent of 
the expected proceeds of the national forests to help high­
way improvement in the West. 44
Swanson angrily attacked this amendment. It would, he 
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said, allow highways to be built earlier in the Western 
states than elsewhere. Furthermore, it would extend the 
credit of the United States to aid the West at the expense 
of other more deserving regions, especially those with high­
er population densities. Bankhead also expressed strong 
disapproval of the amendment, but he was unable to command 
the support of Northern Democrats on this matter, the pro­
posal being accepted by 33 votes to 18 votes. Luke Lea of 
Tennessee and Vardaman also broke with the Southern bloc on 
this, and although their defection did not prove decisive, 
it was embarrassing. Vardaman said that he could find no 
reason for voting against the amendment, despite repeated 
warnings from Bankhead that the thus amended bill would not 
pass the House. Vardaman's justifications were hazy 
however ; it would be a stand against the city and those 
states with money, he argued, and a vote for the country­
side. This defeat mortified Bankhead, and he did not react 
with the most gracious of manners, but this Western victory 
helped to realise a long desired regional goal. 45
The bill passed the Senate without a yea or nay vote 
on 8th May 1916. Despite Bankhead's dire warnings to the 
contrary, the House threat to the bill with the attached 
Walsh amendment never materialised. The managers in both 
chambers speedily arranged a conference to resolve the 
differences between the two bills, and that was achieved 
without difficulty. Wilson signed the bill on 11th July 
1916 making it law. 46
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While improved highways helped to regulate the trans­
portation of cotton and tobacco within the region, it was 
not always in the planter's best interests to move his 
entire crop at once. It was desirable to market most of the 
crop by December, but prices invariably rose after January, 
and it was advisable to retain some cotton or tobacco to 
take advantage of this. This required suitable storage 
facilitieso The story of how the federal government became 
involved in the unlikely business of cotton warehouse licens­
ing illustrates the limits and extents of Southern power in 
Congress. Although beginning in defeat, it ends with a 
Southern triumph and the passage in 1914 of the Federal 
Warehouse Act.
Southern storage facilities were abysmal. According to 
Burkett in 1906, the only policy more foolish than that of 
selling the entire cotton crop within ninety days, was the 
way the South handled the little cotton it retained. Some 
planters stored their cotton under trees, but most left 
their gleanings in the open exposed to the wind and rain of 
a Southern winter. While the quality of cotton fibre deter­
iorated less than other field crops under such conditions, 
discolouration was common and this drove prices down.
Burkett estimated that the loss in value caused by this 
assumed enormous proportions when measured for the entire 
crop. 47
Warehouses did exist, established by both farmers' 
organisations and business interests, but they were few in 
number, patchy in distribution, and expensive to use. The 
Farmers' Union had been particularly active in this, picking 
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up the legacy of the sub-treasury plan. They had built 60 
warehouses in Arkansas, with a storage capacity of 120,000 
bales, and enough in Texas to store 5 00,000 bales. While 
the Union's plan to store enough cotton in their warehouses 
to become the balance of power in disposing of the entire 
Southern crop came to nought, their impact at local level 
was considerable. The Southern Cotton Association, repre­
senting the larger landowners,also adopted the idea. Acting 
with the full support and cooperation of the country banks, 
who saw the warehouse plan as "the only practical one that 
the cotton producers have ever advanced", they guaranteed 
high minimum prices to their depositors. During the panic 
year of 1907, when average prices wavered around the 7 cents 
per pound mark, the Farmers' Union guaranteed 10 cents per 
pound to warehouse depositors, and the Southern Cotton 
Association paid 11 cents per pound. Eligibility for the 
Union warehouses however was restricted to those who could 
take out stock to the value of #25 in the enterprise. 48
The appeal of this to bankers was obvious: not only did 
it increase their customers' prosperity, but it reduced the 
annual rush for short term credit during the harvest season. 
Banks began to organise their own warehouse companies, the 
Warrant Warehouse Company for example being founded by the 
First National Bank of Alabama. The Warrent Company had 
lower guarantees than the Farmers' Union however issuing 
cotton scrip. at only 7 cents per pound in 1907. Private 
warehouses also charged higher prices; Burkett reports that 
this could be as high as #2.50 a bale including insurance, 
and only rarely did it drop below #1.50 a bale. A further 
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drawback to the planter was that warehouse companies sold 
their stocks through an agent, and while this saved the 
planter's time and effort it also cost them #1 a bale. 49 
Demands grew for the state governments to construct and 
regulate warehouses. Writing to Senator Fletcher, the chair­
man of the Southern Commercial Congress recommended that 
each cotton state inaugurate a system of bonded warehouses 
under state supervision. This would allow cotton to be 
sampled, graded, and guaranteed by surety bonds. Such a 
system would enable textile manufacturers to make orders for 
several months ahead with a fair idea of what their profits 
would be. South Carolina had actively promoted warehouse 
development in the 1910s, but this remained an exception. It 
is not hard to see why this was the case; if Southern state 
legislatures did not appropriate sufficient funds for educa­
tion, highway improvements, or even administration, it would 
be unrealistic to spend money on warehouse construction. It 
was not important enough. Furthermore, as legislators could 
argue, cotton was an export crop, a commodity of interstate 
and foreign commerce: did that not leave the responsibility 
with the federal government? 50
The question did not become important until the autumn 
of 1914, and the outbreak of war in Europe. The 1913 cotton 
crop had been outstandingly successful and, on the strength 
of this, the South had increased cotton acreage in 1914; it 
was to be the largest crop in history. Initially all went 
well and a great optimism existed. A friend wrote enthus­
iastically to John Sharp Williams letting him know that the 
cotton prospects in Yazoo County, where Williams had his 
plantation,/
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plantation, were "very bright". All hopes of success how­
ever were dashed by the declaration of hostilities. The 
German and Austrian markets disappeared; the British govern­
ment threatened to declare cotton a contraband of war, thus 
closing the North Atlantic; the New York cotton exchange 
closed down completely for three months, leaving planters at 
the mercy of spot buyers; prices dropped from 13 to 5 cents 
per pound. Rather than sell at this price, many planters 
held onto their bales in the hope that either state or fed­
eral authorities would intervene. 51
Southern anger and frustration focussed upon Congress, 
with every Southern politician being inundated with letters 
describing difficulties and demanding action. Despite under­
standable exaggerations, conditions in the South were truly 
frightening and chaotic especially as additional sums of 
credit had been optimistically advanced in view of the bumper 
crop; many upland farmers had hoped to "get on their feet". 
However, as one Mississippian reported, conditions "were not 
promising", and the people felt "pretty blue"; all the 
farmers he knew had heeded advice not to sell their crop, but 
they considered that Congress was not playing its part.
Edwin Yates Webb, ever sensitive to the popular mood of his 
constituency, wrote to his political lieutenants urging them 
to start campaigning. Webb worried that opposition to 
Congress’s seeming inaction would cost him votes in marginal 
counties. 5 2
Various states and individuals tackled the problem. Both 
Texas and South Carolina passed emergency legislation to pro­
vide temporary storage facilities guaranteed by the credit of 
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the state, although a similar measure failed in Alabama.
Asa Candler, the Atlanta millionaire, set up enormous ware­
houses to store 250,000 bales, and New York department 
stores even sold raw cotton bales, though more as an adver­
tising gimmick than as a serious attempt to alleviate 
Southern conditions. Some planters aided themselves, dis­
playing considerable ingenuity in the process. One Mississ­
ippi planter found a broker in Milan to sell his cotton, 
although this stopped when the planter's insurance agent put 
a new clause into his policy concerning war risk insurance, 
and the banks no longer accepted his drafts. Compared with 
this, the state governments' response seemed weak and in­
effective. Williams wrote that it was "a matter of humilia­
tion" to him that while he was asking the federal government 
for aid, the Southern states did not take a single step to 
help their citizens. 5 3
Yet Southerners in Congress could do little either; 
without the help or sympathy of the President, the administra­
tion, Northern Democrats or Midwestern Republicans, the 
South could achieve little, and the Southern response to the 
crisis succeeded only in alienating almost every area of 
possible support. Southern fury on the matter was under­
standable, but their demands of central government became 
increasingly unrealistic; for, despite their considerable 
knowledge of the cotton trade and how Congress operated, an 
air of fantasy permeates the response of Southern politi­
cians. The crisis had hit the South suddenly, and proposed 
solutions had to be hurriedly conceived, but in their haste 
the disciplined, pragmatic side of the Southern politician 
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vanished, and the darker, more emotional rhetorician emerged.
At first considerable sympathy existed towards the 
South. A Chicago businessman called upon the federal author­
ities to establish warehouses to store cotton under federal 
supervision and to arrange with the banks to loan given 
amounts using warehouse receipts as security at a fixed rate 
of interest. The administration had reacted swiftly, call­
ing a meeting of Southern businessmen, politicians and lead­
ing cabinet members. Held in Washington on the 13th and 
14th August 1914, it heard the administration's proposals 
from McAdoo: the Southern national banks were to issue emer­
gency currency thus enabling the planters to carry their 
surplus until the market revived. This did not go far enough 
for Southern leaders and, as they pointed out, the proposed 
loans had to be redeemed within four months, too short a time 
to move the cotton crop. Furthermore, the country banks that 
served the planters could not benefit from this as they were 
chartered by the states and therefore outside the reserve 
system. Frank Haynes, of Louisiana, proposed federal sub­
sidies to raise the price of cotton to 8 cents per pound; 
Thomas Sissons, a Mississippi representative, demanded that 
the state banks be allowed to issue currency based upon ware­
house receipts. While receiving considerable support in the 
South, these ideas flew in the face of conventional natural 
economic law. McAdoo denounced the suggestions as being 
"wild and ridiculous": they would bring about the financial 
ruin of the country, and the notion that state banks be 
allowed to issue bank notes was too irresponsible to contem­
plate. David Houston supported his cabinet colleague, 
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telling Southerners that it would be folly for the federal 
government to determine the price of any commodity. 54
An increase in British buying, combined with the 
obvious resolve of the administration to do something, re­
turned some confidence to the market, but unsold cotton con­
tinued to accumulate as the harvest moved to its climax.
The treasury's reaction increasingly proved to be inadequate, 
and resistance from the banking community, who resented the 
government's directives, only exacerbated the situation. A 
cotton bloc began to form in Congress, composed in the main 
of Southerners whose ties with the administration were loose, 
and who did not normally play leading roles in Congress; 
this group also received support from congressmen represent­
ing tobacco districts. Robert Henry of Texas introduced a 
bill to the House that instructed the secretary of the 
treasury to deposit #250,000,000 in the Southern national 
and state banks, and for the banks to advance this at 4 per 
cent interest to cotton producers. The funds for this were 
to be raised either by an increased issue of treasury notes 
or else on the sale of Panama Canal bonds.
The Henry bill represented Southern demagogy at its 
most institutionalised. It united all sections of the South 
in supporting it. Previously opinion had been split between 
those favouring action from within the South and those who 
demanded that cotton be bought direct by the federal govern­
ment. As a legislative proposal it was ill conceived and 
politically impossible; as an economic measure it was far 
fetched and irresponsible. One prominent bankers' journal, 
showing characteristic restraint, remarked that the bill 
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displayed more enthusiasm on the part of congressmen than 
any knowledge of economics or finance. 55
The bill failed, but the three weeks spent debating it 
in the House focussed national attention on the Southern 
problem. Wilson declared his total opposition to any such 
legislation; his cabinet agreed with him. No sympathetic 
support came from other agricultural regions, the South's 
audacity having alienated many. Webb begged an associate to 
realise how difficult the situation was: "The cotton states 
have only ninety members out of four hundred and thirty five, 
and it is very bad to make our Northern and Western friends 
understand the unfortunate situation in which the South 
finds itself on account of this cruel war". The House re­
jected the bill by 123 votes to 91 votes. Hoke Smith had 
introduced a similar measure in the Senate as an amendment 
to the administration's emergency war revenue bill, but this 
also failed despite considerable Southern efforts and a 
threat to block the revenue bill. There is little doubting 
the completeness of the Southern defeat; they had to accept 
the administration's proposals, inadequate though these were. 
The situation was resolved only when Britain bought up the 
surplus cotton and decided not to declare it an article of 
contraband in order to ensure Southern allies in Congress 
should the need arise in the future. 56
Although not forming part of the agricultural reform 
programme, the Southern responses to the 1914 cotton crisis 
deserve an extended discussion. In general the South got 
what it wanted on agricultural issues, but on this occasion, 
which was the gravest imperilment faced by Southern agri­
culture/
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culture during the Wilson presidency, the regional politi­
cians achieved little. Why this was so is not hard to dis­
cover: the South needed support in Congress to achieve her 
aim. Where this came from could vary: sympathetic Northern 
Democrats were keen to maintain party loyalties; Midwestern 
Republicans would argue vigorously over details, but agreed 
with the South on most matters of principle ; most import­
antly, support could come from the President who by his 
goadings and publicising could force rebels to toe the party 
line. But, when support was not forthcoming from any of 
these sources, the South lost. Equally important in assess­
ing why the Southern responses failed is that they were 
emotional and ill conceived. Mitigating circumstances did 
exist: the subject was emotional; it was unprecedented; and 
it required a quick solution. The Southern politician's 
great strength however was that he understood how Congress 
worked, had the experience to make it work for him, and had 
the legal training to allow him to draft acceptable legisla­
tion. The Southerner was at his best on the legislation 
that required hard work in committee, and an understanding 
of legal and technical details in debate; these strengths 
had greatly aided the passage of complicated tariff, anti­
trust and banking legislation. Yet when it came to recon­
ciling passion with reason no Southerner could compare with 
La Follette or Beveridge: passion always won out at the 
expense of reason. The consequence was the Southern politi­
cian as irresponsible demagogue, prepared to wreck the for­
tunes of the union for the sake of his own state or county.
The Southern politicians did have one success; early
in/
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in the crisis they managed to garner enough support to enact 
the Smith Lever Federal Warehouse Act* Although intended to 
be temporary, subsequent legislation in 1916 made it a per­
manent part of the reform programme» The bill authorised the 
secretary of agriculture to issue licences to those cotton 
warehouses engaged in interstate or foreign commerce that 
applied for one. Inspectors were appointed to supervise 
these warehouses. Smith hoped that federal supervision would 
ensure that the warehouse receipts issued for the stored 
cotton would have a recognised standing when offered for 
sale. By this, the United States would have plenty of cotton 
available when world demand rose; buyers would have cotton of 
a certified quality; and the producer would have a negotiable 
receipt. The justification for introducing the federal gov­
ernment was that uniform standards would be needed if the 
legislation was to be successful. Hoke Smith in introducing 
the bill to the Senate carefully pointed out that the measure 
neither enforced warehouses to submit to the supervision of 
the secretary of agriculture, nor to apply for a licence; 
control and initiative was to remain at the local level.
Smith also hoped that the receipts would be used locally and 
not regionally, but he was less emphatic upon this point, 5 7 
Smith introduced the bill to the Senate on 21st August 
1914. Despite being well constructed, sensibly limited in 
its aims, and skillfully worded as to not exclude other 
regions, Smith had to endure considerable ridicule and a 
distinct lack of sympathy during the debates. Few objected 
to the notion that the federal government should undertake 
the grading of agricultural products. Although Henry Lippitt 
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of Rhode Island made a token protest, McCumber pointed out 
to him that Congress had already enacted a law permitting 
the federal inspection and grading of cotton. The main 
argument against the bill concerned cost, a perennial con­
cern. The bill proposed to appropriate 3100,000 to pay the 
salaries of officials but, once the various amendments to 
the bill were accepted, it was estimated that the final cost 
would be over #1,000,000. Lippitt worried that under the 
terms of the bill, the federal government was empowered to 
establish its own warehouses, but under local control. This 
he felt to be a potentially expensive precedent. Smith be­
lieved that his plans could be accomplished relatively cheap­
ly, but acknowledged that Lippitt had a valid point; none­
theless he preferred that this be dealt with by subsequent 
legislation. 58
The position of wheat under the bill proved to be a 
stumbling block; it also relied heavily on export markets in 
Europe and was represented by a cohesive bloc vote in Con­
gress. McCumber proposed an amendment during the early 
stages of the debate that allowed the licensing of wheat, 
oats and barley. Smith accepted this proposal. While this 
did not ensure the support of all Midwesterners, Knute 
Nelson for example continued to regard the bill as unnecess­
ary and designed to help only the South, it did win over the 
majority. The acceptance of McCumber's proposal led to a 
flood of amendments: Harold Lane of Oregon wanted to extend 
the bill to include salmon as this also depended on a 
foreign market. Smith, considering this to be mere sarcasm, 
told Lane to draw up his own bill, but when put to the vote 
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the amendment was carried by 25 votes to 24 votes. Of the 
Southerners present, only Furnifold Simmons voted for it, 59 
All attempts at party discipline had broken down; Lane 
was a Democrat, and the proceedings became increasingly 
ridiculous as various members forced amendments on an in­
creasingly irritated Smith* Gallinger of New Hampshire 
proposed that timber and shoes be included; Borah of Idaho 
wanted to include wool; William Chilton of West Virginia 
presented the case for oil and apples; Miles Poindexter of 
Washington pressed for the inclusion of codfish and beans; 
and James Martine of New Jersey applied for the protection 
of applejack. Of these, Chilton and Martine were Democrats* 
Much to Smith's dismay Southern senators joined in this, 
although their proposals were on the whole less fanciful, 
Duncan Fletcher wanted to include naval stores and tobacco, 
both Southern products with local importance* Swanson 
agreed that it would be wise to extend the bill to include 
tobacco, although the North Carolinian senators remained 
strangely silent on the matter despite being present, 60
Smith disappointed Fletcher and Swanson however by con­
demning their action. Tobacco he told them was stored in an 
entirely different way from cotton and should not be inclu­
ded in this bill; he dismissed naval stores as trivial, and 
best to be ignored. The nature of the debate had wounded 
Smith's pride. He said that he had been pained in more than 
the normal way by the superficial manner in which the Senate 
treated his bill* His colleague from Alabama, Frank White, 
joined him in this, warning the West and New England that 
they would suffer if the South went bankrupt. The senators 
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involved duly apologised to Smith for their frivolous behav­
iour and withdrew their amendments. Chilton's amendment 
concerning oil remained on the table, and was voted into the 
bill by 25 votes to 23 with the South led by Hoke Smith 
voting for the amendment. The bill passed the Senate with­
out a yea or nay vote on 24th August 1914. 61
The Senate debates illustrate how deep feelings were 
against the South, even within the Democratic party, when 
the South attempted to use Congress for its own ends. Al­
though many of the proposed amendments were frivolous, cer­
tain of them were justified by the economic situation, and 
Smith did himself little credit by reacting against them as 
spitefully as he did in his blanket condemnation. The 
British embargo on the oil export trade had hit the United 
States producers in unprecedented fashion; similarly, 
leather and textile factories in New England had been forced 
to lay off workers. Furthermore, despite being designed to 
embarrass Smith, few of the amendments would have damaged 
the working of the act. 62
Southern House managers, however, had sensed that the 
Smith Lever bill did not command widespread congressional 
support outside the South, and that it also offered an oppor­
tunity to enact a far more permanent measure, aiding the 
American farmer long after the cotton crisis had passed away. 
Accordingly, Asbury Lever chose to draw up a substitute bill 
rather than continue with the bill that had already passed 
the Senate. Introduced to the House on 21st December 1914, 
and too late therefore to benefit the Southern planter. 
Lever's substitute was a combination of the original Smith 
Lever/
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Lever bill for warehousing cotton, and the Moss bill for 
warehousing wheat, which had already passed the House but 
not the Senate. The bill as rewritten by Lever’s commit­
tee applied to cotton, grain, and all other staple and non 
perishable farm crops and, unlike the previous bills, the 
owner of any warehouse could apply for a licence to operate 
under its provisions, not just those warehouses engaged in 
interstate commerce. Any citizen could apply for a licence 
to grade cotton or grain under the government's standards, 
but such licence holders had to be employed by the state 
authorities before they could issue warehouse receipts. As 
Moss, the co-sponsor of the bill, said; "It does not in any 
instance commit the Federal Government to Federal inspection 
of agricultural products or in any manner nullify any State 
law on the subject". 63
As with the previous bills, the owners of the produce 
were to be given a receipt, which was uniform with every 
other receipt in the United States. This receipt declared 
the actual grade of the product, and by consulting any re­
liable market quotation the producer could discover its value; 
the receipt could be cashed on any date at a bank. The bank 
could then discount the receipt with the federal treasury 
through the regional banks of the reserve system. Moss hoped 
that the warehouse bill would stabilise average prices by 
increasing prices for the producer, while not advancing them 
for the consumers.
No-one in the House disagreed with the bill's aims or 
practicalities: argument centred on the bill's proposal to 
include even those warehouses engaged in solely intra state 
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commerceo Some Southerners doubted the wisdom of this.
Edwin Yates Webb was anxious to discover if the bill's enact­
ment would mean that a state could no longer have its own 
warehouse system, and had to be assured by Moss that the 
bill would not threaten already existing state warehouses. 
Charles Bartlett of Georgia also criticised the bill. He 
could find no power in the fundamental law of the land to 
justify the bill's turning over to federal authorities the 
right to visit and inspect warehouses and demand that they 
comply with rules laid down by the secretary of agriculture. 
Towner of Iowa agreed with Bartlett, considering that there 
was absolutely nothing in the bill on which Congress's right 
to legislate could be based. None of these criticisms could 
be developed however, Lever having ensured that each speaker 
was limited to only four minutes. 64
Despite these criticisms' lack of depth, they still had 
to be faced by the bill's supporters. Oscar Underwood 
claimed that the bill was entirely constitutional, for no 
warehouse had to come under its scope unless the owner of 
the warehouse desired it. Lenroot found this answer fatuous: 
the fact that the bill was not compulsory did not on its own 
give the federal government jurisdiction. The Wisconsin 
representative criticised Lever for having extended the bill 
to cover all warehouses, for its constitutionality would 
have been impeccable if it had been restricted solely to 
those warehouses engaged in interstate commerce. The only 
possible justification for the bill, Lenroot argued, was 
that under the general welfare clause, and he found it amaz­
ing that such a contention be proposed by a Southerner. 65 
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Such arguments did not worry Lever, knowing as he did 
that the bill's passage was assured. This allowed him the 
luxury of avoiding the constitutional problems of the bill, 
modestly pleading that he was not a lawyer, and was hardly 
competent enough to justify the legality of the bill. Be­
sides, he argued, the truth was that when there was a great 
general good to be accomplished by legislation, he was not so 
squeamish about the constitution. His defence of the measure 
stressed its practical benefits. His complacent defence was 
justified: the bill passed the House by 219 votes to 98, the 
bulk of the opposition coming from Northeastern and a few 
Midwestern Republicans. The differences with the Senate bill 
were speedily resolved in conference and the bill became law. 
Although the original reason for its enactment, the 1914 
cotton crisis, had long since passed, the act proved to be 
both successful and popular with staple producers, and a 
subsequent confirmatory Warehouse Act in 1916 ensured a per­
manent place for the Smith Lever Federal Warehouse Act in the 
agricultural reform programme. 66
The Smith Lever Cotton Futures Act was the third measure 
that dealt with cotton marketing. This act culminated a 
Southern enmity towards the New York Cotton Exchange that had 
been a feature of Southern politics since the 1870s. Demands 
for better highways and improved warehouse facilities were 
recent by comparison, and attempts to regulate the Exchange 
became almost inevitable once the South gained some degree of 
political control.
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The most common complaint against the Exchange con­
cerned its allegedly illegal and speculative nature. South­
erners believed that this robbed the planter of his hard 
earned gains, and this opinion was common amongst the most 
responsible of men, as well as the most demagogic. One pro­
minent businessman writing to his senator described it as
"a mere gambling joint"; John Sharp Williams frequently 
referred to "the Three Card Monte game of the New York
Cotton Exchange", The farmers of Tredell County, North
Carolina, an upland county, implored their senator to do all 
in his power to prohibit gambling in cotton as represented 
by the New York Exchange, The Exchange provided politicians 
with an easy target. It rarely received any informed or 
constructive criticism and its operations remained sinister 
and shrouded in mystery to the Southern cotton producer, 67
Ironically, both the New York and the New Orleans 
Cotton Exchanges had been organised to end speculative gamb­
ling in cotton dealings. When cotton was first exported in 
large quantities, a few merchants conducted and regulated 
the transactions, largely in a speculative manner but solid­
ly based upon informed personal judgment. This functioned 
adequately while the buyer or manufacturer was assured of 
high prices when he sold his product, and as long as all the 
cotton sold was purchased for actual consumption. It is 
true that professional speculators had always featured in 
the cotton market, but as long as the prices remained high 
no-one suffered. The sudden and dramatic price fall in the 
1860s however had led to widespread and damaging speculation, 
and in order to regulate this the New York Cotton Exchange 
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had been organised in 1870 under the laws of New York state. 
The New Orleans exchange followed in 1871, and similar in­
stitutions were established in Liverpool and Bremen. 68
The chief service offered by the Exchange was "hedging", 
a form of insurance against losses caused by short term 
price fluctuations. Few banks would lend money on cotton 
that was not hedged, and virtually the whole cotton crop was 
regulated by the Exchange. There was generally a six months 
gap between the time when a cotton merchant made his con­
tract with a buyer and when the cotton was deliverable. The 
merchant judged his price, usually in July, by assessing 
how much cotton would cost in the coming season and making 
an allowance for his expenses and profit. To protect him­
self against any unforeseen price fluctuations the merchant 
bought a future contract on the exchange. If the actual 
price of cotton rose during the harvest this would cover his 
losses on the contract price with the producer. If the 
actual price of cotton declined, the price of the future 
contract was expected to decline in sympathy. Although this 
meant that the merchant sold his future contract at a loss, 
he paid less on the actual market than he anticipated and 
hopefully the profit made on the actual transaction counter­
balanced the loss on the future transaction. While the theory 
was based upon sound commercial practice, it left room for 
manipulation. Furthermore, as in all commodity markets, 
while the producer was excluded from the transaction, its 
workings had a direct influence on the prices that a pro­
ducer could expect to receive. 69
The system began to work against its own efficiency 
however/
321
however by turning the future contract into a commodity in 
its own right, and this became increasingly divorced from 
cotton growing in the field. Future contracts were legal 
sales, but while the contracts called for the delivery of 
cotton, real cotton was seldom delivered. Overtrading in 
futures as a speculative venture became commonplace, and 
such speculations had an effect on the real price of cotton 
causing it to advance or depress without any sound agricul­
tural reason. Decreases in price obviously vexed the 
planter, and these could be considerable. In a Senate 
speech, Hoke Smith revealed that the New York Cotton Ex­
change sold March cotton at 12.54 cents a pound, and July 
cotton at 11.77 cents a pound in 1913; both were middling 
grade cotton. As there was no new cotton in July, this was 
cotton that had been picked by March. The market had driven
the price down even though it should have been higher by
July because of interest in value,and warehouse and insur­
ance costs. Southerners believed that speculators went out 
of their way to drive prices down and create a bear market, 
and they felt frustrated and helpless against the Exchange. 70 
In fairness it should be noted that the New York Ex­
change did not mean to help the producer; it was largely un­
concerned with the production of cotton. But it did have 
two beneficial effects for the producer in that it kept the 
market open for twelve months and created a wider demand for 
cotton than just the textile manufacturers. Furthermore, by 
the 1910s the Exchange was an essential feature of cotton 
marketing, the disastrous effects of its closure in 1914 
showing that its abolition created far more problems than it 
solved./
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solved. One commentator considered that the most important 
result of the 1914 emergency would be that Southern planters 
would no longer clamour for the abolition of the exchanges. 
Nonetheless, faults existed in the workings of the Exchange, 
and these could be exploited with ease by any congressman 
seeking to gain the approval of his electorate. 71
The abolition of the New York Cotton Exchange had been 
one of the populists' most popular proposals, but their 
criticism of the Exchange had been both vague and uninform­
ed. Criticism in Congress continued along the same hazy 
lines. One commentator judged that the apparent ignorance 
of legislators on the Exchange's functions and the workings 
of futures was "astounding", and suggested the need of edu­
cation. Certainly the protection offered to the Exchange 
by its charter under state law led to far fetched congress­
ional attempts to regulate its workings. One bill proposed 
that cotton speculators should be treated as people running 
a gambling house and dealt with accordingly: the bill failed. 
The problem of justifying congressional action was a major 
one, and promised controversy. 72
The most rational comment on the Exchange's dealings 
came in a 1907 report by Herbert Knox Smith, the commissioner 
of corporations. Smith recommended that the exchange adopt 
government standards and use a commercial difference system 
to establish the relative values of different grades of 
cotton. Under New York state law the Exchange could accept 
lower grades of cotton than elsewhere leading to large quan­
tities of low grade cotton being attracted to New York and 
consequently undercutting the price of low grade cotton on 
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the spot markets. A general lack of uniformity existed on 
the New York Exchange and many believed that this encouraged 
dishonesty. Disunity characterised the whole international 
cotton trade however: the New Yorkers held to standards that 
had been fixed in 1874 in Atlanta; arbitrators decided the 
New Orleans classifications on an annual basis; Atlanta used 
a different set of grades, as did Augusta; and Savannah used 
Liverpool standards, the English port having stood wisely 
aside from the Americans and fixed its own grades. The pro­
ducer saw only confusion and he had little idea of the value 
of his cotton. New York usually maintained 27 different 
grades, although there were 30 at one time, based solely 
upon colour and the amount of dirt in the crop, a classifica­
tion that seemed open to considerable abuse, particularly by 
the spot buyers. 73
Over-classification was common to all the exchanges, 
but the New York Exchange was the most guilty of arbitrarily 
fixing the differences of the relative values of grades. 
Middling formed the basis of trading, there being ten to fif­
teen grades below and above this median grade and the various 
grades being decided by the "differences" above or below 
middling. These differences were fixed two or three times a 
year by a committee of the Exchange known as the revision 
committee, which was not bound by any procedure or definite 
method. Producers claimed that this was unrealistic and 
bore little relation to the actual relative market value of 
cotton; they contended that the price of cotton should be 
related to demand, and that middling did not represent an 
accurate basis as different mills required different 
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qualities of cotton. The producers also argued that the 
weather heavily influenced the supply of different grades 
and that during certain seasons there existed a greater 
supply of high grades than low grades. The New Orleans 
Exchange provided standards for its fixed differences but 
planters felt that the New Yorkers preferred their way be­
cause it allowed greater profits. 74
Cotton growers accepted that prices should be partly 
fixed outside the South, but they demanded that a code of 
conduct should be instituted. The Mississippi Cotton Assoc­
iation listed its demands in .a document that it circulated 
to all Southern congressmen. They favoured the government 
supervision of cotton exchanges in the hope that this would 
lessen speculative manipulation. They protested against the 
way that the New York Exchange dealt with spot buyers: the 
New York Exchange should certificate cotton in such a way 
that the grade of a bale should be known by the buyer and 
that any portion of a contract could be re-tendered on the 
original classification without any further certification. 
The Association also added a wish that legislation should be 
enacted to protect the seller and buyer alike against purely 
speculative interests, although the proposal was vague on 
the form this legislation should take. The smaller Memphis 
Exchange agreed with all these suggestions, adding that this 
was a matter for the federal government that should no 
longer be left to the state authorities. 75
While Southern congressmen agreed with this, the pro­
blem of how this should be accomplished and enforced re­
mained. As John Sharp Williams noted in his reply to the 
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Mississippi Cotton Association,the federal authorities could 
not act against an exchange, or a gambling house, that being 
a police regulation coming under the jurisdiction of the 
state. The Democratic caucus in the Senate had attempted to 
regulate the Exchange through Congress's taxation powers by 
way of the Clarke amendment, a "rider" attached to the Under­
wood Tariff. This proposed that a tax of one tenth of one 
cent per pound be levied on all cotton traded in for future 
delivery, which would be returned to the taxpayer when the 
cotton was delivered. Not all Southern senators considered 
that this was adequate. Ellison Smith criticised the amend­
ment for being too lenient: it would tax all contracts, not 
just the dishonest ones. Clarke, the junior senator from 
Arkansas, accepted this but hoped that the tax would raise 
revenue that could later be returned to the cotton producers. 
If Smith's plan to tax only the dishonest was adopted, Clarke 
argued, no revenue would be available if the system operated 
successfully. The amendment passed the Senate, but the House 
conferees refused to accept it, arguing that it would not 
halt speculation but would merely shift transactions from New 
York to Liverpool or Bremen. The House conferees proposed 
their own similar amendment, which had a lower tax rate, but 
this did not command widespread support. Williams described 
it as having no teeth, and he preferred to have nothing to 
what the House proposed. 76
The New York Exchange had hitherto presented a united 
face against their critics, but recognising the inevitable 
they set to putting their own house in order. In November 
1913, the board of the exchange decided to revise their fixed 
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differences monthly and adopt a standard procedure. The 
board also indicated its willingness to adopt government 
grades if the cotton producers and textile manufacturers so 
desired it. By making these concessions the board had 
cleverly stolen their critics' thunder; they had done every­
thing that could be reasonably expected of them, without 
seriously damaging the workings of the Exchange, 77
Despite the Exchange's turn-about, a uniform system of 
government grades had to be enacted, and Southern wishes for 
vengeance upon the middleman still had to be satisfied. 
Accordingly, a bill was introduced to the Senate on 19th 
March 1916 by Ellison Smith with the intention of regular­
ising exchange procedures, and punishing those who did not 
comply. As a similar bill to regulate dealings in wheat 
futures introduced by McCumber was before the Senate at the 
same time, Southern leaders called for cooperation between 
the two agrarian regions. 78
Smith's bill received wide support: both the National 
Association of Cotton Manufacturers and the American Cotton 
Manufacturers Association endorsed its aims. Smith stood 
for the cotton producers. Born on a large plantation near 
Lynchburg, South Carolina, Smith represented that part of 
South Carolina that still perceived itself as aristocratic. 
Renowned for dragging cotton into all his speeches and 
elected to the Senate in 1908 after 14 years in the South 
Carolina House of Representatives, Smith remained in the 
upper chamber for 36 years, becoming one of the strongest 
opponents of the New Deal. 79
The bill followed the recommendations of the commiss­
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ioner of corporations very closely. It proposed that the 
secretary of agriculture should establish nine grades of 
cotton: four above, and four below middling. All the Ameri­
can exchanges were to adopt these, and although the proposed 
grades did not conform to those used by Liverpool or Bremen, 
it was felt that they best suited American conditions. To 
make the Exchange more responsive to the real price of 
cotton, the fixed difference system was to be abolished, and 
exchanges were required to take almost daily account of spot 
market quotations. Manufacturers had lobbied to ensure that 
the Exchange took account of spinning values, but Smith be­
lieved this to be impractical. Finally, the bill sought to 
exclude inferior cotton from the government grades, this 
being a direct blow on the New York practice of storing
large quantities of low grade cotton, 80
None of these proposals were controversial; they were 
all accepted by the Senate. The only amendment to the bill 
was proposed by Hoke Smith, and that separated the standard­
isation of upland and gulf cotton, a minor change that the 
Senate accepted without dissent. The bill’s attempt to 
standardise and regulate an agricultural product was not 
novel. As early as 1897 the federal government had regula­
ted commodity dealings by passing the Tea Act; the Pure Food 
and Drug Act, 1906, was of a similar nature. Even as the
Cotton Futures bill was debated attempts were being made to
regulate the grain exchanges and the dry: food trade. 
Furthermore, European governments were increasingly acting 
as arbiters in commercial disputes, it was not just an 
American phenomenon. What made the Cotton Futures bill 
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different was its proposed method of coercion, for in addi­
tion to a heavy tax, the bill intended to deny the use of 
the mails, telegraph and telephone to those who failed to 
comply with its regulations, 81
In addition to a prohibitive tax of two cents per pound 
of undelivered cotton, the bill proposed that anyone sending 
or receiving any letters, paper, publication, or package 
through the mail contrary to the provisions of the act would 
be guilty of a misdemeanour and liable to be punished by a 
#5,000 fine or a year in jail. The tax invoked a fairly 
recent but established constitutional doctrine. By McCray v 
United States, the oleomargarine case, the Court had upheld 
the constitutionality of an act where the federal govern­
ment's right to levy taxes was invoked not for the purposes 
of revenue, but to ensure the efficient performance of 
legislation. States could do little to challenge Congress's 
right to tax, even if it was directed against production 
sale or transportation of articles wholly within a state, 82 
The denial of the use of the mail, no matter how 
indirectly, was far more controversial, although nobody 
denied Congress's ultimate right to use this sanction. The 
New York Commercial spoke for many in the financial commun­
ity when it praised the intentions of the Cotton Futures 
bill, but objected to its use of the post office as the 
department of justice. The use of this sanction had been 
rare in the nineteenth century, although the South in 1836 
had unsuccessfully attempted to deny abolitionist litera­
ture the use of the mail. Congress had begun to invoke 
this power in the 1900s and many of the bills prepared by 
Samuel/
329
Samuel Untermyer, the legal counsel to the "Money Trust" 
committee of the House, had exploited Congress's power to 
establish post offices and post roads. The only bill that 
Congress passed and the Court upheld however was the news­
paper publicity law, which required that all newspapers and 
periodicals should print their circulations and the names 
of their owners and publishers. The Court upheld this act 
by Lewis Publishing Company v Morgan, although it qualified 
its decision by declaring that it was heavily influenced by 
the privilege of lower mail rates enjoyed by newspapers. 83 
Despite the vagueness of this precedent, Smith was 
adamant that his bill was proper. Ignoring the ruling in 
the newspaper case he based his argument upon Champion v 
Ames, which forbade the use of the mail to carry out a 
lottery scheme. This certainly was a better developed pre­
cedent, the mail having been denied to explosives and 
obscene literature as well as lottery tickets by 1914, but 
these arguments did not quite correlate with the circum­
stances of cotton future trading. Smith's argument with 
regard to cotton futures was that the offence was committed 
either at the moment the future contract was drawn up, or 
else when the cotton was not delivered. The logic behind 
the lottery case was that while it was not an offence to 
publish a lottery ticket, it was an offence to sell it; as 
the crime was committed while the lottery ticket was in the 
mail Congress could act. There is little doubting Congress's 
right to deny the use of the mail to an illegal organisa­
tion, or to ensure the efficient working of a law, but it is 
strange that Smith used this rather roundabout argument to 
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justify the legislation, 84
This same lack of precision characterised Smith's draft­
ing and handling of the bill. Republicans however did not 
exploit this. There was a considerable consensus in favour 
of the measure in Congress and the mail clause was never 
fully debated. This is to be regretted for although Its 
efficiency as a sanction can be questioned, certainly in 
comparison to the proposed tax, it raised important issues 
regarding the extent of congressional power. The Midwester­
ners sat silent throughout the debate, doubtless in the hope 
that the South would support the regulation of grain ex­
changes, and the New York senators also remained taciturn, 
curiously so given the insults rained down upon one of their 
state's institutions, 85
Gallinger however was concerned about the wording of 
the mail clause: if people who sent or received mail relat­
ing to undelivered cotton were to be prosecuted, how would 
congressmen who received letters on the subject be exempt? 
The example given was frivolous but it did raise an import­
ant point: how could laws be drafted against anyone receiv­
ing mail? Smith attempted to reassure Gallinger that this 
would not happen in practice but Gallinger rightly remained 
unconvinced. Smith said that the bill was not intended to 
act against individuals, but against members of a corpora­
tion and that it was quite proper for Congress to act 
against the members of a criminal combination or one that 
it saw fit to make a criminal combination, 76
This answer did not please Sutherland of Utah who 
pointed out that the bill would deny the use of the mail for 
any/
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any publications, even the reception of newspapers, to 
people found guilty. Smith conceded this, but replied that 
Sutherland was taking too legalistic a view. Yet the anom­
aly existed and Smith attempted to remedy it by introducing 
a hastily drawn up substitute that restricted the measure 
to members of joint stock companies, societies, associa­
tions, or corporations. Unfortunately his command of Senate 
procedure did not match his knowledge of cotton growing, 
for he introduced the substitute before the amendments 
already on the table had been heard, and the substitute was 
not accepted by the president pro tempore. Fortunately for 
Smith, one of these amendments solved his problem; this had 
been tabled by McCumber who obviously wished the cotton 
futures bill to be as strong as possible thus aiding the 
wheat futures bill, McCumber*s amendment cleared up the 
bill's vagueness on where the line should be drawn regard­
ing denial of the mail but certain senators, notably Thomas 
Reed of Missouri, were concerned that the bill's important 
aims would be hindered because of this provision, 87
Despite such qualms the bill passed the Senate on 27th 
March 1914 without a roll call vote and after Smith had 
successfully moved an amendment that struck out the words 
"or receive" from the mail clause. The hurried discussion 
of the bill had worked against its speedy passage however, 
for after it passed the Senate, Kenyon of Ohio realised 
that a minor clause concerning definition of the exchanges 
could be considered to legalise cotton pools and thus the 
bill would be voided by the Supreme Court, This foolish 
error meant that the bill had to be recalled from the 
House/
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House committee on agriculture and amended before it finally 
reached the House floor. Debate in the House, efficiently 
conducted by Asbury Lever, occupied but a half day. Lever 
accepted a few minor amendments to the bill, which the Sen­
ate conferees agreed to and accepted in conference. 88
This did not complete the legislative history of the 
bill, for producers soon discovered that one section of the 
act hindered rather than helped them. Section eleven for­
bade Americans from trading in foreign cotton exchanges that 
had not adopted the United States standards of classifica­
tion, This rather arrogant provision had been intended to 
foil American speculators transferring their activities from 
the New York Exchange to the European exchanges, but the 
effect was to give European brokers a monopoly of European 
business, and because the American merchants were unable to 
sell their cotton in Liverpool, they hedged in the United 
States causing home prices to drop by obstructing exports. 
Cotton producers believed that spot buyers could pay higher 
prices if they could hedge their purchases on the European 
markets, 89
In many ways such demands went against the spirit of 
the act. The intention of the act's framers had been to 
regulate and standardise the American system and bring the 
New York Cotton Exchange to heel, they had not intended 
that the American producers should have a better idea of 
United States prices, and then choose the European exchanges 
Nonetheless, Asbury Lever reintroduced the act in 1916 with 
the offending clause struck out and it passed both chambers 
with ease. Apart from section eleven, the cotton producers 
strongly/
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strongly approved of the workings of the act
Together, the Federal Highways Act, the Federal Ware­
house Acts, and the Federal Cotton Futures Act, ensured the 
involvement of the federal government in every stage of 
cotton marketing, from when the cotton left the plantation, 
to when it reached the exchanges and the consumer. Although 
the means to this end differed in how they were conceived 
and enacted, collectively they represented a considerable 
achievement on the part of the Southern congressmen. For, 
despite their failure during the 1914 cotton crisis and the 
sometimes haphazard and casual way in which they had hand­
led debate, they had aided the Southern cotton producer in a 
tangible way, and had helped to improve the future prospects 
of American agriculture.
Furthermore, although there were notable lapses, the 
political achievement was impressive. Often acting in the 
face of concerted and determined opposition, the Southern 
congressional leaders had ensured that the measures were 
passed with the minimum necessary amendment. They had main­
tained their discipline, and in so doing had greatly eased 
the task of the bills' sponsors, and the Democratic floor 
managers. The constitutional implications of each bill were 
also important, for each bill developed the federal govern­
ment's right to intervene in new areas of economic life, and 
often involved original methods. In this sense, all of the 
marketing reforms were radical, and as each was conceived 
within the framework of constructionalist constitutional 
thought/
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thought this suggests that states rights could be both flex­
ible and relevant to social and economic reality. Certainly 
the reserved powers of the state were in no way directly 
threatened by this increased federal activity.
The eventual passage of the marketing legislation com­
pleted the agricultural reforms; only the Smith Hughes Voca­
tional Education bill remained to be passed, and, as already 
recounted, the delay in its passage was due not to contro­
versy, but because Hoke Smith wished to be courteous. The 
complete reform programme, as promised by the Democrats in 
their 1912 platform had been passed, and the federal licens­
ing of warehouses had been added to the original proposals. 
Yet despite the impressive flights of constitutional 
rhetoric, and manipulation of congressional strings, the 
legislation still had to prove itself. All the Southern 
congressmen's efforts would count as nought unless the re­
forms proved to be of benefit to Southern agriculture, and 
satisfied their constituents.
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tactic, and was not gambling.
Ibid., 5535.
86 Ibid., 5523.
87 Ibid., 5527-5529.
88 Ibid., 5592, 5604.
89 Letters complaining about section eleven include:
Memphis Cotton Exchange to J.T. Robinson, 10th January 1916, 
U.S.S.C.A.F. 64th Congress;
Little Rock Board of Commerce to J.T. Robinson, 10th January 
1916, U.S.S.C.A.F. 64th Congress;
Laser Goldman Cotton Company to J.T. Robinson, 15th January 
1916, U.S.S.C.A.F, 64th Congress;
Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union, Fort Worth, to 
all Texas Congressmen, 15th February 1916, U.S.S.C.A.F.
64th Congress;
Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union, Louisiana, to 
A.J. Gronna, 11th March 1-916, U.S.S.C.A.F. 64th Congress.
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CONCLUSION
Thomas Jefferson's detractors severely criticised the 
Virginian for having led his party as an absolute monarch 
while claiming to represent the true wishes of the people. 
Seeking to defend his biographical study from this charge,
John Sharp Williams declared that America had never suffered 
from too much political leadership, rather the reverse was 
the case. It was true, Williams wrote, that there had been 
a surfeit of unofficial, unelected, and irresponsible leader­
ship in America, but too few had led by convincing others 
that they were correct by appeals to the popular heart and 
mind: such men had no followers except volunteers. Williams 
realised the importance of leadership in government. By 
their roles in the passage of the agricultural reforms, 
Williams and his Southern congressional colleagues demonstra­
ted the necessary standards of political leadership to enact 
popular reform, add to the functions and duties of government, 
and improve the quality of rural life, while remaining true 
to their electorate and electoral promises. 1
Their efforts ensured that Congress passed with minimal 
amendment the most comprehensive plan yet conceived to aid 
the American farmer. The achievement was impressive: federal 
funds were available for agricultural extension work, voca­
tional education and highway improvement; the fiscal 
structure existed for easily obtainable long and short term 
credit; federal authorities helped to standardise cotton 
grades through warehouse regulation; and the New York Cotton 
Exchange, the bane of the Southern planter, had been humbled. 
The/
349
The success of the reforms pleased the bureaucrats as well as 
the politicians. While David Houston regretted that no pro­
vision existed for improving rural health and sanitation, his 
disappointment was slight. His department was a major bene­
ficiary. Its budget and duties had increased, the secretary 
of agriculture's voice carried more weight in the Cabinet, 
and it seemed as if the dream of an efficient and profitable 
American agricultural system could be realised. 2
Although Congress's interest in agriculture did not 
cease with the signing of the last reform act, congressmen 
continuing to introduce legislation and modify existing 
statutes, the reform programme determined the course of 
American agriculture until the New Deal. The American declar­
ation of war in 1917 threw great pressure upon agriculture, 
creating great hardship initially, but temporary financial 
legislation ensured that American farmers profited from their 
war time dealings. Cotton prices, for example, rose to 41 
cents per pound in 1919, although Southern congressmen had to 
resist a government attempt to control cotton prices by 
placing cotton on an embargo list, claiming that the staple 
was a war commodity and used in munitions manufacture. The 
return of Republican agricultural policies in 1921 meant that 
the new administration trusted in a high protective tariff, 
doing little to promote specific agricultural reforms. The 
Republicans, however, made no attempt to dismantle the 
Democratic legislation, and the Southern principle of extend­
ing the duties of central government while insisting upon 
local autonomy remained intact, and would influence agricul­
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tural policies in the 1930s.
Historians have differed in their opinions of the agri­
cultural reforms’ effectiveness and merits. James Shideler 
considered that the legislation met most of the farmers' 
demands, helping them to overcome their disadvantages in 
industrial America. While conceding that the New Freedom 
legislators did not cure any basic problem, Shideler nonethe­
less maintained that the programme's strengths were shaken by 
the economic dislocations of the war. Francis van Gigth's 
view is more caustic, holding that as the reforms were con­
ceived in an archaic but lingering faith in the free market's 
ability to effect improvement, they were doomed to failure.
The economic changes were cosmetic, bolstered by egalitarian 
rhetoric. Van Gigth further asserted that by contributing to 
over-production, the legislation was dangerous: it was a 
direct cause of the agricultural catastrophe of the 1930s. 4
This difference of opinion highlights an important 
dichotomy between the long and short term effects of the 
legislation, for the most important truism of the reforms is 
that they were unable to avert or alleviate the Dust Bowl, 
the collapse of cotton in the marginal lands of the South, or 
the massive out migration of Southern whites and blacks. It 
would require a far greater degree of federal involvement to 
solve these problems than the Southern Democrats of 1913 
could either contemplate or condone. Yet, it is unrealistic 
and unreasonable to condemn the efforts, of these men solely 
because they were unable to determine the events of almost a 
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quarter of a century later. Few, if any, congressmen felt 
that they could adopt such a long term view. Immediate pro­
blems demanded solutions, and these had priority in the poli­
tician’s mind. John Sharp Williams spoke for many when, 
during the tariff debates, he warned that it was unwise for 
Congress to project its legislation too far into the future. 
Even on that most partisan of issues, the tariff, Williams 
retained a pragmatic approach, saying that he was unable to 
legislate for the 1920s. The God’s truth, he said, was that 
neither free trade nor protectionalism would increase wages 
or benefit society; the next truth was that either may; and 
the next truth was that either may not, all depending upon 
circumstance. Therefore, while it is important not to lose 
sight of the reforms’ long term effects upon agricultural 
developments, it is more worthwhile to consider short term 
workings, for that is how its congressional proponents con­
ceived the reforms. 5
The varying effects of the reforms are illustrated by the 
history of the two education statutes. Hoke Smith took great 
pride in the workings of these reforms. Speaking in 1924, he 
claimed that although there had been no agricultural training 
twenty five years before, regular agricultural courses now 
existed in all Georgia’s schools : boys were taught how to grow 
cotton and raise stock; girls learnt the principles of home 
making; and both went out into the world prepared to take 
their places as well informed men and women. Despite these 
successes, Smith’s most ambitious educational reform had come 
to nought. Seeking to build upon his earlier achievements, 
Smith had introduced the Smith Towner bill in 1919, proposing 
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that a federal department of education be established, and 
that federal funds be appropriated, on a matching funds 
basis, for all schools whether vocational or not. Although 
Smith secured a favourable recommendation from his committee, 
the bill failed due to mounting opposition and a completely 
lukewarm response from the administration. The Smith Sears 
Act, which provided funds for the vocational education of 
disabled soldiers, did build upon earlier achievements, but 
this was an administration bill from conception to birth 
providing Smith with little personal glory. 6
The Smith Lever Act proved to be a genuine success, 
achieving most of its proponents' aims, and contributing to 
the improvement of rural life. Southerners benefited further 
by the 1914 Agricultural Appropriation Act, which appropria­
ted #570,000 to substitute the money provided by the General 
Education Board in the South, The act helped to regulate an 
already existing but chaotic system. Previously, extension 
work had been the responsibility of the United States depart­
ment of agriculture, the state departments of agriculture, 
the agricultural colleges, and the county farm bureaus. The 
divisions between these agencies had been indistinct, and 
the new act clarified responsibility. Furthermore, the 
South's insistence that only one college in each state should 
receive funds had the beneficial side effect of ensuring 
administrative unity within each state, 7
Although some bureaucratic wrinkles had to be smoothed 
out, the system was fully operative by 1920. Almost 1300 
agents were employed in the South, an eightfold increase of 
the number employed in 1910. Only 5 3 of these agents were 
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black however, the Southern state authorities having acted 
as Albert Cummins had predicted. The provisions of the act 
encouraged the colleges to extend their work for children 
through establishing farm clubs. By 1923, 62,842 boys and 
45,581 girls were enrolled in these institutions. As well 
as introducing white Southern children to scientific agri­
culture at an early age, these clubs also met a social need 
in rural areas. But it was by extending the reach and func­
tions of the agricultural colleges and by allowing more 
farmers to view new crops and methods of cultivation in 
action that the act performed its greatest service. It is 
true that such demonstrations encouraged farmers to over­
produce, but they also encouraged farmers to produce a wider 
variety of better quality crops and this benefited Southern 
agriculture, as well as securing higher prices. Few direct 
benefits came to the tenant farmer who had little managerial 
control over his farming, but indirect benefits could accrue 
from the landowner's more efficient marketing or adoption of 
better seed. Such gains in cost effectiveness would even­
tually filter down from a wise landowner to his tenants. The 
greatest beneficiary was the landowner, but it is hard to 
conceive of a plan that could help the tenant in a more 
direct fashion. 8
The Smith Hughes Act proved less successful. More 
ambitious than Smith Lever in its scope, it suffered from a 
lack of clarity. Ambiguity existed in the act on those 
institutions that should receive aid. State education boards, 
when left to their own initiative, invariably allocated the 
funds to the land grant colleges and not to the high schools. 
Federal/
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Federal inspectors reported a misuse of the funds allocated 
for teacher training, finding an enormous variation in the 
methods and standards of training. The main beneficiaries 
of the Smith Hughes Act were those already in teaching as the 
establishment of vocational departments in high schools 
widened employment opportunities for agricultural teachers 
and graduates. Many of these departments were created with 
the intention of obtaining funds for general education, and 
not for promoting vocational education. Despite receiving 
more aid for agricultural education relative to any other 
region, not one Southern state ranked among the five states 
with the highest percentage of high school pupils enrolled in 
agricultural training in 1928, although three were in the 
bottom five. Southern high schools continued to be noted for 
their adherence to classical education, 9
The Shackleford Bankhead Highways Act not only proved 
popular and successful but its provisions and aims were soon 
widened. A renewal act was necessary in 1921, and this not 
only guaranteed the previous statute, but extended it by 
inviting each state to prepare a list of not more than seven 
per cent of its roads that, when improved, would facilitate 
the construction of interstate highways. This was a victory 
for the aims of the automobile manufacturers and a departure 
from the principles of the original act, but Southern states 
accepted the invitation. Between 1920 and 1929, Southern 
state legislatures increased their expenditure on highway 
improvement by 15 7 per cent. The mileage of improved roads 
in the South increased from 57,979 miles in 1914, to 121,164 
in 1921, and to 209,880 miles by 1929, 10
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The distribution of these improvements varied within 
each state, this being influenced by local need, geological 
conditions, and state politics. Generally the funds for high­
way improvement were raised at county level either by pay-as- 
you-go schemes, or by bond issue. As the federal resources 
that each state could tap were finite, wealthier counties 
could do better relative to poorer counties, and as the 
wealthiest counties tended to dominate state politics, state 
legislatures did little to ensure that help went to deserving 
areas.
This is borne out by the working of the system in South 
Carolina. Two upstate counties. Union and Greenville, had 
improved 180 and 350 miles of road respectively by 1923.
While Union county had to raise revenue by toll roads, Green­
ville county had successfully floated a #950,000 bond. Black 
Belt counties were more ambitious and active. Kershaw county 
had constructed 70 miles of hard surface roads by 1922, of 
which there were none in the upland counties, and improved a 
further 350 miles by 1923. Over 50 miles of hard surface 
roads had been constructed in Florence county, and Sumter 
county had voted a #2,560,000 bond to cover its improvements. 11
Not all roads within a state were improved or built 
using federal funds, but the general trend in South Carolina 
at least is clear; Black Belt counties did better than 
upstate counties. The benefits could be considerable. The 
United States department of agriculture informed Kershaw 
county residents that a 40 per cent reduction in transport 
costs would result. Those in Sumter county were certain that 
their real estate value would increase not only along the 
roads/
356
roads but all over the county. Politicians also gained, the 
new state highway bureaus offering new sources of patronage 
to reward loyal lieutenants and local business. The well 
organised Crump machine in Tennessee, for example, dominated 
state politics through its manipulation of highway contracts 
and appointments. 12
Despite the political chicanery that accompanied the 
administration of the highways funds, improved roads bene­
fited all in the South. Landowners not only saved on 
transport costs, but could market their crop in a more 
rational manner, and improved roads brought social benefits 
that affected all, as predicted by Branson. Improved roads 
allowed better communications between farmers, and the 
increased use of the automobile introduced a new dimension to 
the life of many. One landowner complained that his tenants 
all asked him for an automobile, and knowing that the tenant 
would leave if one was not provided, the landowner gave in, 
even though he knew that the tenant should have a cow or 
horse. Farm women in particular found an improvement in the 
quality of their lives. Previously male tenants had some 
contact with the outside world, through visits to the store, 
the post office, or the landowner, but in most cases once a 
woman married she remained on the farm. The automobile en­
larged their social circle and horizons. One North Carolin­
ian farm wife considered that life in the 1930s was an 
improvement from the 1910s solely because she had an auto- 
mobile. Roger Stephenson, the North Carolinian boss, was 
less certain of the automobile's advantages, considering a 
black tenant and an automobile to be the most dangerous of 
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all possible combinations. But, he reasoned, if the blacks 
spent their money on automobiles, then they were not spending 
it on land, and upon that rested white supremacyI 13
Despite these improvements, credit continued to provide 
the key to social and economic advance. The ability to raise 
credit remained a crucial element in the ordering of Southern 
rural society, for with this ability most things were possible, 
but without it there existed little hope of progress. Despite 
the welcome given to the Federal Reserve Act, cotton produc­
ers continued to snipe at commercial banks. Prior to the 
post war slump the national bank system ran like "a well 
regulated clock" according to John Skelton Williams, the 
comptroller of currency, but a sudden drop in cotton prices, 
from 41 cents per pound to 13 cents per pound by 1921, pro­
voked widespread Southern outrage, one planter being convinced 
that the treasury department had used its powers to punish the 
country for its refusal to join the League of Nations, The 
federal authorities considered this criticism to be unjust. 
Cotton producers, John Skelton Williams wrote, had aggravated 
the situation by obtaining unprecedented prices for cotton 
after the war, using the cheap credit afforded by the new 
system, and then turned around to demand the system’s aboli­
tion. The reserve system had attempted to accommodate 
farmers’ wishes, one amendment proposed by Hoke Smith permit­
ted cotton factors’ paper secured by cotton to be discounted 
at full value instead of 70 per cent value as before, but the 
agricultural community reserved its enthusiasm for the 
Federal Farm Loans Act, 14
As with the Agricultural Extension Act, bureaucratic 
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tardiness delayed the initial implementation of the farm 
loans banks. Although the members of the Federal Farm Loan 
Board had been appointed by August 1916, the first charter 
to a farm loan association was not granted until mid 1917. 
Another year was lost while the Supreme Court upheld the 
act’s constitutionality. Further delay occurred while the 
boundaries of the farm loan districts were decided. Maps 1 
and 2 show these boundaries, and how they differed from those 
of the reserve banks. Hollis's wish that the boundaries of 
each bank should favour the South at the expense of New 
England had been heeded. As the federal government under­
wrote each land bank, this effectively meant that the federal 
authorities undertook a greater commitment to aid long term 
agricultural development in the South relative to other 
regions. While appropriate, the problem in the South being 
greater than elsewhere, the land bank divisions reveal how 
successfully the South's politicians presented their case for 
regional aid, as well as further developing the principle 
that the federal authorities could aid weaker regions at the 
expense of others.
Progress was rapid after the Smith v Kansas City Title 
and Trust Company decision approving the land banks. By 1919, 
3,890 farm loan associations existed in Texas, according to 
the state's department of agriculture. The Federal Land Bank 
of Houston had loaned #33,647,906 by the end of that year, 
and over 11,000 farmers had borrowed money. Initially, few 
tenant farmers used the bank, but the wartime cotton price 
increase caused their aspirations and collateral to rise. 
Although only 10 per cent of the Houston bank's loans were to 
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tenants in August 1918, this rose to 18 per cent by the end 
of the year. The average loan to a tenant was the same as 
to a landowner, around $3,000. 15
Most tenants who borrowed money came not from the more 
productive and socially stable Black Belt counties, but from 
the more marginal lands of North East Texas. The cheaper 
land in these counties attracted 75 per cent of all tenant 
borrowers. As such, the new credit system did not solve the 
tenant problem in Texas. It could be argued strongly that 
the new system acted against efficient land management by 
encouraging the cultivation of such marginal and unproductive 
land. Many would be displaced from these areas by natural 
disaster and government agencies in the 1930s. Nonetheless, 
by allowing families to repurchase farms that had been mort­
gaged in the 1890s and 1900s, the land banks did satisfy 
aspirations. 16
Texan conditions were not representative of the whole 
South but they show that tenants could and did use the new 
banks. The situation differed in the less dynamic Southeast. 
Federal inspectors in South Carolina reported that virtually 
all loans were made to landowners, or else to landowners’ 
sons on their fathers' security allowing them to farm on 
their own. The land banks proved to be as unwilling to 
advance loans to tenants as the county banks, pre-supposing 
that the tenant had secured the local land association’s 
endorsement. The credit merchant remained the main source of 
credit, a survey of 588 share croppers in North Carolina in 
1928 revealing that none borrowed a single dollar from a bank 
or public lending agency. 17 
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Considerable benefits awaited those who could join the 
land associations, especially in the Southeast where higher 
land values provided greater collateral. The average loan 
in Kershaw county, South Carolina, was $3,500, and in the 
nearby Dillon county loans averaged $6,500. Agricultural 
economists in South Carolina praised the new credit regula­
tions, although most admitted that it could only act as a 
brake on the further spread of tenancy. One economist argued 
that this was all that could be hoped for, the tenant's best 
hopes for the future resting upon the "selfless cooperation 
of fortunate landowners". 18
The new credit system influenced the ordering of South­
ern rural society, creating an almost impenetrable barrier 
policed by the land associations between those who owned land 
and those who did not. This represented an institutionalisa­
tion of the division between landowner and tenant that began 
with the increase of tenantry in the 1890s. While tenants 
could still leap the hurdle between have and have not, it 
became increasingly rare. One commentator noted that a 
tenant had to so saddle himself with debt to become an owner, 
and that he reverted to tenancy when times became hard. A 
survey of 1,830 South Carolina landowners in 1933 revealed 
that each man had been, on average, a landowner for 75 per 
cent of his employed life, a non-farmer for 10 per cent of his 
employed life, and a tenant for only 15 per cent of his 
employed life. Of those with a tenant background, the vast 
majority had been renters, very few having been a share 
cropper or farm manager. The same survey indicated that the 
credit system provided the landowner with considerable 
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security: only four per cent of the renters, and less than 
one per cent of the wage hands, interviewed had ever owned 
lando 19
Despite the drudgery of tenantry, most Southerners 
stayed in rural areas, although more tenants did migrate to 
cities in the 1920s than did in the 1900s» The questioning 
of 4,838 tenant families in North and South Carolina in 1934 
revealed that 83 per cent of the white families and 88 per 
cent of the black families had never worked in urban areas. 
Families grew up perpetuating the culture of plantation life. 
Southern tenants were still highly mobile, eager for the 
chance of a better life, but most moves occurred within the 
same county, and usually to another farm owned by the same 
landlord. 20
New palliatives such as the radio and automobile existed 
as well as the traditional outlets of alcohol and evangelical 
religion, but the burdens of an unattractive life were also 
eased by the degree of fluidity within tenantry. Renters 
were predominantly upward mobile. Of those questioned in the 
1934 survey, 67 per cent had been wage hands, 43 per cent had 
been share croppers, and 19 per cent had been some other type 
of share tenant. As already noted, few renters had been or 
would become landowners, but this was partly due to increased 
age as well as limited credit resources. However, unlike 
landowners, it was possible for a renter to move down the 
social ladder. Of the share croppers interviewed, 63 per 
cent had been wage hands previously, but 43 per cent had 
moved down from some other tenantry. This downward^was 
usually gradual: only 7 per cent of wage hands had been 
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renters, although 41 per cent had been share croppers. 21
Many factors affected social mobility. Increased age 
meant greater farming expertise and an accumulation of 
personal property, thus easing and entrenching any ascent of 
the social ladder. Alternatively, the appearance of the 
boll weevil, or a damaging wind or storm could erradicate 
the patient strivings of many years. Few saw any point in 
saving. Upward movement accelerated in times of prosperity, 
but the trend changed rapidly in times of depression. None­
theless, the general trend is clear: great fluidity existed 
between and within Southern tenant groups; while generally 
upward, it was rarely sufficient to raise the tenant to the 
level of landowner. Where tenants did become owners, as in 
East Texas, it was on cheap, marginal, and unproductive land, 
unwanted by others. The new credit regulations cemented the 
divisions between those who owned land and those who did not.
The agricultural reforms did not realise the hopes of 
their most idealistic advocates. They did not create Eugene 
Branson's’’multiplied host of small farmers who live on and 
cultivate the farms they own”. The main beneficiaries were 
those who owned land, although there were important, albeit 
indirect, benefits for the tenants. The reforms permitted 
greater managerial control of land, thus allowing more 
efficient planning and marketing. Cheaper and better regu­
lated credit facilities allowed the landowner to offer better 
terms to his tenants, in addition to working against the wild 
fluctuations that had bedeviled Southern agriculture. The 
reforms allowed the possibility of change from above: they 
were paternalistic. They perpetuated the dominance of one of 
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the least admirable elites in American history, and they 
allowed that elite to control its domain economically as well 
as politically, but they also represented one small step for­
ward for the majority of the South* s rural population. The 
reforms met most of the expectations that they created: there 
would be no Populist revolt in the 1920s.
The states rights argument had served the South well: 
while remaining true to its tenets of local autonomy, South­
ern congressmen had drafted and supported legislation 
increasing the federal government's commitment to agriculture. 
It can be argued that Southern congressmen simply staged a 
spectacular robbery of the national treasury, but the evidence 
suggests otherwise. Acting in a sophisticated manner, and 
using a consistent argument, soundly based upon constitutional 
precedent and relevant to practical problems. Southern 
congressmen succeeded in aiding both their electorate and 
Southern agriculture. States rights had proved to be an 
effective problem solver.
Opponents used many arguments against the agricultural 
reforms, ranging from where money should be spent to the 
technical details of road construction, but the most important 
arguments concerned the constitution. Such arguments were 
relevant and necessary. As Arthur Bestor has noted, men do 
not evade substantive issues when debating the constitution, 
rather the constitutional argument is superadded to already 
existing controversy, and the presence of a constitutional 
argument is a measure of the intensity of a substantive 
conflict./
364
conflict. Regarding agricultural reform, most congressmen 
agreed upon the necessity of aiding the farmer and the main 
division of opinion arose over the fundamental constitution­
al problem of the limit and nature of federal authority. 22
By contemporary standards, the federal commitment to 
supporting agriculture by 1917 was considerable. In addi­
tion to the reform programme, already existing projects had 
to be maintained. In 1914, for example. Congress appro­
priated 050,000,000 under the Newlands Irrigation Act;
0101.000.000 for the land reclamation service; 010,000,000 
for the valuation of railroads linking agricultural markets; 
0500,000 to cure hog cholera; and 0295,000 for the distribu­
tion of free seed. Many perceived the appropriation of
010.000.000 to construct railroads in Alaska as an indirect 
aid to agriculture. Additionally, the regular annual appro­
priation for the department of agriculture exceeded one 
million dollars. Aside from financing various regulatory 
commissions, the federal authorities undertook no comparable 
commitment to supporting American industry. It is a major 
paradox of American development that this major and innova­
tory extension of federal responsibility should be accom­
plished by a party that supported local autonomy, and in 
favour of a class that Thomas Jefferson considered to be the 
most effective check upon an enlarged government. 23
This is part of the greater paradox whereby Jefferson's 
rhetoric and philosophy has come to embrace causes that the 
wealthy Virginian slaveowner would have abhorred. Indus­
trialists, labour leaders, federal bureaucrats, and Marxist 
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historians have all adopted the sayings of a man whose prime 
concern was for a patrician rural society and a minimum of 
government. Jefferson, however, was never blinkered to the 
possibility or necessity of constitutional change. His 
philosophy reasoned that as laws and institutions went hand 
in hand with the progress of the human mind, so, as new 
truths and discoveries emerged, institutions must also 
advance. Every generation, he believed, had the right to 
choose for itself "the form of government it believes most 
promotive of its own happiness”. The Southern Democrats, 
Thomas Jefferson's most direct political descendants in 1913, 
fully realised that the principles of local autonomy had to 
be accommodated within a pragmatic solution to the problems 
of the rural economy. 24
Although deriving much of its force from an emotional 
interpretation of the Confederacy and Reconstruction, the 
Southern states rights argument was not hopelessly lost in 
a mid nineteenth century view of America. Its interpretation 
of federal government could respond to changing economic and 
social conditions, while remaining conservative at heart.
Its cornerstone of local autonomy was relevant to early 
twentieth century Southern society, economics and geography, 
as well as tradition. As Robert Wiebe noted, America in the 
late nineteenth century was a society of island communities, 
with only weak communications between these islands. Not 
only did local autonomy appeal to an elite wanting to 
control its own community, it often was the only approach to 
ordering politics and society. Thus, while the matching 
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funds legislation of the agricultural reforms implied a new 
federal state relationship, with consequences for subsequent 
reforms, it also had its roots in the social and economic 
reality of 1913. The Southern Democrats in 1913 found by 
matching funds legislation one solution to the problem that 
Jefferson had mused upon at Monticello, namely, how could 
the gentry rule in its own interest, improving the lot of 
all in society, while preserving local autonomy? 25
The historian can find many examples where the states 
rights argument worked against the South's best long term 
interests. No-one can argue with conviction that the short 
term economic benefits of a servile black labour force, token 
workmen's compensation laws, or poorly protected women and 
child employees adequately offset the long term social dis­
advantages of racial bitterness, vicious labour disputes, or 
stunted and poorly educated children. Rarely have the short 
term gains of Southern landowners or industrialists benefit­
ed all in Southern society. Yet Southern elites were not 
blind to change: planters saw their chance in industry, and 
businessmen realised the attractiveness of land as an invest­
ment and a passport to social success; neither w.d.5 hidebound 
by pre-conceived notions. They adopted pragmatic solutions 
to their problems, and while states rights continued to 
provide acceptable solutions to legal and constitutional 
problems, it was retained. They did not perceive the struct­
ural problems that historians have identified as being pro­
tected by the states rights arguments as being serious pro­
blems, being content with a cheap and unprotected labour 
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force and considering a segregated and deprived black popula­
tion to be consistent with the natural ordering of mankind.
It would be a mistake to label the states rights 
doctrine archaic and irrelevant to modern industrial society 
on the sole ground that it hindered reforms that liberal 
historians have traditionally held dear. It lay at the heart 
of Southern constitutional thought and, through this, it 
influenced the development of American government. It 
deserves more serious attention than it has been accorded by 
historians. The agricultural reform programme demonstrates 
how the doctrine could foe applied in a sustained and sophis­
ticated manner that was constitutionally proper and economi­
cally relevant. States rights could extend the interests of 
the Southern elites as well as protect them. Their use of 
the doctrine throughout the twentieth century suggests that 
they have continued to find it useful.
The development of mass interstate communications and a 
completely integrated national economy meant that the states 
rights argument became increasingly defensive. While South­
ern politicians welcomed the initial measures of the New Deal, 
they formed the main opposition to measures that sought to 
extend federal power. Southern legislators opposed the 
Works Progress Administration, the Wagner Act, the Pair 
Labor Standards Act, the Social SecMv-li^ y Act and the Farm 
Tenants and Housing Acts, claiming that they were unconstitu­
tional. Similar arguments were used to justify opposition to 
Tv^ man's Pair Employment Practices Commission. Although the 
racial aspects of states rights were defeated by the Brown v 
Board of Education of Topeka in 1954, the economic relevance 
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of the doctrine continues. Many Southern states still have 
right to work laws, designed to prohibit minimum wage and 
closed shop legislation, that are defended by similar argu­
ments to those used in 1913. Similarly, the non ratifica­
tion of the Equal Rights Amendment by many Southern states 
was based upon the belief that it unduly encroached upon the 
reserved rights of the state. 26
The South's adherence to the doctrine of state 
sovereignty remained long after defeat in the Civil War. The 
view that central government is an evil against which the 
people should be protected, as propounded by Thomas Jefferson, 
has survived, despite existing amongst the almost constant 
state of movement that has been American society for the past 
two hundred years. Modifications and accommodations have 
occurred, but its basic tenet of local autonomy remains un­
altered. Generally, this means the state, although lower 
levels of government are possible. Whatever level is preferred 
it must constitute an adequate bulwark against any possible 
incursions by federal authority, while permitting or even 
encouraging advance within the local community. This latter 
quality has been the most important for the long term survival 
of the doctrine, for without a pertinence to economic problems 
and a proven ability to provide acceptable solutions to these 
problems, the Southern elite would have discarded state 
sovereignty soon after Appomatox.
The agricultural reforms of the Wilson period demon­
strate one way by which the states rights argument could be 
used aggressively by Southern congressmen to promote the 
economic and social interests of the Southern elite. The 
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legislation committed the federal government to supporting 
agriculture, as only the federal authorities had sufficient 
resources to tackle the problem, while ensuring that the 
local political establishment decided who benefited. It 
is ironical that this should lead to a vastly increased 
federal authority during the New Deal, but this was unin­
tended and unforeseen by the men of 1913. Their constitu­
tional and political solution to Southern agricultural 
difficulties related to conditions in 1913, and limited 
though the solution may appear to subsequent generations, it 
remains a landmark in the development of agricultural reform 
and constitutional thought.
The intellectual accomplishment of justifying federal 
action while retaining local autonomy was remarkable, but 
the political achievement of enacting such varied legislation 
over a prolonged period is even more impressive. Southern 
congressional leaders not only ensured that the bills passed, 
but that vital details remained unaltered. In doing so they 
revealed standards of leadership and political skill that 
command respect and admiration.
This was congressional legislation: despite defections 
the Democratic party showed that an American political party 
could enact a controversial programme without presidential 
initiative or pressure. Woodrow Wilson's name has not been 
prominent in this study for, with the exception of the Federal 
Farm Loans Act, his support, although desirable, was not 
crucial. This is not to underestimate Wilson's role in 
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transforming the Presidency into a vigorous and effective 
branch of government. By his active concern for the minutiae 
of legislation and Capitol Hill politics, Wilson contributed 
more of lasting value to the office of President than any 
man^^two.«,n\^t5«?uniWhile this should be borne in mind, it 
should not obscure the part played by Congress in formulating 
policy and initiating legislation. As the example of the 
Federal Farm Loans Act demonstrates, the influence of 
Congress could be such that it forced the President to act 
against his own wishes. This lack of a prompting and con­
trolling executive owes more to the nineteenth century than 
the twentieth century model of government.
The Southern Democrats provided the base of this success. 
Not numerous enough on its own to enact legislation, the 
Southern bloc vote nonetheless offered party managers the 
most consistent and cohesive grouping in Congress: once 
Southern support was secured, it was relatively easy to 
attract sufficient Northern Democrats or Midwestern Republi­
cans to form a majority. Only when Southern demands became 
outrageous, as they did during the 1914 cotton crisis, could 
non-Southerners find enough common ground to unite and defeat 
the South. This bloc vote required careful and sympathetic 
management: party managers had to ensure that all members 
were present when crucial or unexpected votes were called. 
This could be an arduous task, given absences due to illness, 
congressional business, or business commitments; the usual 
pairing arrangements eased this, but party managers had to 
make certain that these were observed. Generally, the 
Democratic managers performed their tasks skillfully, and 
relatively/
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relatively few amendments were successful. This owed much 
to Wilson's ideas of how a governing party should conduct 
itself, but was also the product of the Southern Democrats' 
years of political and legislative experience.
The nature of the agricultural reforms greatly eased 
the Democrats' task; very few congressmen opposed federal 
aid to agriculture in the manner that they opposed the 
Underwood tariff or the Clayton Anti-Trust Act. As Senator 
Works remarked, it was unpopular and unpleasant to oppose any 
legislation that purported to be in the farmer's interests. 
Yet, opposition did exist, particularly on matters of detail, 
and chances to amend the legislation were seized eagerly.
This could be attempted directly, as with the Jones amendment 
to the Smith Lever Agricultural Education bill, or indirectly, 
as with the tabling of so many amendments to the Federal 
Highways bill that debate was hindered and prolonged.
Although it was important to control the vote on the chambers' 
floors, in the first instance, great care had to be exercised 
in drawing up legislation in an acceptable form, taking 
account of Congress's intricate procedural rules. The legis­
lative history of a statute involves far more than a recita­
tion of roll call votes. 27
The history of the agricultural reforms reveals that, on 
occasion, a measure was threatened most, not by concerted 
opposition to its economic or constitutional principles, but 
due to avoidable error on the part of its sponsors. One bill 
was referred to the wrong committee; another contained an 
unconstitutional clause. An element of chance always existed 
in enacting legislation, particularly in the Senate where the 
chamber’s
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chamber’s rules allowed petty squabbles to develop that had 
little to do with the matter in hand. This highlights the 
hard work and close attention to detail required of a sponsor
if a bill was to be enacted successfully.
Congress, and individuals within Congress, were crucial 
in the enacting of legislation. Congressional debate was 
conducted between men who knew each other socially as well as 
politically on a very personal level. There were 95 senators 
and 385 representatives in 1912, but they were rarely all 
present at the one time. Legislation that many had cam­
paigned for over many years, and affecting the lives of all 
Americans, could be debated and decided by less than a dozen 
men before the minimum quorum. Fortunately, congressmen 
recognised their responsibilities and sought to understand 
their subjects, but face to face conflicts between two men 
over a vital clause in which personal character and not 
superior ideology or knowledge decided the matter were not 
uncommon. Often, the ability of the congressman to manage
debate and ward off opponents decided whether or not a long
awaited proposal became law. While recent legislative 
histories of the progressive era have concentrated almost 
exclusively upon either the influence of outside interests or 
an analysis of roll call votes, the history of the agricul­
tural reform programme demonstrates that a bill's success was 
not guaranteed once it entered Congress, and that the history 
of bills passed without a roll call vote could be dramatic. 
The success of the agricultural legislation was not secured 
by the lobbying skills of the financier, industrialist, or 
any/
373
any other shadowy interest group, but by the traditional 
skills of the politician.
Southern politicians excelled in their use of these 
skills. Their debating techniques had already been developed 
on the Southern stump and during the years of opposition in 
Congress, as had their knowledge of how Congress operates, 
but their ability to draft and safeguard major legislation 
remained untested in 1913. That they could apply these 
skills to specific measures such as the tariff and the 
Federal Reserve Act has been demonstrated elsewhere. The 
agricultural reforms show that the South could also draft and 
enact a legislative programme over a prolonged period. During 
the first major debate of the Sixty Third Congress, that on 
the tariff, Hoke Smith said that several acts would be intro­
duced to help the farmer: all were enacted by 1917. While 
this degree of planning and party discipline would be credit­
able in any legislature, the achievement is remarkable given 
the traditionally fluid nature of American politics.
The quality of the Southern leadership was also import­
ant. By their control of congressional committees and 
seniority within the Democratic party they not only ensured 
that the desired bills received a speedy recommendation, but 
that their bills had priority in the legislative timetable. 
This latter consideration was particularly important. In 
legislative terms the Sixty Third and Sixty Fourth Congresses 
were amongst the most active in American history. Congress­
ional leaders appeared to take unnecessary care over who was 
to speak and for how long, but this was essential to conduct 
the government's business. This constant pressure of time 
places/
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places the achievement of passing all the reforms in its 
true perspective, and indicates the skills of congressional 
management displayed by the Southern leadership. The tone 
of this leadership deserves comment. In the main it was 
responsible, efficient, and reasonable, although it could 
also display a necessary ruthlessness when considering the 
views of others. Few of the Southern congressmen and none 
of the Southern leaders corresponded to the traditional 
image of the racist, populist, and strident demagogue. And 
while it is true that Southerners cornered the lion's share 
of any appropriation for their own region, they never lost 
sight of the national interest realising that their actions 
would affect all Americans. Experience taught them that 
this was how Congress operated.
Few of the Southerners mentioned in this study remained 
in politics for long after Harding's victory. Those who did, 
such as Carter Glass and Ellison D. Smith, remained influen­
tial in the Democratic Party and national life, but most of 
the men who received their political apprenticeships during 
Reconstruction and Redemption retired from political life. 
Hoke Smith lost his Senate seat unexpectedly to Tom Watson 
in 1920. Returning to Atlanta he attempted to build up a 
legal practice, but this soon declined after a successful 
start, and Smith gave up all thoughts of a political return, 
although he bravely supported the candidature of Alfred E. 
Smith in 1928. He died in 1931 in Atlanta. Asbury Lever 
resigned from the House in 1919 to become a member of the 
Federal Farm Loan Board. Serving there until 1922, he was 
elected president of the First Carolines Joint Stock Land 
Bank/
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Bank in Columbia, only to return to Washington during the New 
Deal as a director of the Farm Credit Association. He died 
in 1940o John Sharp Williams happily resigned his seat in 
1922 to return to his plantation. He had often confided his 
increasing dislike of politics and public life to his friends, 
and although he was mentioned as a possible candidate for the 
Federal Reserve Board, nothing came of this. He remained on 
his plantation, resisting all entreaties to return to politics, 
until his death in 1932. The end of his Mississippi colleague 
James Vardaman was less happy. Defeated in the 1918 primary 
on account of his anti war stance and poor organisation, he 
remained active in politics until his final defeat in the 
1922 primary. After this he felt it necessary to leave 
Mississippi for Alabama, dying there in 1930, prematurely 
aged and senile. 28
The Democratic victory of 1912 had provided these men 
with their first and last opportunity of national leadership. 
It furnished their only chance to enact legislation affecting 
all Americans and influencing Southern economic development. 
Seizing their chance eagerly, they determined the future 
course of American agricultural reform by their forceful and 
effective presence in Congress. They also dictated the 
nature of future federal involvement in the economy. In 
accomplishing this they demonstrated that the traditional 
rhetorical and political skills of the congressman could 
relate to the solution of economic problems, and that South­
ern constitutional thought could promote as well as defend 
the interests of Southern elites.
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